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This dissertation explores several conceptual and methodological features of medical science that 
influence our ability to accurately predict medical effectiveness. Making reliable predictions about 
the effectiveness of medical treatments is crucial to mitigating death and disease and improving 
individual and population health, yet generating such predictions is fraught with difficulties. Each 
chapter deals with a unique challenge to predictions of medical effectiveness.  
In Chapter 1, I describe and analyze the principles underlying three prominent approaches to 
physical disease classification—the etiological, symptom-based, and pathophysiological models—
and suggest a broadly pragmatic approach whereby appropriate classifications depend on the goal in 
question. In line with this, I argue that particular features of the pathophysiological model, such as 
its focus on disease mechanisms, make it most relevant for predicting medical effectiveness. 
Chapter 2 explores the debate between those who argue that statistical evidence is sufficient for 
inferring medical effectiveness and those who argue that we require both statistical and mechanistic 
evidence. I focus on the question of how mechanistic and statistical evidence can be integrated. I 
highlight some of the challenges facing formal techniques, such as Bayesian networks, and use 
Toulmin’s model of argumentation to offer a complementary model of evidence amalgamation, 
which allows for the systematic integration of statistical and mechanistic evidence. 
In Chapter 3, I focus on p-hacking, an application of analytic techniques that may lead to 
exaggerated experimental results. I use philosophical tools from decision theory to illustrate how 
severe the effects of p-hacking can be. While it is typically considered epistemically questionable and 
practically harmful, I appeal to the argument from inductive risk to defend the view that there are 
some contexts in which p-hacking may be warranted.  
Chapter 4 draws attention to a particular set of biases plaguing medical research: Meta-biases.  I 
argue that biases of this type, such as publication bias and sponsorship bias, lead to exaggerated 
clinical trial results. I then offer a framework, the bias dynamics model, that corrects for the influence 
of meta-biases on estimations of medical effectiveness.  
In Chapter 5, I argue against the prominent view that AI models are not explainable by showing 
how four familiar accounts of scientific explanation can be applied to neural networks. The 
confusion about explaining AI models is due to the conflation of ‘explainability’, 
‘understandability’, and ‘interpretability’. To remedy this, I offer a novel account of AI-
interpretability, according to which an interpretation is something one does to an explanation with 
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Making reliable predictions about the effectiveness of medical interventions is essential to numerous 
goals in modern medicine. It plays a key role in diminishing death and disease and is vital to 
improving individual and population health. It is necessary for the development of successful 
healthcare policy and central to fostering public trust in the products, institutions, and practitioners 
of medical science. Yet, therapeutic prediction is fraught with difficulties. In this dissertation, I 
analyze several conceptual and methodological features of medicine that affect our ability to make 
reliable predictions about the effectiveness of medical interventions.  
It is difficult to overstate the importance of understanding the elements involved in predicting 
medical effectiveness. Medicine is huge part of our personal and social lives. We are surrounded by 
guidelines, policies, and treatments aimed at mitigating suffering from disease and preventing 
unnecessary death in safe, cost-effective ways. Billions are invested into research on new therapeutics, 
and, in many cases, individuals commit thousands of dollars a year to health insurance for themselves 
and their families. In the midst of catastrophe, we turn to medicine to help reduce harms. At the 
center of all this is the notion that medicine gets it right, that we can trust what medical practitioners 
say will happen. If they get it wrong, people may die. It is thus not hyperbolic to say that 
understanding the complexities of predicting medical effectiveness is a matter of life or death.  
While there is not enough space in this dissertation to cover all the features of medicine that 
contribute to predicting medical effectiveness, those I do explore fall under three relevant areas in 
medical epistemology. First, is the role of evidence in medical inference. Naturally, medical 
researchers and philosophers of science have emphasized the role of evidence in inferring the capacity 
of treatments to bring about their intended effects. In the realm of medicine, this emphasis on 
evidence has led to one of the most influential movements in modern science: Evidence-based 
medicine (EBM). At its inception, its early advocates deemed it “a new paradigm for medical 
practice” (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group 1992). The aim of EBM is to utilize the best 
evidence for making inferences about medical interventions and diagnostic tests including 
pharmaceuticals, surgical procedures, and various screening programs. In line with this, EBM has 
developed a principled approach to evaluating the quality of various forms of medical evidence. This 
has resulted in the hierarchies of evidence we see today (see, for example, GRADE Working Group 
2013). Proponents of EBM regard meta-analyses (along with systematic reviews) and randomized 
control trials (RCTs) as providing the best evidence for inferences of medical effectiveness. This is 
followed by observational studies like cohort studies and case-control trials. Typically relegated 
toward the bottom of evidence hierarchies are mechanistic evidence and expert opinion.  
Not all medical researchers agree with the central tenets of the EBM movement. Some, 
including Donald Berwick (2005), an early advocate of EBM, believe that the dominance of 
epidemiological methods and statistical data in medicine has resulted in a significant disregard for 
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important types of scientific reasoning and evidence that, they argue, are necessary for the 
development of medical interventions. Often what is needed for such development, this argument 
goes, are small scale studies, lab benchwork, and good observational studies. Many philosophers of 
medicine have adopted a similar approach. Some have argued, in contrast to EBM, that mechanistic 
evidence is integral to making accurate predictions of medical effectiveness (Russo and Williamson 
2007; Clarke et al. 2014; Parkkinen et al. 2018). Others have questioned the place of randomized 
control trials (Worrall 2002; Cartwright 2007) and meta-analyses (Stegenga 2011, Jukola 2015) at 
the top of evidence hierarchies, while some argue that the whole concept of evidence hierarchies is 
flawed (Upshur 2005; Solomon 2011, 2015; Stegenga 2014). Much of the work in this dissertation 
fits into debates about the role of medical evidence.   
The second area I touch on is constituted by a pair of interrelated features relevant to predicting 
medical effectiveness: Questionable research practices and research biases. In recent years, 
questionable research practices, such as hypothesizing after results are known, data fishing, and p-
hacking, have received just scrutiny. Many hold questionable research practices, at the very least, 
partially responsible for the replication crises facing psychology and medicine (Nosek et al. 2012; 
Open Science Collaboration 2015; Munafò et al. 2017; Christian 2017). There are other reasons to 
explore questionable research practices. If such practices are pervasive, then trust in medical science 
will be threatened (Anvari & Lakens 2018; Colquhoun 2017). Furthermore, the epistemic costs of 
questionable research practices may lead to harmful policies (Ioannidis and Trikalinos 2007; 
Simmons et al. 2011; Head et al. 2015;). Likewise, biases in research, such as outcome reporting bias 
and publication bias, have long been a topic of concern for medical researchers and, more recently, 
for philosophers of medicine. Such biases contribute to what some see as a general overestimation of 
medical effectiveness and underestimation of the harms caused by pharmaceuticals (Gøtzsche 2013; 
Stegenga 2018). Many of the arguments I present in this dissertation are influenced by, and extend 
on this previous work on questionable research practices and research biases.  
Finally, a more recent area of concern is the reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) for aiding 
inference and decision making in medical contexts. There is a growing body of evidence showing 
that AI systems perform better than human experts in diagnosis, prognosis, and, importantly, 
making predictions about medical effectiveness (Fleming 2018; Rajpurkar et al. 2017; Tschandl et 
al. 2019). Many of these systems are being deployed in the clinic, across various subdomains of 
medicine. For example, algorithms are being used to generate breast cancer treatment 
recommendations (Somashekhar et al. 2018) and make predictions regarding screening (McKinney 
et al. 2020). Many have argued that these successes are just the beginning, and that AI is set to become 
a staple in the process of medical inference (Wiens and Shenoy 2018). Of course, the implementation 
of AI in medicine is not without its problems. Some scholars have emphasized that the integration 
of AI in clinical decision making and prediction runs the risk of harmful outcomes. A notable 
example of this is the risk of algorithmic biases due to the methods used to train AI models seeping 
into treatment recommendations (Obermeyer et al. 2019). Of course, the question of how AI 
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models generate their predictions is important to those who use them and those who are meant to 
benefit from their use. This is a burgeoning field, and philosophers are well situated to cut through 
the conceptual weeds that obstruct discussions about the use of AI models in medicine. In this 
dissertation, I examine an important conceptual issue in medical AI, the concepts of explainability, 
understandability, and interpretability. While much more can be said about AI in medicine, my 
hope is that the arguments I make here will contribute to a deeper understanding of how algorithms 
can help make better predictions of medical effectiveness.  
Given this wide array of themes, it is reasonable to ask whether this dissertation risks being 
spread too thin on the topic of predicting medical effectiveness. After all, it is common for projects 
of this kind to defend some overarching thesis in medical epistemology. However, by presenting five 
substantive chapters on somewhat distinct topics relevant to predicting medical effectiveness, I am 
able to focus in on more concrete issues that philosophers and medical researchers are concerned 
about. Moreover, I take it that this project, and other work like it, constitutes a logical next step to 
existing insightful monographs in the epistemology of medicine (Howick 2011b; Broadbent 2013; 
Solomon 2015; Stegenga 2018; Valles 2018).  
With this in mind, the arguments presented in this dissertation should be valuable to three sets 
of readers. Since the research is primarily situated in philosophy of science, it is relevant to both 
professional philosophers and students of philosophy alike. The topics I explore are relevant to 
medical research and practice, and so my hope is that physicians and medical scientists, students, and 
organizations will, at the very least, find the work useful. Lastly, I wrote this dissertation with the 
underlying assumption that medicine ought to be practiced in service of the patient, and thus, the 
arguments I offer are pertinent to those who seek to benefit from therapeutic interventions. This 
dissertation is relevant to philosophers, medical practitioners, and patients.  
Medical Effectiveness 
Before outlining the structure of the dissertation, it would be useful to have a definition of its central 
concept: Medical effectiveness. To start, consider a widely accepted key distinction used throughout 
this dissertation, according to which the efficacy of an intervention is its capacity to bring about its 
intended outcome under ideal circumstances, whereas the effectiveness of an intervention is its 
capacity to bring about its intended outcome under normal circumstances (Cochrane 1972). 
Cartwright (2009; 2012) provides helpful clarification of this distinction. In the definition of 
efficacy what is meant “ideal circumstances” is usually an experimental setting. According to EBM, 
the ideal experimental setting is a well-conducted RCT. However, other experimental settings, such 
as those in various forms of observational trials, can provide somewhat ideal circumstances for claims 
of efficacy when RCTs are not viable. Cartwright further clarifies that claims which fall under the 
definition of efficacy are claims of “it works somewhere” (2012: 975). Effectiveness, on the other 
hand, includes claims of “it works generally” and claims that “it will work for us” (ibid.). The former, 
it works generally, is a claim about the general capacity of an intervention to bring about its intended 
effect in varied settings outside of the experimental context—there is no specific target context in 
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mind. The latter, it will work for us, is a claim about the capacity of an intervention to bring about 
its intended effect in a specific target context or population outside of the experimental setting. It is 
these kinds of claims that I associate with medical effectiveness in this dissertation. Thus, medical 
effectiveness is an intervention’s capacity to bring about its intended effect generally or in a target 
context.  
Stegenga makes a further distinction. When it comes to claims about medical effectiveness, he 
argues that we are often concerned with claims that it “works for me” (2018: 45); that is claims about 
whether an intervention will work for a particular patient. Such claims fall under what Fuller and 
Flores (2015) refer to as the “particularization” of clinical results. Claims of this kind are, as Stegenga 
rightfully argues, harder to warrant than it works generally since they rely on justifying not just that 
the intervention works generally, but also that the purported general capacity of the treatment 
applies to the particular patient in question. Following this line of reasoning, claims of it works for 
me are harder to justify than claims of it will work for us, which in turn are more difficult to justify 
than claims of it works generally. In the dissertation, I do not place explicit focus on the singularized 
sense of medical effectiveness, although I take it that claims of the kind it works for me, amount to 
extreme cases of claims that it will work for us ; it is just that the target population in question is a 
population of one.  
It should be noted that claims about medical effectiveness are often articulated quantitatively. 
In RCTs, study participants are randomly allocated into two groups, the experimental group, and 
the control group. Those in the experimental group receive the intervention being tested and those 
in the control group typically receive an inert intervention—a placebo—or, less commonly, no 
intervention. When a placebo is used, participants are usually blinded, meaning they are not 
informed about whether they are receiving the treatment or placebo. The efficacy of the intervention 
is then measured, commonly by researchers who are themselves blinded, by recording and 
comparing the outcomes for participants in each arm of the trial. Researchers quantify the outcomes 
of an intervention using an outcome measure. This is a formal expression of the relationship between 
the measured value of a property in the treatment group of the clinical trial, and the value of that 
property in the control group of the trial. Many different outcome measures are used in medical 
research (see Appendix 2), each of which generates a numerical result known as an effect size. The 
effect size is the measure of the difference that exposure to an intervention makes to a particular 
outcome in the study population of the trial. It is intended to illustrate the strength of purported 
causal relation between the treatment and an outcome in the experimental setting. Thus, the effect 
size in a study population constitutes a quantitative claim about the efficacy of the intervention in 
question. Once calculated, the effect size is typically used to infer the capacity of the intervention in 
question for some target population using a process of extrapolation. 
Medical effectiveness is about more than (quantitative) claims regarding the general capacity of 
an intervention to bring about its intended effect. What, for instance, is meant by “bring about its 
intended effect”? Here, Stegenga (2018) provides a helpful argument. Stegenga argues for a hybrid 
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conception of disease, according to which a disease is a failure of particular physiological mechanisms 
to perform their particular functions at normal efficiency and a disvalued state. Since medical 
interventions target diseases, in order to count as effective, their intended effects must prevent or 
modulate either the physiological disfunction—what Stegenga refers to as “the causal target of 
effectiveness” (2018: 29)—or the disvalued state—what Stegenga refer to as “the normative target of 
effectiveness” (2018: 30) of a particular disease. Integrating Stegenga’s insights into the previous 
characterization of medical effectiveness results in the following definition, which I will use 
throughout the dissertation: 
Medical effectiveness is an intervention’s capacity to prevent or modulate the 
physiological dysfunction or disvalued state of a disease generally or in a target context. 
Dissertation Structure  
As I have mentioned, the topics covered in this dissertation only scratch the surface of the complex 
elements involved in predicting medical effectiveness. While I cannot explore every feature of 
therapeutic prediction here, I have aimed to cover topics of central concern to medical research 
practices. In what follows, I provide an outline of the dissertation.  
Disease classification is imperative for our theoretical understanding of diseases. It plays a 
significant role in the practical and clinical goals of medicine, such as diagnosis, drug development, 
and prediction of therapeutic effectiveness. However, there is disagreement about the best approach 
to classifying diseases. In Chapter 1, “A Pragmatic Approach to Disease Classification”, I describe 
and analyze the principles underlying three prominent approaches to disease classification—the 
etiological approach, the symptom-based approach, and the pathophysiological approach. I then 
suggest a broadly pragmatic approach whereby classifications depend on the goal in question. In line 
with this, I argue that particular features of the pathophysiological model, such as its focus on disease 
mechanisms, make it most relevant for predicting medical effectiveness. 
In discussions about the relationship between evidence and causal inference in medical research, 
two rival views have emerged. The first argues that good statistical evidence from randomized 
control trials or meta-analyses, is necessary and sufficient to warrant causal claims. The second 
suggests that both statistical and mechanistic evidence are necessary. This latter argument is often 
made on the grounds that prediction and extrapolation of medical effectiveness require knowing the 
underlying mechanisms of a purported causal relationship. However, this view raises a question: 
How should mechanistic and statistical evidence be integrated? In Chapter 2, “Integrating 
Mechanistic Evidence for Inferring Medical Effectiveness”, I clarify important aspects of these two 
competing views of medical evidence and offer an informal method for integrating mechanistic 
evidence with statistical evidence for predicting medical effectiveness. I differentiate between two 
senses of evidence integration, mathematical and systematic, and highlight some of the challenges 
facing formal techniques, such as Bayesian networks. I then use Toulmin’s model of argumentation 
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to offer a complementary model of evidence amalgamation, which allows for the systematic 
integration of mechanistic and statistical evidence. 
Analytic choices in clinical studies can affect the reliability of predictions of medical 
effectiveness. P-hacking, the exploitation of statistical techniques such that trial results may be 
exaggerated, constitutes one such set of choices. In Chapter 3, “P-hacking: Its Costs and When It Is 
Warranted”, I provide much needed clarity on the concept of p-hacking and use philosophical tools 
from decision theory to articulate the prevalent view that p-hacking is epistemically and practically 
harmful.1 Using this framework also allows me to illustrate the claims of vocal opponents to p-
hacking and highlight the flaws in their arguments. While p-hacking is typically considered 
epistemically questionable and practically harmful, I appeal to lessons from the argument from 
inductive risk to defend the contrasting view that there are some contexts in which p-hacking may 
be warranted. 
Medical research is fraught with numerous biases which affect our ability to reliably estimate 
medical effectiveness. In Chapter 4, “Curb Your Effectiveness: Correcting for Meta-Biases in 
Therapeutic Prediction”, I argue estimations of medical effectiveness often fail due to a particularly 
pernicious set of biases, which I refer to as meta-biases. Biases of this kind, such as publication bias 
and sponsorship bias, result in systemic overestimations of medical effectiveness and thus affect 
inferences about the effectiveness of treatments. Much research focuses on mitigating and 
preventing meta-biases, but these strategies often fail and when they are successful, their effects take 
time. To tackle these problems, I offer a framework, which I call the bias dynamics model, according 
to which estimates of medical effectiveness are corrected in line with up-to-date evidence on the 
prevalence and effects of meta-biases. 
Artificial neural networks are fast becoming an integral part of healthcare and, importantly, are 
being used to aid in predictions of medical effectiveness. In Chapter 5, “Medical Artificial 
Intelligence: What is Interpretability?”, I argue against the prominent view that machine learning 
models are not explainable by showing how four familiar accounts of scientific explanation can be 
applied to artificial neural networks.2 I suggest that the confusion about explaining AI models stems 
from an equivocation on the notions of explainability, understandability, and interpretability. To 
remedy this, I distinguish between these concepts in the context of AI, and provide a novel account 
of AI-interpretability, according to which an interpretation is something one does to an explanation 
with the explicit aim of producing another, more understandable, explanation. 
My hope is that the arguments in this dissertation provide useful insights on these various 
challenges to predicting the effectiveness of medical interventions. While I do not defend an overall 
thesis, the work is important. There is a great deal at stake. Although it is unlikely that any single 
 
1 Part of this Chapter draws from work published on data-dredging in medical research (Erasmus, Holman, and 
Ioannidis 2020). Thanks are due to my co-authors on that piece, Bennett Holman and John P.A. Ioannidis. 
2 This chapter is based on a published journal article on the interpretability of artificial neural networks (Erasmus, 
Brunet, and Fisher 2020). Thanks are due to my co-authors on that paper, Tyler D.P. Brunet and Eyal Fisher. 
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project will solve all its problems, developing a better understanding of the concerns explored in the 
dissertation, however small, will contribute to improving predictions of medical effectiveness. What 
is more, this project will ideally open new avenues for philosophical exploration in the realm of 
therapeutic prediction. Some of these will be outlined in the dissertation’s conclusion.   
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Chapter 1  
A Pragmatic Approach to Disease 
Classification 
1.1  Introduction 
Nosology is the part of medicine concerned with classifying diseases. One of its main aims is to 
improve communication among researchers, physicians, and health insurers. However, disease 
classification also contributes to numerous other goals in medicine, including therapeutic 
prediction. Given its significance in many areas, it is important to understand and evaluate the 
principles underlying the classification of diseases. In this Chapter, I clarify three prominent 
approaches to nosology and argue for a pragmatic approach to disease classification. In line with this, 
I suggest that we should use pathophysiological classifications in the context of predicting medical 
effectiveness.   
Disease classification is vital to medical research. Its primary role is to inform standardized 
disease coding systems, such as the World Health Organization’s (WHO) International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases (ICD), for use in epidemiological studies and medical reports on world 
health. However, the way in which medical researchers and practitioners interpret and pursue many 
other goals in medicine also depends, at least in part, on disease classification. Such classifications 
influence the formulation of diagnostic criteria and thus play a role in the process of diagnosis. For 
example, classifying osteoporosis as having a bone density that falls 2.5 standard deviations below 
mean levels in young healthy adults of the same sex (Lindsay and Cosman 2015) impacts the 
diagnostic criteria for the disease. Disease classifications can also provide important information 
about risk factors for various diseases. For instance, we might include information about the 
association between inadequate daily calcium intake and low bone density in our classification of 
osteoporosis. These are some practical aspects of disease classification that directly affect patients in 
the clinic. 
There are less direct impacts too. Research practice and resource allocation, for instance, rely on 
classificatory practices. This is illustrated by recent proposals for the reclassification of Alzheimer 
disease (AD). AD is currently classified as a degenerative disease of the nervous system characterized 
by atypical amyloid plaque build-ups in the brain (Sennvik et al. 2000). However, there have been 
calls to reclassify AD as ‘type 3 diabetes’ (de la Monte and Wands 2008; Kandimalla et al. 2017). This 
proposal is based on growing evidence that the cognitive dysfunction associated with AD is caused 
by deficient utilization of glucose by the brain. Following this reasoning, AD is essentially a 
metabolic disease. Its reclassification would necessitate changes in the direction of AD research and 
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in intervention development strategies for the disease. Less emphasis would be placed on searching 
for ways to clear the disease’s trademark amyloid plaque build-ups, and more focus and resources 
would be directed at understanding the metabolic disfunctions newly associated with the disease. 
This example also illustrates how the development of effective medical interventions depends on our 
understanding of individual diseases, which in turn is revealed in disease classifications. Given these 
impacts, it is crucial to ask how individual diseases should be classified.  
In modern medicine, there are, broadly speaking, three prominent approaches to disease 
classification: The etiological approach, the symptom-based approach, and the pathophysiological 
approach. As a brief start, the etiological approach classifies diseases according to causes; the 
symptom-based approach classifies diseases according to symptoms or syndromes; and the 
pathophysiological approach classifies diseases according to underlying mechanisms. My first aim is 
a clarificatory one. I analyze these three approaches to disease classification, outline their distinctive 
principles, and touch on the advantages and disadvantages of each.  
Despite its importance there is relatively little philosophical work on physical disease 
classification. Most scholarly work on nosology is limited to its role in psychiatry and the purported 
flaws of using a symptom-based model of classification for diagnosing and understanding mental 
disorders (Hempel 1965; Bolton 2012; Ghaemi 2012, 2013; Zachar and Kendler 2017). Other 
accounts examine the different models that fall under the etiological approach (Whitbeck 1977; 
Cooper 2002; Broadbent 2009, 2013; Smart 2014). Common to these accounts is the assumption 
that the etiological approach provides the most useful way to classify diseases. For example, when 
questioning psychiatry’s systems of nosology, it is typically argued that an etiological model for 
classifying mental disorders would fare better than the symptom-based approach that has dominated 
the discipline since the publication of the DSM-III in 1980 (American Psychiatric Association 
1980). And in discussions regarding etiological classifications, much emphasis is placed on whether 
diseases are best classified according to the monocausal model of disease or a multifactorial model of 
disease (see Section 1.2), without considering other strategies like a pathophysiological approach.  
The etiological approach is privileged by several medical professionals as well. Scadding, for 
example, holds that “[w]hen the current state of knowledge permits more than one possible basis of 
definition of a disease, an aetiological basis will usually be more useful than a pathological, and a 
pathological than a syndromal” (1959, 323). In line with this, Snider makes the following claim: 
These four levels indicate progressively decreasing knowledge of the disease and 
therefore decreasing priority as defining characteristics: etiology has the highest priority, 
altered structure or function, respectively, have intermediate priority, and clinical 
features have the lowest priority. (2003, 679)   
To my knowledge, the only philosophical account to consider the pathophysiological approach 
is that of Fuller (2018b). He claims that all diseases are in fact defined according to their constitution. 
However, the reality is that physical diseases are often classified using other approaches. This could 
 
10 
be a result of epistemic gaps in our understanding of diseases. Perhaps we should read Fuller’s claim 
that medicine in fact classifies according to the constitutive features of a disease as evidence that 
medicine has moved on from thinking etiological classifications are better than pathophysiological 
ones. If this is the case, then I disagree on pragmatic grounds. My second aim in this Chapter is to 
defend a broadly pragmatic approach to disease classification. That is, classificatory choices should 
depend on the goal being pursued. The picture of disease classification I suggest is as follows: The 
medical goal being pursued determines what kind of information about a disease is important, and 
this, in turn decides which classificatory approach should be used. This is because each model has 
particular advantages that are helpful in certain circumstances. To illustrate this point, I provide a 
brief argument for the use of the pathophysiological approach in the context of therapeutic 
prediction.  
The Chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, I describe the etiological approach. Under this 
approach, diseases can be classified according to the monocausal model or the multifactorial model. 
Briefly put, the monocausal model of disease holds that, under the right circumstances, a particular 
disease is caused by a single necessary cause (Section 1.2.1). The multifactorial model, on the other 
hand, holds that disease causation is more complex and that a particular disease is the result of a 
constellation of causes (Section 1.2.2). Following this, in Section 1.3, I outline the symptom-based 
approach. Here, I discuss how physical diseases, like mental disorders, can be usefully classified by 
appealing to symptoms, despite the approach being largely rejected by many medical researchers. In 
Sction1.4, I discuss the pathophysiological approach. This approach uses mechanistic information 
to classify diseases. I outline two ways in which diseases can be classified under the 
pathophysiological approach: Either by appeal to abnormal anatomical structure or abnormal 
biomechanistic function. Then, in Section 1.5, I briefly outline the pragmatics of disease 
classification, touching on its use in therapeutic prediction. Finally, I conclude.  
1.2  The Etiological Approach 
A common way to classify diseases is by appealing to their etiology. The etiological approach to 
disease classification defines a disease in terms of the presence of its cause (or causes). In principle, 
this approach typically ignores other factors like pathogenesis, physiology, mechanisms, and 
symptoms. Put another way, etiological classifications of disease appeal to the distal causes of a 
disease, while disregarding its proximal causes. A distal cause of a disease as one that is extraneous to 
the constitutive mechanisms of the disease, and responsible for the manifestation and pathogenesis 
of that disease. Proximal causes, in contrast, are those that are constitutive of the underlying 
pathophysiology or mechanisms of the disease. Examples of distal causes include Streptococcus 
pyogenes for streptococcal pharyngitis, smoking for chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder 
(COPD), a mutation of the cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) gene for 
cystic fibrosis, or rheumatic fever for mitral stenosis.  
The etiological approach seems reasonable given that it is commonly held that the best way to 
intervene on a disease is by modulating its causes (Scadding 1959; Snider 2003). However, the 
 
11 
attention it has received in philosophy of medicine suggests that it is problematic (Whitbeck 1977; 
Carter 2003; Cooper 2002; Broadbent 2009, 2013; Smart 2014; Fuller 2018b). In this section, I will 
provide analyses of two models of disease classification that fall under the etiological approach: The 
monocausal model and the multifactorial model. I will then briefly outline a criticism of the 
distinction between the monocausal and multifactorial models and offer a short argument for the 
usefulness of this distinction.  
1.2.1 The Monocausal Model of Disease 
According to the monocausal model, individual diseases are best understood as having a single 
necessary and universal cause. In the late Nineteenth Century and early Twentieth Century, 
breakthroughs of interventions that targeted specific pathogens became increasingly common. Such 
discoveries came to characterize modern Western medicine until the mid-Twentieth Century. This 
resulted in a paradigmatic shift from symptom-based classifications of diseases (see Section 1.3) to a 
causal model of classification. However, this also led to widespread acceptance of a relatively 
simplistic view of disease causation—that a disease has one cause. This view can be captured by the 
monocausal model of disease classification.  
Broadbent (2013) offers a useful analysis of the monocausal model. On his account, the 
monocausal model is not simply the view that diseases have a single necessary and universal cause, 
but rather a single cause that satisfies the following two conditions: 
(i) The putative cause CD is a cause of every case of the disease D. 
(ii) Under a specific set of circumstances insufficient to cause D, CD causes D. 
Broadbent refers to conditions (i) and (ii) as the necessity condition and sufficiency requirement 
respectively (2013, 150). The purpose of stipulating that CD satisfy condition (i) is to ensure what 
Fuller refers to as “causal specificity” and “causal necessity” (2018b: 9). CD is casually specific because 
it refers to one causal agent, not a disjunction of causes, and CD is causally necessary because the 
disease will only occur if CD occurs. Take Streptococcus pyogenes (S. pyogenes) for streptococcal 
pharyngitis; the only causal agent responsible for streptococcal pharyngitis is S. pyogenes and 
without it, streptococcal pharyngitis would not occur. 
The key feature of condition (ii) is circumstantial sufficiency of CD. Circumstantial sufficiency 
of CD requires that a particular disjunction of circumstances, which are not jointly sufficient to cause 
D, must be present along with CD in order for D to occur. According to Broadbent, the purpose of 
condition (ii) is to prevent the possibility of other causes satisfying the monocausal model of a 
particular disease. Without condition (ii), the argument goes, we could take any other cause, say lack 
of immunity to S. pyogenes, and characterize it as the necessary cause of streptococcal pharyngitis.  
It is unclear that condition (ii) achieves this, however. Streptococcal pharyngitis can still, at least 
in principle, still be classified according to a necessary cause other than the presence of Streptococcus 
pyogenes. We could simply include the presence of S. pyogenes in our disjunction of circumstances 
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and characterize lack of immunity to Streptococcus pyogenes as the necessary cause of the disease. 
Of course, in practice this is not the case and the monocausal model is useful for classifying some 
diseases. 
Classifying diseases monocausally is particularly useful for infectious diseases. These are diseases 
that are caused by pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, or parasites. For 
example, listeriosis might be classified as the infection caused by the presence of the bacteria Listeria 
monocytogenes in the body. In principle, classifying listeriosis in this way ignores the underlying 
mechanisms of the disease—that the bacterium enters the host’s phagocytic white blood cells, which 
leads to septicemia and permits access to the brain, causing meningitis, and allows for transplacental 
migration to the fetus in pregnant women.  
According to the monocausal model, classifying diseases should adhere to the following 
monocausal principle, which states that a condition is a case of a particular disease if and only if the 
cause of the disease is the cause of the condition. 
x is disease D iff CD caused x 
Using listeriosis as an example, a condition (x ) is a case of listeriosis (D) if and only if the presence of 
Listeria monocytogenes in the body (CD) caused the condition.  
The monocausal principle is simply Whitbeck’s (1977) ontological conception of disease 
classification. The ontological conception states that the identity of a disease is entirely determined 
by the disease-causing entity. On this view, classifying diseases entails merely identifying and 
distinguishing between different pathogens that could enter the body.   
The monocausal principle can be a useful approach to classifying diseases. For one, it has some 
explanatory power. Classifying a disease by its cause partially explains why someone contracts the 
disease. For instance, categorizing tuberculosis as the disease caused by the presence of 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis (M. tuberculosis) partially explains why someone contracted the 
disease: M. tuberculosis entered the body which caused the pathogenesis of tuberculosis. An 
etiological disease category also partially explains why an intervention might be effective. For 
example, a monocausal classification partially explains why antibiotics are effective; they target the 
cause of the disease and thus eliminate the pathophysiological effects, and in turn the symptoms, of 
the disease. 
Relatedly, striving to classify diseases using the monocausal principle may contribute to the 
development of effective interventions, such as vaccines, antivirals, and antibiotics, that target 
specific disease-causing pathogens. This is illustrated by commonly cited historical examples. Koch’s 
discovery of how to identify bacteria by staining along with his 1882 discovery of tubercle bacillus 
as the cause of tuberculosis laid the groundwork for Ehrlich to develop the concept of ‘magic bullet’ 
interventions. Magic bullets are interventions that target and eliminate the disease-causing pathogen, 
without damaging other cells in the organism. This ultimately led to the development of real-world 
‘magic bullet’ interventions like the synthetic antibiotic arsphenamine (Salvarsan) for syphilis. This 
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paved the way for other advancements, such as Prontosil and, more famously, penicillin. Since these 
discoveries, numerous other antibiotics have been developed. Identifying a necessary and universal 
cause of a disease, and thus being able to classify the disease etiologically, is often crucial to the 
development of such treatments. 
1.2.2 The Multifactorial Model 
Of course, over the years epidemiologists and other medical researchers have determined that many 
diseases do not have a single cause but are, rather, multifactorial. Thus, classifying diseases according 
to multiple causes is another important model for disease classification that falls under the etiological 
approach. Some hold that all diseases, even those infectious diseases typically classified 
monocausally, are multifactorial (Krieger 1994; MacMahon, Pugh, and Ipsen 1960; Rothman 
1976). Proponents of the multifactorial model consider diseases to be more complex than the 
monocausal model assumes and regard the causes of individual diseases as manifold. One way of 
thinking of this multifactorial model is as the simple claim that diseases have more than one cause.  
On this view, we could refine the etiological approach so that it makes room for multiple causes 
for a disease. The monocausal principle could be reformulated as the following naïve multifactorial 
principle : 
x is disease D iff C1 ∨ C2 ∨ . . . ∨ Cn caused x 
Using the naïve multifactorial principle, a condition x is a case of osteoporosis (D) if the condition 
is caused by heavy drinking (C1) or reduced amounts of testosterone (C2) or any of the putative 
causes of the disease up to Cn.  
However, this formulation would not be very useful since it entails that we think of diseases as 
being caused by any one of their putative causes. Furthermore, this would lead to confusion in 
classification since many diseases are caused by the same things. For example, a cause of small lung 
cancer is smoking, but the same can be said of osteoporosis. The multifactorial model is problematic 
in this sense since, on this naïve reading, it ambiguously characterizes the causes of a disease—is it 
that a disease could be caused by many singular causes, or by some set of causes, or by any one 
constellation of causes? Thus, this cannot be how medical scientists think of the multifactorial 
model.  
The multifactorial model, as it is understood in medical science, holds that diseases are the result 
of complicated, congruent interactions of features including physiological, environmental, and 
lifestyle factors, and that individual cases of a particular disease are best described by appealing to 
these different causal risk factors for the disease. So, any particular disease might be characterized by 
appealing to different combinations of different lifestyle choices like smoking or inactivity, genetic 
features like having certain mutations, and environmental elements such as air pollution, which all 
increase the risk of contracting that disease.  
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Due to their causal complexity, when it comes to classifying chronic diseases etiologically the 
multifactorial model is typically used. Osteoporosis is commonly described using this causal risk 
factor understanding of the multifactorial model. Risk factors for osteoporosis include 
hyperthyroidism, reduced amounts of testosterone or estrogen, pituitary gland disorders, hereditary 
factors, heavy drinking and smoking, problems of malabsorption, long-term use of high-dose 
corticosteroids, to name just a few (Lindsay and Cosman 2015). Thus, an etiological approach to 
classifying osteoporosis would be to say that the disease is caused by any number of causal attributes 
associated with its risk factors. 
Smart (2014) has proposed a more nuanced multifactorial model of disease classification that 
can make sense of this view.  He claims that a disease can be classified according to “the disjunction 
of conjunctions of events jointly sufficient for contracting the disease” (Smart 2014, 257). 
Accordingly, the following refined multifactorial principle can be formulated: 
x is disease D iff (C1 ∧ C2) ∨ (C1 ∧ C3) ∨ . . .  caused x 
Smart claims that it is theoretically possible to classify diseases by outlining the finite possible 
causal configurations that could result in one contracting the disease.  
What Smart is using in his analysis is essentially Mackie’s INUS account of causes (1965). On 
this view, a cause is an insufficient by necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient—hence 
INUS—condition for an effect. That is to say, a cause of some effect is any member of a minimal set 
of sufficient conditions for that effect. In the case of disease, each member (Cn) of the finite possible 
causal configurations that result in one contracting the disease can be considered an INUS cause. 
The refined multifactorial principle above represents a special case where C1 is present in every set 
of minimal sufficient conditions, but it should be noted that there need not always be a common 
cause of this kind. Applying the INUS account of causes to disease is helpful. For instance, it helps 
understand how smoking is a cause of osteoporosis: Smoking is an insufficient but necessary part of 
an unnecessary but sufficient condition for osteoporosis to occur. Similarly, testosterone deficiency 
is an insufficient but necessary part of another unnecessary but sufficient condition for the disease. 
Each disjunct in the refined multifactorial principle is a sufficient condition for a disease to occur, 
and each contains multiple INUS causes.  
A problem for adopting the refined multifactorial principle is that most chronic diseases will, 
in a strict sense, be ill-defined. For instance, the causal risk factors for ischemic heart disease (IHD) 
are smoking, physical inactivity, obesity, hypertension, and excessive alcohol consumption (Antman 
and Loscalzo 2015), but none of these factors are strictly necessary for someone to develop the 
disease. Further, if all these causal risk factors were necessary, patients who suffer from IHD often 
differ in terms of the extent to which these factors are present and contribute to the development of 
the disease. That the set of causes for a disease could differ across individual cases of the disease brings 




The above problem suggests that the number of different sufficient causal configurations for a 
disease are beyond human capacity to count. Smart (2014) responds to this objection claiming that 
similar inability is common in the sciences. He adopts an essentialist standpoint, according to which 
the aim of science is to discover essential properties of natural kinds. Not knowing these essential 
properties does not make essentialism unappealing, nor does it mean that the properties are 
unknowable and discovering more of the essential properties of natural kinds improves scientific 
understanding. Similarly, goes Smart’s argument, discovering more causal configurations for a 
disease improves our understanding of the disease and allows us to manipulate these causes.  
1.2.3 A Challenge for the Etiological Approach 
A challenge facing the etiological approach stems from the monocausal-multifactorial distinction. 
Some philosophers have argued that the prima facie distinction between the monocausal and 
multifactorial models might not be as striking it seems (Broadbent 2009, 2013; Fuller 2018b). What 
does this mean for the etiological approach in general? 
Diseases that are generally considered to be monocausal are the result of complex causal 
configurations that vary in individual cases and thus it is possible, in principle, to recharacterize them 
as multifactorial. This is particularly true for those cases where we do not have full knowledge of the 
specific set of circumstances in that make up part of condition (ii). For example, around 90% of 
patients who have M. tuberculosis, the bacterium responsible for tuberculosis, in their body do not 
develop any symptoms of the disease. This is known as latent tuberculosis. Active tuberculosis, on 
the other hand, is now understood as being caused by having the disease-causing bacterium in one’s 
body along with some endogenous factors. But what those particular endogenous factors are is 
currently unknown. People with latent tuberculosis are often considered to be in a state of persistent 
immune response to M. tuberculosis and can develop active tuberculosis later in their lives if the 
presence of the bacteria is not treated. The manifestation of active tuberculosis in those with latent 
tuberculosis is normally put down to a weakening of the immune system, sometimes due to a 
secondary auto-immune deficiency such as HIV. However, the exact circumstances in each case are 
often unknown and cannot be explained by appeal to the monocausal classification. Thus, we can 
theoretically reclassify all purported monocausal diseases as multifactorial diseases. 
The distinguishing feature of monocausal diseases, however, is that they are said to have a 
defining necessary cause, whereas multifactorial diseases do not. This amounts to monocausal 
diseases satisfying condition (i) but it is doubtful that many do. It is unclear whether even infectious 
diseases, considered exemplars of the monocausal model, satisfy causal specificity and casual 
necessity. Tuberculosis, for example, was once considered to only be caused by M. tuberculosis, but 
it is now understood that the disease can be caused by a member of the M. tuberculosis complex 
(MTBC), which includes M. tuberculosis, M. africanum, and M. bovis, among others.  
Still, multifactorial diseases do not seem to have a defining necessary cause of the same sort as 
monocausal diseases. Given the successes of the monocausal model mentioned in Section 1.2.1, the 
fact that chronic diseases do not have a defining necessary cause might even be considered 
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unfortunate (Fuller 2018b). We know a vast amount about the causal risk factors of many chronic 
diseases. Smoking is considered a risk factor for IHD, yet we do not classify it using by this cause 
alone. Smoking as a cause for IHD is similar to S. pyogenes as a cause for streptococcal pharyngitis 
in that both increase the risk of contracting their respective diseases, but neither are sufficient 
without some other factors. While one may argue that casual risk factors merely contribute to 
disease, the same is true of the defining necessary causes of monocausal diseases, thus medical 
scientists could, at least in principle, use the monocausal model for chronic diseases.  
In other words, in the same way that many infectious diseases have been reclassified in the past, 
we could simply reclassify chronic diseases monocausally (Broadbent 2013). Tuberculosis was once 
classified by its symptoms and was understood pathologically. It was considered to be caused by 
several infectious agents until Koch isolated M. tuberculosis. After this, tuberculosis was reclassified 
monocausally and, consequently, certain conditions that were once considered cases of the disease 
were excluded from the classification. The same can be done for chronic diseases. We could divide 
up the classification of IHD into several classifications such as ‘IHD caused by smoking’ and ‘IHD 
caused by high blood pressure’ and so on.  
So, monocausal diseases can be classified multifactorially, and multifactorial diseases are not 
impervious to being classified monocausally. The distinction between the monocausal and 
multifactorial models thus seems not as stark as we might have thought, yet medical scientists tend 
not to use the monocausal model for chronic diseases nor the multifactorial model for infectious 
diseases. Why is that? In one sense, it is currently difficult to do so. The necessary causes of particular 
chronic diseases (whether these be some underlying genetic mutations or certain levels of exposure 
to environmental factors) are simply not as well understood as the necessary causes of particular 
infectious diseases are. In another sense however, chronic diseases are interpreted in a pragmatically 
different way to infectious diseases.  
To understand what is meant by the pragmatic interpretations of infectious disease and chronic 
disease we need to consider how the etiological (distal causal) pictures of each are used. For infectious 
diseases, the etiological picture of there being a necessary universal cause for a disease is useful in the 
development of interventions that target those distal causes. Adopting the view that infectious 
diseases are monocausal aligns well with our historical capacity to develop such treatments, such as 
antibiotics and antivirals—it has worked. Adopting a multifactorial etiological picture of infectious 
diseases would arguably lead to failed research into less practical causal targets. Of course, 
vaccinations are aimed at developing immunity to particular pathogens, which may be interpreted 
as targeting a different cause of infection, namely a lack of immunity to the pathogen in question. 
However, even the development of vaccines requires that we accept the monocausal interpretation, 
since such research relies on identifying the pathogen we wish to prevent from infecting people. 
There is more success to be had by adopting a monocausal etiological picture of infectious diseases. 
Chronic diseases, on the other hand, are interpreted multifactorially because their causes are not 
as explicitly linked to the pathogenesis of disease as those of infectious diseases. The distal causes of 
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chronic diseases are commonly viewed as risk factors, and not as strict causes. This is because while 
we may know that certain causal features are risk factors for a disease—features that contribute to 
an increased risk of developing the disease—we often do not know the extent to which those features 
contribute to the disease. Thus, we cannot be as clear about when a certain risk factor is necessary 
for a chronic ailment as we can for a particular pathogen and an infectious disease. Relatedly, we 
often cannot intervene on such risk factors in the same way as we can on the causes of infectious 
diseases. It is not the case that we can intervene on many distal causes for chronic diseases, such as 
smoking, heavy drinking, and obesity, in the same way that we can for those of infectious diseases. 
We might argue for reducing one’s exposure to such factors, but if one is exposed, (a) there is no 
certainty that they will develop the disease, and (b) if the disease did manifest we would often be 
unable to give them a drug and remove that exposure in the same way as we would a pathogen. We 
interpret chronic ailments using a multifactorial etiological model because useful necessary universal 
causes, sensu the monocausal model’s interpretation of a necessary universal cause, do not exist or 
are not known for such diseases. 
This indicates that pragmatic considerations relating to identifying factors that can be usefully 
intervened upon, rather than purely logical considerations relating to necessary causes, explain why 
infectious diseases are typically classified monocausally and chronic diseases multifactorially. Thus, 
an etiological approach to disease classification is pluralist in the sense that, depending on the 
pragmatic understanding of the disease in question, classifications can be monocausal or 
multifactorial. As I argue later in the Chapter, pragmatic considerations are inseparable from our 
disease classificatory practices. 
1.3 The Symptom-Based Approach 
So far, we have established that the etiological approach can use either the monocausal model or 
multifactorial model to classify diseases by their cause(s). Another approach to disease classification 
involves appeal to the observable clinical picture that a patient presents; that is, the symptoms or 
syndrome of the disease. For example, classified symptomatically, mitral stenosis is characterized by 
dizziness, shortness of breath, fatigue, heart palpitations, and chest pain (O’Gara and Loscalzo 2015). 
This is the symptom-based approach to disease classification. Since there is little contemporary 
philosophical work on the symptom-based classification of physical disease, I discuss the symptom-
based model of classification with reference to its widespread use in psychology and psychiatry. It 
should be noted that there are examples of physical diseases that are classified according to 
symptoms. When I analyze the approach through the lens of psychiatry, I do so to appropriately 
clarify certain aspects of the model, such as its advantages and the challenges it faces.  
In this section, I also identify a major problem facing a symptom-based classification: The 
problem of underdetermination of treatment strategies due to shared symptoms. I argue that to 
avoid this problem, a symptom-based model of classification should be such that it reveals the 
underlying structure or function of the disease. This however, I argue, entails that we are already able 
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to classify these diseases according to their pathology or pathophysiology. This means that there are 
some cases where symptom-based classifications are redundant.  
The symptom-based approach is common practice in psychiatry, particularly after the APA 
adopted an atheoretical approach to disease with the publication of the DSM-III in 1980. In the 
ICD-10, unless the etiology is known, mental disorders are also classified by their symptoms. An 
exemplar of a nosological system that predominantly uses a symptom-based approach is the DSM-
5, the current version of the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Here is 
an example of a disorder which is classified symptomatically in the DSM-5. Major depressive 
disorder (MDD) is a state in which at least five of the following symptoms are present during the 
same two-week period, with at least one of the five symptoms being either symptom (1) or symptom 
(2): 
(1) Depressed mood on most days for most of the day, indicated either by subjective 
report or by observation of others. 
(2) Notably reduced interest or enjoyment in all, or almost all activities, most of the 
day, almost every day. 
(3) Significant weight loss without diet or weight gain, or an increased or decreased 
appetite. 
(4) Insomnia or hypersomnia almost every day 
(5) Psychomotor agitation or retardation most days (observed not just subjectively 
reported) 
(6) Feeling fatigued or loss of energy most days. 
(7) Feelings of worthlessness or excessive unwarranted guilt most days. 
(8) Reduced ability to concentrate, or indecisiveness most days. 
(9) Recurring thoughts of death, or suicide with or without specific plan, or 
attempted suicide.  
Two caveats for the diagnosis of MDD include that the symptoms must cause significant social or 
occupational distress or impairment, and that the condition must not be the result of taking any 
substance or other medication (American Psychiatric Association 2013).  
With this model of classification, the following symptom-based principle, which states that a 
condition is a case of a particular disease if and only if the set of symptoms of the condition are the 
same as a subset of symptoms of the disease, can be formulated: 
x is disease D iff Gx = GD1 ∨ GD2 ∨ … ∨ GDn 
A condition (x) is MDD (D) if and only if the condition is a set of symptoms (Gx) that are the same 
as at least five of symptoms (1) – (9) and at least one of those symptoms is symptom (1) or (2) (GDn). 
Physical diseases can also be categorized by their symptoms. This is most common for those 
diseases for which only the symptoms are known. A good example is nodding disease—a mentally 
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and physically disabling disease only affecting children, which is confined to small regions of South 
Sudan. The symptoms of nodding disease include a total stunting of growth affecting not just the 
body, but the also the brain. It is named for its characteristic nodding seizures which occur when 
affected children begin eating or, in some cases, when they feel cold. Nodding disease is described 
according to its symptoms because its cause is currently unknown (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 2019). Another example of a physical disease that can only be categorized by its 
symptoms is acute flaccid myelitis (AFM), a neurologic illness which, like nodding disease, affects 
children. AFM presents as localized weakness of the limbs, but its cause is unknown (Hopkins 2017).  
A symptom-based approach to disease classification is useful in some cases. For one, developing 
a nosological system based on symptoms would mitigate the effects of theoretical disagreement that 
is sometimes present in medicine. This is one of the reasons for the APA’s “atheoretical” approach 
to the causes of mental disorders since 1980 (American Psychiatric Association 1980, 1987, 1994, 
2000, 2013). There is often disagreement in the mental healthcare profession about the causes and 
appropriate treatment of mental disorders. By adopting an atheoretical approach, the APA aims to 
reduce the alienation of any particular constituencies in the profession and compels mental health 
professionals to diagnosed disorders based on agreed upon symptoms. Although there is a significant 
historical literature on this debate, the focus of this Chapter is on physical disease—this short 
discussion of psychiatric nosology is useful insofar as it illustrates a possible similar advantage that 
might be applicable when categorizing physical diseases where consensus on their causes has not 
been reached. 
Another related use of adopting a symptom-based approach is its potential benefits to the 
process of diagnosis. Nosology is often equated with diagnosis because the ways in which diseases 
are classified are often used to make inferences about what disease a patient may have. However, the 
two are distinct in an important way: Diagnosis is inferential whereas nosology is descriptive. That 
is to say, diagnosis is an iterative process of inferring what disease a patient has based on information 
gathered about particular characteristics of the patient. This includes information gathered from the 
patient’s clinical history and from a patient interview, which includes questions about the patient’s 
more recent history and their perceived symptoms. This is followed by a physical exam to gather 
other information that might contribute to formulating a working diagnosis. A working diagnosis 
is then formed based on the physician’s interpretation of the information, followed by diagnostic 
tests to either confirm or disconfirm the diagnosis. If the diagnostic tests confirm the working 
diagnosis, an intervention strategy is prescribed. If the diagnostic tests disconfirm the working 
diagnosis, it is refined or reworked based on the new information gathered through diagnostic tests. 
Nosology, on the other hand, is concerned with typologizing diseases. Medical researchers pick 
out defining characteristics of diseases and formulate classifications based on these characteristics. 
Of course, the logic of nosology is still fundamental to diagnosis since inferring diagnoses is only 
possible using an underlying nosological system (Armstrong 2011). When a working diagnosis is 
formed, the information gathered is constituted, in part, by reported and observed symptoms, so 
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perhaps having symptom-based categories for diseases would provide doctors with a nosological 
system that aids in this process. Take MDD for example: once it is established that a patient has at 
least five of the disorder’s symptoms, with at least one of the five symptoms being either symptom 
(1) or (2), then they are generally diagnosed with MDD. Disease classifications provide definitions 
which determine diagnostic criteria which in turn inform physicians whether their diagnoses are 
likely accurate or not. 
The benefit of having a set of criteria against which to measure a diagnosis, however, is shared 
by all three models of disease classification. Furthermore, it seems that a symptom-based model of 
nosology is not better than other approaches unless it includes some theoretical aspects. This is 
because of the following particularly serious challenge facing any symptom-based nosological 
system: In some cases, symptoms underdetermine decisions regarding appropriate disease 
intervention strategies. This is a common issue for physicians. To illustrate, consider the following 
scenario. A patient is brought into an emergency room. Her symptoms include trouble walking and 
speaking, partial paralysis of the face, trouble seeing in her left eye, and a headache. Based on these 
symptoms, her clinical history, and an interview with relatives who brought her in, the patient is 
diagnosed with stroke. Considering that time is of the essence, emergency measures must be taken. 
At this point, doctors in this emergency room have two options available to them: either they 
administer an intravenous injection of a tissue plasminogen activator (TPA), or they give the patient 
an antihypertensive drug.  
Given that a TPA injection targets the cause of ischemic strokes but is contraindicated in 
hemorrhagic strokes, and an antihypertensive drug targets the cause of hemorrhagic strokes but is 
contraindicated in ischemic strokes, how should the decision regarding which treatment strategy to 
use be made? The reported and observed symptoms do little to help with the decision. Normally, 
the physician orders a CT scan, the results of which would show if there were bleeding in or around 
the brain. If the results show that there is no bleeding, the doctors can infer that the stroke is 
ischemic. If the results show that there is bleeding, then the doctors can infer that the stroke is 
hemorrhagic. This then allows the doctors to decide on which intervention strategy is best.  
There is a crucial difference between the reported and observed symptoms and the one revealed 
(or shown to be missing) by the CT scan. The latter symptom is one that reveals important 
information about the underlying pathology (and pathophysiology) of the disease in question, 
whereas the former set does not. Thus, only symptoms which reveal the underlying mechanisms and 
causes of a disease are good for determining an appropriate treatment strategy. 
While a symptom-based model of classification is problematic, knowing the symptoms of 
diseases can contribute to other goals in medicine, such as making some decisions regarding the 
direction of research into interventions. We might observe a symptom in one patient that was 
present in another and infer that an intervention that proved effective for the latter would be 
effective for the former. Analgesics, for instance, are effective interventions for the pain associated 
with many diseases. Of course, such inferences do not necessarily establish that the intervention will 
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target the causes of a disease, but they do provide reason to expect that the intervention will alleviate 
the symptoms of some condition. Such interventions lean further toward disease management rather 
than disease elimination.  Given this, it would be hasty to completely discount a symptom-based 
model of nosology, especially in cases where the causes of a disease are unknown. And in fact, a 
similar symptom-based inference is made regarding nodding disease, where anticonvulsants are often 
used to help mitigate the seizures caused by the disease. 
The symptom-based approach to disease classification, thus, has some important uses. It is a 
good starting point for understanding diseases and thus helps in reasoning about treatments. It can 
be useful for developing new disease categories when there are epistemic gaps regarding other 
properties of a disease. It is useful for the diagnostic process. Finally, as long as we are clear about its 
limits, the symptom-based approach can be useful for decisions regarding treatments. Symptoms 
used for treatment decisions should reveal important information about the underlying 
pathophysiology of a disease. In the next section, I discuss the pathophysiological approach to disease 
classification. 
1.4 The Pathophysiological Approach 
The last prominent approach to disease classification is the pathophysiological approach. This 
approach aims to classify disease according to what they are, their constitution. The kinds of features 
that constitute a disease are largely determined by the contemporary naturalist conception of disease.  
According to this approach a disease is abnormal functioning of a part or process in the body (Boorse 
1977). The pathophysiological approach, then, aims to classify diseases by appeal to the parts and 
processes of the body that are dysfunctional. This notion of dysfunctional parts and processes can 
be directly linked to speak of mechanisms in biology and medicine. Machamer et al. (2000) define a 
mechanism as entities (or parts) and activities (or processes) and their organization (or their normal 
functioning). Thus, the pathophysiological approach classifies diseases according to mechanisms.  
In this section, I examine the pathophysiological approach. I touch on the distinction between 
mechanisms in terms of pathology (structure) and pathophysiology (function) noting that since 
abnormal structure is implied by abnormal functioning, the distinction is a matter of degree. What 
this means is that functional abnormalities are caused by structural abnormalities and thus when we 
speak of a functional abnormality we are implying that a structural abnormality is present. I 
conclude that, since the practical effects of using pathological classifications are indistinct from those 
resulting from using pathophysiological classifications, the latter model of classification is sufficient 
for achieving the goals for which the former might be used.  
As I mention above, classifying diseases by their pathophysiology involves defining a disease by 
what it is in the mechanistic sense. In structural biology, the relation between structure and function 
is emphasized. Structure refers to the form and makeup of biological elements like cells, proteins, 
and DNA. For example, bacteria are prokaryotic cells meaning they lack a true nucleus. Function, 
on the other hand, refers to the mechanistic processes performed by the structural elements. For 
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example, a functional description of bacteria is that they reproduce by binary fission. Biology 
commonly classifies living things by both structural and functional similarities.  
Similarly, in the biomedical sciences, diseases can be classified by structure or function. The 
pathology of a disease refers to abnormalities in the body’s structures, whereas the pathophysiology 
of a disease refers to abnormalities in the body’s functions. One might assume that we can distinguish 
between pathological classifications of disease and pathophysiological classifications. On this view, 
the pathological classification of a disease involves describing structural abnormalities of the 
anatomical site in question, while a pathophysiological classification involves describing abnormal 
physiological function. On closer analysis however, we see that when it comes to disease classification 
the distinction between pathological and pathophysiological is just a matter of degree of detail and 
a pathophysiological model of classification is sufficient for a multitude of biomedical goals. 
To see how the distinction between pathological and pathophysiological classification dissolves, 
I will describe classificatory principles for each. I will use the example of mitral stenosis to illustrate 
my argument. A pathological classification of mitral stenosis is a narrowed apex of the funnel-shaped 
mitral valve with a shrinkage of the valve leaflets and presence of fibrous tissue and/or calcific 
deposits (O’Gara and Loscalzo 2015). A corresponding pathological principle for disease 
classification, which states that a condition is a particular disease if, and only if, that condition is a 
certain pathological structure, can be formulated as follows: 
x is a case of disease D iff Sx = SD 
Using mitral stenosis: A condition (x ) is a case of mitral stenosis (D) if, and only if, the 
mechanistic structure of the condition Sx is a narrowed apex of the funnel-shaped mitral valve with 
a shrinkage of the valve leaflets and presence of fibrous tissue and/or calcific deposits (SD). In the 
pathological principle, SD refers to specific structural abnormalities. Importantly, SD can be finer- or 
courser-grained in its description of the structure, which entails describing the pathology of the 
disease at different physical scales. For example, a coarser-grained description of SD for mitral stenosis 
would be a narrowed mitral valve orifice.  
The pathophysiological classification of mitral stenosis could be an abnormally elevated left 
atrioventricular pressure gradient due to significant obstruction of the mitral valve orifice area. A 
corresponding pathophysiological principle for disease classification, which states that a condition 
is a particular disease if and only if the underlying mechanisms of the condition are the same as the 
underlying mechanisms of the disease, is the following: 
x is a case of disease D iff Fx = FD 
Using mitral stenosis once more: A condition (x ) is a case of mitral stenosis (D) if and only if, 
the underlying mechanisms of the condition (Fx) are an abnormally elevated left atrioventricular 
pressure gradient due to significant obstruction of the mitral valve orifice area (FD). In the 
pathophysiological principle, FD refers to specific functional abnormalities.  
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The functional abnormalities appealed to in FD can include more, or less specificity and may 
describe fine- or coarse-grained descriptions of the mechanisms involved. A less specific mechanistic 
descriptions of mitral stenosis is an abnormally elevated left atrioventricular pressure gradient due to 
significant obstruction of the mitral valve orifice area. A more specific mechanistic definition of the 
disease is an elevated left atrioventricular pressure of ~25mmHg due to a mitral valve orifice area of 
<1.5cm2 (O’Gara and Loscalzo 2015).  
A coarse-grained mechanistic definition of mitral stenosis is a reduction of blood flow in the 
heart, and a fine-grained mechanistic definition is a reduction of normal blood flow from the left 
atrium to the left ventricle due to a narrowing of the mitral valve orifice area. A finer-grained 
mechanistic definition of the disease is an elevated left atrioventricular pressure of ~25mmHg due 
to a mitral valve orifice area of <1.5cm2. And finer still: An elevated left atrioventricular pressure of 
~25mmHg due to a mitral valve orifice area of <1.5cm2 which is the result of an abnormally elevated 
left atrioventricular pressure gradient due to significant obstruction of the mitral valve orifice area. 
What is noteworthy here, is that with more specificity and finer-grained descriptions of the 
pathophysiology, we can include descriptions of the pathology of the disease in question. On this 
account, pathological classifications are constrained by the structural descriptions in SD. That is, if 
we were to attach anything other than structural descriptions to SD, the pathological principle would 
no longer produce purely pathological classifications. Conversely, a classification made using the 
pathophysiological principle may include structural descriptions to provide a more detailed 
description of the mechanisms at work in the disease and remain a pathophysiological classification. 
Thus, to distinguish between the pathological and pathophysiological classifications is, at best, a 
matter of degree, or, at worst, incorrect. We should, I propose, opt for the pathophysiological 
principle over the pathological principle. 
Let us analyze how the pathophysiological approach fares against the challenge faced by the 
symptom-based model where the elements appealed to in a disease classification underdetermine the 
appropriate treatment strategy. The pathophysiological principle entails that a condition (x ) is a 
stroke (D) if and only if the underlying mechanisms of the condition (Fx) are such that brain tissue 
is being damaged due to insufficient blood flow to the brain (FD). Stroke is a broad category of a 
disease which obviously lacks the detail required in some parts of the biomedical sciences. However, 
as we have just seen, one advantage of a pathophysiological approach to disease classification is that 
it can provide granular descriptions of diseases. One might, for instance, include the categories of 
‘ischemic stroke’ and ‘hemorrhagic stroke’ under the broader category of stroke. Each would include 
finer grained descriptions of the underlying mechanisms of these types of stroke, ones that include 
the pathophysiology-revealing symptoms to differentiate between different types of stroke. For 
instance, an ischemic stroke is a condition where brain tissue damage is the result of insufficient 
blood flow to a part of the brain caused by a blockage in blood supply. A hemorrhagic stroke, on the 
other hand, is a condition where brain tissue damage is the result of insufficient blood flow to a part 
of the brain caused by bleeding in and around the brain. The usefulness of these finer-grained 
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classifications manifests in their contribution to decisions regarding appropriate intervention for a 
condition, discussed in Section 1.3 above. 
Discovering the underlying mechanisms of diseases has led to numerous effective medical 
treatments, and thus using a pathophysiological model of nosology might be beneficial for further 
development. For instance, in 1920 Frederick Banting and Charles Best discovered that type 1 
diabetes is the autoimmune destruction of insulin-producing beta cell population of the pancreas, 
which prevents the pancreas from producing insulin, which leads to high glucose levels. From this 
they inferred that insulin therapy might mitigate the effects of type 1 diabetes. This led to one of the 
most effective medical interventions we have today. Although autoimmune damage to the pancreas 
still occurs, insulin therapy is effective because it modulates the body’s inability to produce insulin, 
thus providing a way to manage the effects of the disease.  
At first glance, a pathophysiological model of nosology seems to favor a multifactorial model of 
disease causation. Chronic diseases like type 1 diabetes, osteoporosis, and IHD are easily categorized 
using a pathophysiological model, and furthermore, are classified at broader- or finer-grains 
depending on the goal in question. For instance, IHD could be defined at a fine grain by referring 
to the mechanisms involved in the process. Here, IHD may be classified as inadequate supply of 
blood and oxygen to a portion of the myocardium “due to a combination of fixed vessel narrowing 
and abnormal vascular tone as a result of atherosclerosis and endothelial dysfunction” (Yelle 2012; 
my emphasis).  
Given that it is well suited for defining chronic diseases, what use is the pathophysiological 
approach for infectious diseases? Infectious diseases can be described using the pathophysiological 
principle too. Take pulmonary tuberculosis: for a condition (x ), if the underlying mechanisms of 
the condition (Fx) are such that inhaled bacilli from the MTBC reach the alveoli of the lungs where 
macrophages phagocytose the bacilli, which leads to multiplication of the bacilli and further 
infection and extracellular infection gradually forming granuloma which eventually necrotize 
leading to blood and sputum in the lungs (FD), then the condition is a case of pulmonary tuberculosis 
(D) (Raviglione 2015). Classification according to pathophysiology in this way is possible for all 
infectious diseases.  
If diseases which can be described according to their causes can also be described according to 
their underlying mechanisms, we might have reason to question the supposedly stark distinction 
between the etiological and pathophysiological systems of nosology. However, while the etiological 
model is restricted to distal causes, the pathophysiological model I am proposing, in virtue of 
describing diseases mechanistically, includes proximal and, at times, distal causes in its disease 
definitions. Take the following pathophysiological description of type 1 diabetes. The underlying 
mechanisms of type 1 diabetes are such that the immune system mistakenly destroys the insulin 
producing beta-cell population of the pancreas which prevents the pancreas from producing insulin 
which in turn leads to high glucose levels in the blood. This pathophysiological explanation of type 
1 diabetes has causal components—the autoimmune destruction of beta cells causes insulin 
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deficiency, which in turn causes high glucose levels in the blood. Another good example is listeriosis. 
The pathophysiological mechanisms of listeriosis entail that Listeria monocytogenes bacteria present 
in the body enter phagocytic white blood cells, which causes septicemia, and which allows the 
bacteria access to the brain, causing meningitis. This pathophysiological explanation of listeriosis 
contains causal information about the distal cause and the proximal causes of the disease.  
Because of the option to include proximal and/or distal causes in the definitions of diseases 
when using the pathophysiological principle, the pathophysiological approach is appropriate for 
informing the development of medical interventions. Interventions are often developed based on 
mechanistic evidence; thus, it is reasonable to expect the pathophysiological model to contribute 
greatly to this goal.  
This means that medical researchers and practitioners have various options open to them when 
using the pathophysiological approach to disease classification. Of course, if there is little 
understanding of the pathology or pathophysiology of a disease, a symptom-based model will be 
useful for directing research to further develop our mechanistic knowledge about the disease. If, 
however, our pathophysiological understanding of a disease is good, then we are faced with choosing 
between structural or functional classifications. Sometimes, good symptom-based classifications are 
sufficient to serve a given aim, such as a physician informing a patient of how they inferred a 
particular diagnosis. Other times, a pathophysiological classification is more suitable, such as when 
the goal is intervention development. Moreover, because of the possibility of providing more specific 
and/or finer-grained (or less specific and/or coarser grained) classifications of diseases, the 
pathophysiological approach can be further manipulated to serve very specific goals in medicine.  
1.5  Adopting a Broadly Pragmatic Approach  
What is clear from the discussions in the previous sections is that disease classifications come in many 
forms and that medical researchers and physicians have multiple options to choose from when 
deciding how to classify diseases. A primary advantage of this is that medicine can (and should) adopt 
a broadly pragmatic approach when it comes to disease classification. The disease-related medical 
goal being pursued should determine which classification of the disease in question is used. Given 
that each approach outlined above has its own advantages, there are different aspects of medicine 
that could benefit most from using a particular approach. This is not exactly a novel idea—medicine 
has adopted a broadly pluralist approach to classification. Diagnosis, construed as a primary aim of 
medicine, has benefited from the use of symptom-based approaches since the dawn of modern 
medicine. Moreover, that different disease-related goals of medicine dictate classificatory choices in 
a pragmatic way is part of the reasoning behind the ICD-10: 
The purpose of the ICD is to permit systematic recording, analysis, interpretation and 
comparison of mortality and morbidity data collected in different countries or areas and 
at different times. The ICD is used to translate diagnoses of diseases and other health 
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problems from words into an alphanumeric code, which permits easy storage, retrieval 
and analysis of the data (World Health Organization 2016, 3, my emphasis). 
What is more, a similar approach is seen in the pages of widely used medical textbooks, which provide 
different classificatory descriptions various diseases, and do so according to what aspect of a 
particular disease is being outlined (Kasper et al. 2015; Walker et al. 2014). What is noteworthy in 
proposing a broadly pragmatic approach to disease classification is that arguments about which 
approach is best, or which provides the most understanding for all medicine (Scadding 1959; Snider 
2003), are rendered somewhat redundant.  
What should be at the center of debates over disease classification is what kind of information 
about a disease is most useful for the goal at hand—what approach to classification one should adopt 
depends on their medical aims. To see this, consider a case where we have etiological, 
pathophysiological, and symptom-based classifications of a particular disease, say IHD. As 
mentioned above, the etiological classification of IHD provides the following risk factors: Smoking, 
physical inactivity, obesity, hypertension, and excessive alcohol consumption. A symptom-based 
classification of IHD includes as symptoms extreme fatigue, shortness of breath, lightheadedness or 
fainting, angina, heart palpitations, and edema, among others. And a pathophysiological 
classification of IHD states that it is as inadequate supply of blood and oxygen to a portion of the 
myocardium due to both the fixed vessel narrowing and abnormal vascular tone as a result of 
atherosclerosis and endothelial dysfunction.  
Now say our goal is to outline strategies for the primary prevention of IHD. Such strategies may 
include programs to encourage exercise, a healthy diet, and to discourage smoking. While we have 
classifications of the disease according to its observable symptoms and its underlying 
pathophysiology, such information is not useful for primary preventive strategies. If we are 
concerned with preventing the onset of the disease, we should focus on its distal causes. These are 
provided by the disease’s etiological classification. Likewise, if our goal is to formulate a diagnostic 
hypothesis for a given condition, we can focus on observable symptoms. If one were to come in for 
a consultation complaining about fatigue, chest pain, occasional dizziness, and swelling in their legs, 
a doctor could hypothesize that they suffer from IHD. On the other hand, as mentioned in Section 
1.3 above, diagnostic confirmation may require symptomatic information that reveals 
pathophysiological facts about the condition, and thus the pathophysiological approach is most 
appropriate. In each case, we have access to different classificatory approaches for IHD, however, 
certain approaches are more applicable than others given the goal at hand.  
Another key concern in this regard centers on which approach is best for predicting the 
effectiveness of medical interventions.  Medical interventions are targeted at distal or proximal causes 
of disease. Given that interventions target these causes, researchers may want to utilize etiological or 
pathophysiological classifications for therapeutic prediction. However, as I outline in Section 1.4, 
the pathophysiological approach can include information about the distal causes of a disease while 
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providing information about more proximal causes. This renders the etiological approach relatively 
redundant for therapeutic prediction.  
The main reason for preferring the pathophysiological approach in the context of predicting 
medical effectiveness, however, is related to the information it provides about mechanisms. There 
are numerous arguments in the philosophy of medicine about the importance of mechanisms, 
mechanistic reasoning, and mechanistic evidence for causal inference in medicine (Russo and 
Williamson 2007; Illari 2011; Clarke et al. 2014; Parkkinen et al. 2018 (see Chapter 2 below)). 
Briefly, it is argued that mechanistic information is often necessary for such inferences in medicine 
because (a) it tells us how a cause brings about an effect, and (b) it can help us to avoid accepting 
problematic statistical results.3 This line of reasoning has been extended to therapeutic prediction 
(Steel 2008; Cartwright 2012; Fuller and Flores 2015). Since predictions of medical effectiveness are 
causal inferences about interventions that will be used in practical contexts, we need to be able to 
generalize from the restricted scenarios in which statistical evidence is commonly produced—the 
experimental context—to target contexts where such interventions will be administered. 
Interventions can fail in target contexts for many reasons, one of which is differences between 
relevant mechanistic features of the experimental context and target context. Thus, to generalize 
more reliably we should have mechanistic evidence about how interventions may work, and how 
they may fail to work, in target contexts. One aspect of this is having information about the 
mechanisms of the disease our intervention is targeting. Since pathophysiological classifications 
provide mechanistic information, it stands to reason that we should expect the pathophysiological 
approach to be helpful for predicting medical effectiveness.  
1.6 Conclusion 
The first goal of this Chapter was to describe and clarify three prominent approaches to disease 
classification: The etiological approach, the symptom-based approach, and the pathophysiological 
approach. The etiological approach classifies a disease according to its cause or causes. There are two 
models that fall under the etiological approach. The first, the monocausal model, is well-suited for 
classifying diseases that are thought to have one necessary and universal cause, such as infectious 
diseases. The second, the multifactorial model, is more appropriate for classifying diseases which can 
be caused by multiple constellations of causes, such as most chronic diseases. While these two models 
may not be as distinct as previously thought, they each have benefits for treatment development and 
the understanding of risk factors, respectively.  
The second approach I examine in this Chapter is the symptom-based approach. This approach 
classifies diseases according to their symptoms or clinical pictures. I argue that symptom-based 
classifications can be problematic when used for making decisions about treatment strategies, unless 
the symptoms cited in the classification can help reveal relevant information about the underlying 
 
3 For concrete examples of (b), see Biddle (2007), Jukola (2017), and Goldacre (2012). 
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pathophysiology of the disease in question. However, the symptom-based approach is useful in some 
contexts, particularly in the realm of diagnosis. 
The final approach I discuss is the pathophysiological approach. This approach classifies 
diseases according to their constitutive basis. I argue that this constitutive basis is typically articulated 
in mechanistic terms. We are concerned with the dysfunction of the parts and processes in the body 
when we speak of disease. There are two forms the pathophysiological approach may take: 
Classification by structure, or classification by function. I argue that the latter, the more 
pathophysiological approach can include information about the former without sacrificing its focus 
on function. This, I argue, is a strength of the pathophysiological approach. 
I then argued that medicine should adopt a broadly pragmatic approach to disease classification. 
The medical goal in question should dictate the classificatory approach used. This is because each 
approach had its own advantages and disadvantages that can affect our capacity to achieve certain 
goals. I close by describing how therapeutic prediction would benefit most from information 





Integrating Mechanistic Evidence for 
Inferring Medical Effectiveness 
2.1 Introduction 
Two competing views have emerged in debates about the relationship between evidence and causal 
inference in medical research. The first, the statistical approach, argues that good statistical evidence 
from randomized control trials (RCTs) or meta-analyses, is necessary and sufficient to warrant 
causal claims. The second, the mechanistic approach, suggests that both statistical and mechanistic 
evidence are necessary. This latter argument is often made on the grounds that prediction and 
extrapolation require knowing the underlying mechanisms of a purported causal relationship. The 
view that mechanistic evidence is important for extrapolating causal claims from one context to 
another is well-established, however, there is less in terms of how such evidence can or should be 
integrated with statistical evidence in service of this goal. In this Chapter, I clarify the concept of 
mechanistic evidence; argue that a key distinction between the mechanistic and statistical approaches 
lies in assumptions regarding the probability of there being differences between contexts; and offer 
an informal model for integrating available mechanistic evidence with statistical evidence for 
predicting medical effectiveness.  
In the context of medicine, the debate often features in discussions about what evidence is 
required to warrant causal claims in medical research. The statistical approach argues that all that is 
required is evidence from RCTs or meta-analyses (EBM Working Group 1992; Howick 2011a). Its 
most prominent support comes from the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement, as evident in 
several of the discipline’s evidence hierarchies, which typically consider evidence gathered from 
RCTs and meta-analyses as the highest quality available (Guyatt et al. 2008; OCEBM Levels of 
Evidence Working Group 2011). Additionally, some regulatory bodies, such as the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) (see Stegenga 2017), adopt this approach in their approval processes 
for new pharmaceuticals. A key feature of this view is that if there is good evidence from RCTs or 
meta-analyses, that is statistical evidence, then evidence from other sources, such as mechanistic 
evidence, is expendable. 
Recently, many philosophers and medical practitioners have challenged the central doctrines of 
the EBM movement. Broadly speaking, some have questioned the rationale behind evidence 
hierarchies (Upshur 2005; Solomon 2011; Stegenga 2014). More specifically, some have challenged 
the status of RCTs as the benchmark of evidence quality (Worrall 2002; Doherty 2005; Cartwright 
2007) while others have challenged the notion that meta-analyses produce objective amalgamated 
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results (e.g. Stegenga 2011, Jukola 2015). A common thread through many of these critiques is an 
emphasis on the shortcomings of statistical evidence. 
Given these concerns, some have argued that statistical evidence is insufficient to warrant causal 
claims in medicine and have suggested that it should be augmented with mechanistic evidence 
(Russo and Williamson 2007; Clarke et al. 2014). Among this mechanistic approach’s most ardent 
defenders are proponents of EBM+ movement, who argue that, provided it meets certain standards, 
mechanistic evidence should be considered equal in quality to statistical evidence (Parkkinen et al. 
2018). This, some claim, is especially the case given that mechanistic evidence mitigates certain 
potential intrinsic biases of statistical evidence, and vice versa (Illari 2011). Additionally, some 
professional organizations, at least in principle, promote this view. The International Agency for 
Research on Cancer, for instance, outlines the importance of mechanistic evidence in its guidelines 
for the identification of carcinogenic hazards (IARC 2019), while the National Institute for Health 
Research encourages studies investigating mechanisms (NIHR 2019). 
 Understanding the differences between these two approaches to evidence is key to explaining 
the relation between evidence and causal inference, particularly in the context of predicting medical 
effectiveness. Highlighting these important differences sheds light on the underlying reasons behind 
excluding or including mechanistic evidence from such predictions. Here, I argue that the difference 
between the approaches is not just the attitude each adopts toward the quality of mechanistic 
evidence. I show that, in fact, several proponents of the statistical approach see mechanistic evidence 
as useful in some cases. Another crucial difference, when it comes to predicting effectiveness, is in 
disparate assumptions regarding the probability that the context to which a drug is being applied is 
different in relevant respects to the context in which the drug was tested. I argue that the standard 
view of the mechanistic approach is that this probability is high, and that mechanistic evidence can 
help in assessing the extent of these differences. 
However, this raises the important question of how available mechanistic information should 
be integrated with statistical evidence. Much has been said about the difficulties associated with 
amalgamating evidence (e.g., Douglas 2012; Stegenga 2013; Fletcher et al. 2019). Still, this question 
has recently received increased attention, with some proposing the use of Bayesian networks (Landes 
et al. 2018; Marchionni and Reijula 2019). Using Toulmin’s (2003) model of argumentation as a 
base, I suggest a schema for the systematic integration of mechanistic evidence with statistical 
evidence for predicting medical effectiveness. This model, I argue, is not necessarily an alternative to 
the more formal Bayesian network approaches, but it does avoid several of the issues they face.  
I begin in Section 2.2 by offering an account of mechanistic evidence to work with throughout 
the Chapter. Mechanistic evidence is often defined in contrast to statistical evidence. Here, I follow 
Marchionni and Reijula’s (2019) claim that this strategy is largely problematic, particularly when 
making singular conceptual comparisons between the two types of evidence. However, I argue that 
taken together, these contrasts afford us insight into the nature of mechanistic evidence. Following 
this, in Section 2.2.2, I explain the relation between mechanistic reasoning and mechanistic evidence 
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before turning to my comparison of the statistical and mechanistic approaches to evidence and 
causal inference in Section 2.3. I argue that, in the context of predicting medical effectiveness, a 
crucial distinction lies in each approach’s assumptions regarding contextual similarity (Section 
2.3.2). I then briefly outline the kinds of differences between contexts that would be relevant to 
predictions of a drug’s effectiveness. In Section 2.4, I present my informal model of evidence 
integration. I explain the key features of the Toulmin model of argumentation. Following this, I use 
the case of the failed deployment of the HIV anti-retroviral drug efavirenz in Zimbabwe to 
demonstrate how the model can be applied to integrate mechanistic evidence with statistical 
evidence. In Section 2.5, I address a potential objection to the use of the Toulmin model before 
concluding.   
2.2 What is Mechanistic Evidence? 
It is important to define mechanistic evidence before tackling the problem of how integrate it with 
statistical evidence. Given the nature of the debate, it is common to describe mechanistic evidence 
by contrasting it with statistical evidence. This contrast has been characterized in several ways, 
including along methodological, numerical, populational, abstractive, and ontological lines. 
Marchionni and Reijula (2019: 57-58) have provided detailed critiques for the first four of these, 
which I summarize below. I argue that the last on its own, a distinction along ontological lines, is 
just as untenable. Following this, I provide an account of mechanistic evidence, arguing that it 
exhibits appropriate-level specific information about the components of causal pathway in question. 
Another important issue involves the relation between mechanistic evidence and mechanistic 
reasoning. While these terms are often conflated, I show that they are different in important ways, 
and explain that mechanistic reasoning relies, in part, on having mechanistic evidence. 
2.2.1 Contrasting Statistical and Mechanistic Evidence 
Distinguishing between statistical and mechanistic evidence by appealing to differences in 
methodology (Russo and Williamson 2007; Gillies 2018) is questionable. Statistical methods 
regularly provide information about mechanisms, while purportedly mechanistic methods, such as 
wet or dry lab work, often makes use of and provide statistical data. Moreover, it is not clear that 
what sets mechanistic evidence apart from statistical evidence is that the former is necessarily 
qualitative whereas the latter is quantitative (Waldner 2012). We can, and regularly do, use 
quantitative data to make inferences about mechanisms, while qualitative features of the world are 
used to stratify groups for statistical research. Relatedly, arguing that statistical evidence provides 
information about populations, whereas mechanistic evidence is about individuals (ibid.) is 
untenable since mechanistic information can apply to groups just as much as it could to individuals. 
Finally, strictly characterizing statistical evidence as providing macro-level information and 
mechanistic evidence as providing micro-level information (Claveau 2012) is problematic simply 
because mechanisms can be described at various levels of abstraction and grain. 
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Another way in which the distinction between statistical evidence and mechanistic evidence has 
been made, and one worth considering in more depth, is as evidence of entirely different things—an 
ontological distinction. Illari (2011), in response to what she sees as ambiguity in the RWT, argues 
that statistical evidence is evidence of correlation whereas mechanistic evidence is, straightforwardly, 
evidence of mechanisms. That is to say, where former refers to evidence illustrating a difference-
making relationship between two variables, the latter simply refers to “evidence of the entities or 
activities that make up mechanisms, or the organization of those entities and activities by which they 
produce the phenomenon the mechanism is known for” (Illari 2011: 145). This characterization has 
been carried over into the EBM+ movement. 
This definition, however, is too permissive about what counts as mechanistic evidence. Since a 
mechanism is defined as entities and activities and their organization (Machamer et al. 2000), the 
definition would count as evidence of mechanism anything that substantiated the existence of such 
entities and activities organized in a productively continuous way.4 Say we postulate the existence of 
a particular mechanism M1 connecting two variables C and E. Finding evidence of correlation V 
between the variables counts as (at least some) evidence for the existence of M1. Yet, if someone 
proposes that there is a different mechanism M2 connecting C and E, then V counts as evidence for 
M2 as well. Both M1 and M2 cite entities and activities and their organization, and since V gives 
evidence for both, it counts as evidence of mechanisms. So, it seems that (good) evidence of 
correlation is trivially evidence of mechanism, at least if we use the definition above.  
Another reason evidence of correlation satisfies this definition is that this view is consistent with 
the claim that statistical evidence is evidence about difference-making, and mechanistic evidence is 
evidence of productive continuity between entities. However, if the different things we are getting 
evidence of are difference-making and productive continuity, then this view is not saying much at 
all about the difference between statistical and mechanistic evidence. In discussions of mechanisms, 
productive continuity is the notion that the relevant activities of one element give rise to the relevant 
activities of the next from the start to the completion of a mechanism (Machamer et al. 2000; Steel 
2008). Difference-making, according to Woodward’s (2003) counterfactual-manipulationist 
account of causation, is the notion that ideal interventions on one variable C will lead to changes the 
value or probability-distribution of another variable E. The distinction between these two concepts 
is not so stark. If a mechanism exhibits productive continuity, then it is necessarily the case that 
changes in the relevant activities of particular element will lead to changes in the relevant activities 
of another. Similarly, if we know two variables exhibit a difference-making relation, then it is 
necessarily the case that there is a productively continuous mechanisms between the variables. 
Therefore, distinguishing between the two types of evidence along these lines alone is inadequate. 
 
4 I adopt Machamer et al.’s (2000) definition, which is similar to Illari’s. I do not have the space to examine other accounts 
of mechanisms here (e.g. Bechtel and Abrahamson 2005; Gillies 2017). I direct readers to Anderson (2014a, 2014b) for 
a good overview of mechanisms in the philosophy of science. 
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2.2.2 Mechanistic Evidence and Mechanistic Reasoning 
Overall, drawing a stark distinction between statistical and mechanistic evidence is difficult. There 
are numerous overlaps between the two types of evidence, which make defining mechanistic 
evidence in this way problematic. The contrasts outlined above are questionable when taken in 
isolation, however, when taken together, some provide useful insights into two important features 
of mechanistic evidence.  
The first is that mechanistic evidence gives us information about particular components of a 
causal process between two variables. To see this requires recognizing that there are methodological 
considerations for obtaining mechanistic evidence. It is right that there is no broad methodological 
distinction between these two categories of evidence such that certain types of methods, say RCTs, 
strictly produce statistical evidence, while others, say wet lab work, strictly produce mechanistic 
evidence. However, we regularly tailor the methods we use to acquire information about one or the 
other type of evidence. In other words, token cases of research methodologies, such as an RCT 
tailored to investigate the influence of a particular gene mutation on drug response, can produce 
mechanistic evidence, and there are significant methodological constraints in these cases.  
Similarly, ontological considerations are useful too. I have argued above that the ontological 
distinction is problematic because it is too vague. However, this also helps us recognize that some 
correlational data provides information about the components of the mechanism between two 
variables. This, in conjunction with methodological considerations above, helps us recognize that 
mechanistic evidence is not simply evidence that some mechanism exists; statistical evidence, 
evidence of correlation, whatever we call it, already provides that for us. Rather, mechanistic 
evidence exhibits specificity—which is to say, it provides information about specific entities, specific 
activities, and/or specific organizational structures of the causal process between two variables of 
interest. 
Understanding that mechanistic evidence exhibits specificity helps us appreciate the second 
feature of mechanistic evidence: It exhibits specificity at an appropriate granular and populational 
level. The problems with the macro-level-micro-level and population-individual contrasts of 
statistical and mechanistic evidence together demonstrate that there is no fixed level of specificity for 
mechanistic evidence. We might, for instance, want mechanistic evidence regarding genetic 
mutations for an individual, or we might want mechanistic evidence about the genetic make-up of a 
target population. Indeed, the specificity of mechanistic evidence varies according to the level of 
abstraction we choose (Cartwright 2012). However, the level of specificity is appropriate when it 
serves the goal in question. While information about the genetic make-up of a target population may 
be appropriate for predicting the effects of the rollout of a particular drug, it serves little purpose for 
estimating the drug response of a given individual. Thus, mechanistic evidence is appropriate-level 
information about the specific entities, specific activities, and specific organizational structures of 
the causal pathway between two variables of interest.  
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Of course, appropriate-level specific information about components of a casual pathway 
certainly is not all always necessary for making predictions about medical effectiveness. However, as 
I argue in Section 2.3, assumptions about the probability of there being differences in relevant causal 
features between a sample and target context play a role in the arguments for excluding or including 
available mechanistic evidence in inferences of medical effectiveness. One immediate implication 
here is that the propriety of available mechanistic evidence should be evaluated before its inclusion 
in such inferences (Parkkinen et al. 2018).  
Another important issue facing the inclusion of mechanistic evidence is its relationship with 
mechanistic reasoning. Mechanistic reasoning has been characterized as inferences from mechanistic 
knowledge to claims that an intervention has a particular effect, with explicit linking of the 
intervention to its outcome (Howick et al. 2010; Marchionni and Reijula 2019). However, given the 
numerous areas of medical research which feature reasoning about mechanisms, this is too narrow a 
definition. A vast number of inferences in medicine involve reasoning about mechanisms including 
hypothesizing the existence of specific mechanisms, inferring how a particular intervention 
produces an outcome, and developing drugs based on their mechanistic features. Simply put, 
mechanistic reasoning is not limited to inferences about the effects of interventions.  
Mechanistic reasoning, then, is inferences about the underlying mechanism of a given 
phenomenon. It is important to note that the product of these inferences is not mechanistic 
knowledge, but rather mechanistic theories or mechanistic claims (Campaner 2011). For example, 
the hypothesized disease mechanisms of C. auris are inferred using well-established theories and 
evidence about closely related pathogenic species within the Candida clade, such as C. albicans and 
C. glabrata (Chatterjee et al. 2015). Such reasoning may be based on existing hypotheses regarding 
underlying causal structures, theories about mechanisms, or, notably, mechanistic evidence. In the 
case of C. auris, researchers are concerned with looking for genomic information which confirms 
the hypothesized disease mechanisms of the fungus (ibid.). This illustrates how (good) mechanistic 
reasoning is reliant on (good) mechanistic evidence.  
To reiterate, mechanistic evidence provides appropriate-level information about the specific 
entities, specific activities, and specific organizational structures of the causal pathway between two 
variables of interest. Relatedly, mechanistic reasoning involves making inferences about the 
underlying mechanisms of a particular phenomenon. Having characterized both mechanistic 
evidence and mechanistic reasoning, I now turn to comparing the statistical and mechanistic 
approaches to evidence.  
2.3 Medical Evidence, Contextual Similarity, and Causal 
Consistency 
This section focuses on comparing the statistical and mechanistic approaches to evidence. I begin by 
explaining their distinct attitudes towards mechanistic evidence before situating them in the context 
of predicting medical effectiveness. In that context, I argue that a key factor explaining the attitudes 
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toward evidence is each approach’s assumptions regarding contextual similarity. The section ends 
with my account of casual consistency, which aims at articulating the kinds of differences between 
contexts that are relevant when making predictions about drug effectiveness.  
2.3.1 Two Attitudes Toward Medical Evidence 
Proponents of the statistical approach claim that evidence obtained from RCTs and meta-analyses 
is enough to establish the efficacy of a medical intervention (Howick 2011a). Generally, the EBM 
movement defends this position. This is illustrated by the EBM Working Group (1992), which 
claims that such clinical research should be favored over clinical experience and mechanistic 
reasoning. The statistical approach to medical evidence has been further ratified in several evidence 
hierarchies within the EBM, which typically rank evidence gathered from RCTs and meta-analyses 
above other evidence, such as that gathered through non-randomized trials, case reports, and 
importantly, mechanism-based reasoning (Guyatt et al. 2008; OCEBM Levels of Evidence Working 
Group 2011). Because of the view that statistical evidence, on its own, is necessary and sufficient to 
warrant causal inferences, I refer to proponents of this approach as evidential monists. 
This cynicism towards mechanistic reasoning is typically defended on the grounds that it often 
results in erroneous causal inferences. A common argument here is that, because of their complexity, 
we often cannot have adequate knowledge of physiological mechanisms for mechanistic reasoning 
to be reliable (Howick 2011a: 136-143; Anderson 2012). Stegenga (n.d.) calls this the trouble-in-the-
box argument for the statistical approach. This problem is often illustrated using the example of the 
CAST trial designed to test the efficacy of antiarrhythmic drugs (Greene 1992). It was 
(mechanistically) reasoned that because some people died due to cardiac arrythmias within a year of 
myocardial infarction, antiarrhythmic drugs would help reduce one’s risk of dying after suffering a 
heart attack. The CAST trial, however, demonstrated that such drugs increase overall mortality. 
This, according to proponents of the statistical approach, shows how mechanistic reasoning can lead 
to flawed and, at times, devastating results.  
It should be noted, however, that the statistical approach does not completely disvalue 
mechanistic reasoning. Howick (2011a, 2011b), for example, states that it can be useful to make 
inferences from well-understood, simple mechanisms. Moreover, it has been suggested that, in the 
absence of adequate evidence, mechanistic reasoning is necessary for solving clinical problems (EBM 
Working Group 1992). Nevertheless, these considerations are consistent with proponents of the 
statistical approach’s claim that mechanistic reasoning is neither necessary, nor sufficient for 
warranting casual claims.  
The skepticism towards mechanistic reasoning has led to a depreciation of mechanistic evidence 
in the EBM movement. As mentioned in the previous section, reasoning from mechanisms depends 
on evidence for those mechanisms. Because of this, research which produces such evidence is 
relegated to the lower tiers of evidence hierarchies. Accordingly, a striking feature of the statistical 
approach, is the claim that if there is good evidence from RCTs or meta-analyses, then mechanistic 
evidence can be wholly disregarded when making claims about an intervention’s effectiveness.  
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In opposition to this, proponents of the mechanistic approach argue that statistical evidence is 
necessary but insufficient to warrant causal claims in medicine and have suggested that available 
mechanistic evidence should always be included for such inferences (Illari 2011; Clarke et al. 2014). 
Currently, the most prominent defenders of this approach are those in the EBM+ movement, who 
“evaluating evidence of mechanisms alongside evidence of correlation” (Parkkinen et al. 2018: 20). 
These arguments can broadly be understood as defenses of the Russo-Williamson Thesis (RWT) 
which states that scientists require both correlative and mechanistic support for making causal claims 
(Russo and Williamson 2007). Given this strict adherence to the RWT, I refer to this stricter view 
of medical evidence as evidential dualism—the view that we must have both statistical and 
mechanistic evidence to warrant a causal claim. However, not all proponents of the mechanistic 
approach claim that the RWT is true in every case; I refer to this more amenable approach to the 
medical evidence as evidential pluralism— the view that sometimes one or the other kind of evidence 
is enough to warrant a causal claim. However, both evidential dualists and evidential pluralists argue 
for the importance of taking available mechanistic evidence into account when inferring casual 
claims in medicine. That is, provided it meets certain standards, mechanistic evidence should be 
considered equal to evidence gathered from RCTs and meta-analyses in evidence hierarchies and 
used to complement the evidence gathered in medical trials.  
Proponents of the EBM+ movement have offered plausible grounds for the claim that the 
statistical and mechanistic evidence complement one another. For instance, some claim that 
mechanistic evidence mitigates certain potential intrinsic biases of statistical evidence, and vice versa 
(Illari 2011). Relatedly, others have highlighted the numerous historical cases where neither 
statistical evidence nor mechanistic evidence on their own were sufficient for accepting causal claims 
(Clark et al. 2014). The mechanistic approach is therefore consistent with the view that 
incorporating different types of accurate evidence will improve the inferences we make about the 
causal relation in question. In other words, if good mechanistic evidence is available, then including 
it will improve predictions about medical effectiveness.  
The above discussion illustrates a broad contrast between these two approaches to evidence and 
causal inference. Because evidential monists regard mechanistic evidence as lower in quality in 
comparison to statistical evidence, the statistical approach adopts a dismissive attitude toward 
evidence. This is the notion that if evidence from RCTs or meta-analyses is available, then 
mechanistic evidence, can be disregarded when inferring that an intervention will be effective in 
some target context. In contrast, because both evidential dualists and evidential pluralists see 
statistical and mechanistic evidence as being equal in terms of evidential quality, the broader 
mechanistic approach embraces an augmentive attitude toward evidence. This is the notion that 
statistical evidence and mechanistic evidence complement one another, thus strengthening causal 
inferences. This entails that if mechanistic evidence is available, then it should be combined with 
statistical evidence when making causal claims.  
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While these opposing attitudes and considerations of evidence quality help explain the contrast 
between the statistical and mechanistic approaches in general, it is important to evaluate the further 
reasons for these different views in the narrower context of making predictions about the 
effectiveness of medical interventions. 
2.3.2 Assumptions Regarding Contextual Similarity 
When it comes to extrapolating the results of RCTs and meta-analyses to target contexts, advocates 
on both sides of the debate agree that if a sample and target are not sufficiently similar in relevant 
respects, then the results from the sample will not obtain in the target. The view that mechanistic 
evidence is inferior to statistical evidence only partially explains the dismissive view in the context of 
prediction. Here, I show that another reason, cited by proponents of the statistical approach, is that 
there is a low probability that a sample and target are different in relevant respects. The mechanistic 
approach, on the other hand, assumes a high probability that the relevant features of two contexts 
are different. This contrast has not been scrutinized to the same extent as the disagreements about 
evidence quality, but it is important in understanding why mechanistic evidence is excluded by 
evidential monists when predicting medical effectiveness.  
Proponents of the statistical approach claim that results from RCTs can be extrapolated to a 
target context unless there is some reason to believe that the sample and target differ. Prominent 
EBM epidemiologists recommend that we should deal “with the issue of generalizability by 
accepting that randomized trials apply to wide contexts unless there is compelling reason to believe 
the results would differ substantially as a function of particular characteristics of those patients” 
(Post et al. 2013: 641-642). Steel (2008) refers to this as simple extrapolation, however, a more 
accurate characterization is provided by Stegenga (2015), who refers to as simple extrapolation unless 
(SEU) and notes that this view is shared by other EBM practitioners and researchers (see Guyatt et 
al. 2015; Moher et al. 2010). Moreover, SEU is actively taught to future EBM researchers and 
clinicians (see Straus et al. 2019: 126-127).  
Importantly, the statistical approach argues that reasons to doubt that the results from a sample 
context can be applied to a target will rarely be found. Guyatt et al. (2015: 116), for example, claim 
that “you will usually not find a compelling reason, in which case you can generalize the results to 
your patient with confidence”. There are at least two possible motives for this rationale among EBM 
practitioners.  
First, they may believe that even if we conduct mechanistic studies (and thus use mechanistic 
reasoning) and happen to find evidence that seems to cast doubt on our extrapolation, that evidence 
would fail to constitute a “compelling reason”. This is because, according to the proponents of EBM, 
mechanistic reasoning (and thus mechanistic studies) is a low-quality source of evidence. Strikingly 
however, many of the same authors, including Post et al. (2013), argue that compelling reasons may 
be found by evaluating pathophysiological, socioeconomic, and epidemiological characteristics. A 
recent textbook by leaders in the movement states that we should “consider whether our patient's 
socioeconomic features or pathobiology are so different from those in the study that its results are 
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useless to us and our patient; only then should we discard its results and resume our search for 
relevant evidence” (Straus et al. 2019: 126). Given that mechanistic studies are often used to find 
such evidence, the mistrust of mechanistic evidence and reasoning may play less of a role than some 
may think.  
The second possible motive behind the claim that compelling reasons are rarely found, is the 
belief that relevant differences are simply unlikely. That is, proponents of SEU may believe that the 
probability of there being relevant differences between a sample context and the target context to 
which the results are being applied is low enough that we can typically extrapolate results. There is 
evidence that this is ultimately the rationale behind the statistical approach. Post et al. (2013), for 
example, consider adverse effects of treatments to be unlikely and Straus et al. (2019: 127) claim that 
“differences in response are extremely rare”. More explicitly, the influential GRADE Working 
Group writes: 
In general, one should not rate down for population differences unless one has 
compelling reason to think that the biology in the population of interest is so different 
from that of the population tested that the magnitude of effect will differ substantially. 
Most often, this will not be the case. (Guyatt et al. 2011: 1304) 
This demonstrates that proponents of the statistical approach adopt an equative view of contexts 
and their populations—there is a low probability that a sample and target context differ in relevant 
respects. This contributes to dismissing mechanistic evidence when it comes to predicting medical 
effectiveness. Given the high probability of relevant similarity between a sample and target, 
mechanistic evidence can be dismissed when applying the results of an RCT to the target. 
Proponents of SEU provide evidence in support of the equative view. Post et al. (2013: 641) 
cite several studies showing that relative effect measures are generally consistent across RCTs 
included in meta-analyses regardless of differences in baseline risk of illness and factors such as 
participant age or sex.5 At the same time, they acknowledge that there are cases where such factors 
do impact effect sizes.6 and thus, we should look “carefully for evidence (preferably from RCTs) 
that suggests differential effects for the subgroup of interest and applying appropriate criteria in 
judging the likelihood that a subgroup effect is real” (ibid.). Fuller (2013), however, brings up a 
striking issue regarding this evidence: It only demonstrates consistency in relative effect measures 
across RCTs and not the generalizability, or external validity, of those results. In other words, it 
shows that the equative view is valid when it comes to the populations and contexts of RCTS. The 
problem here, as proponents of the mechanistic approach argue (see below), is that RCTs typically 
enforce strict criteria on participant inclusion and exclusion and thus they run the risk of being 
 
5 The references Post et al. (2013) provide are: Schmid et al. (1998), Furukawa et al. (2002), Deeks (2002), Turnbull, 
Neal et al. (2008), and  Turnbull, Woodward et al. (2008).  
6 Here, Post et al. (2013) cite Hlatky et al. (2009) and Pignon et al. (2009). 
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unrepresentative of populations outside of those studies. There is always a chance that populations 
not constrained by the selection criteria of RCTs will differ in relevant ways. 
The above studies are not the only evidence provided by Post et al. (2013) for the equative view. 
They claim that a Cochrane review (Odgaard-Jensen et al. 2011) concluded that “participation in 
RCTs is associated with similar outcomes to receiving the same treatment outside RCTs” (Post et 
al. 2013: 641). They suggest that this goes against the notion that results from RCTs are not 
generalizable. However, a careful reading of the Cochrane review in question reveals that no such 
conclusion is drawn. In fact, the review compares control trials with randomized allocation of 
participants to control trials without randomization and concludes that “the results of randomised 
and non‐randomised studies sometimes differed. In some instances non‐randomised studies yielded 
larger estimates of effect and in other instances randomised trials yielded larger estimates of effect” 
(Odgaard-Jensen et al. 2011: 7). It is unclear how these conclusions entail that we should expect that 
the outcomes in non-RCT settings will be similar to those observed in RCTs.  
Nevertheless, a more recent Cochrane review may count towards the equative view. Anglemyer 
et al. (2014) compared the measured effects of interventions in RCTs with those of well-conducted 
observational studies and found that there was little difference between them. It may be concluded 
from this that the results from RCTs are at least generalizable to the less constrained settings of 
observational studies, and thus there is some warrant for the equative view. Yet, the authors are clear 
that there can be differences between the effect sizes measured in RCTs and those measured in 
observational studies, it is just that those differences are not likely the result of differences in study 
design (Anglemyer et al. 2014: 15).  Indeed, this fits with the proposal of those in the EBM 
movement that good reasons for doubting the generalizability of RCTs can be found by evaluating 
pathophysiological, socioeconomic, and epidemiological characteristics of the populations in 
questions. These are what constitute relevant differences between sample and target contexts.  
Evidential dualists and pluralists, too, argue that relevant differences between a sample and 
target entails that the results from the sample will not hold in the target (see Parkkinen et al. 2018; 
Cartwright 2012). Moreover, they agree that pathophysiological, socioeconomic, and 
epidemiological differences could lead to different treatment responses. For instance, those in 
EBM+ movement cast the issue as one of external validity and extrapolation and argue that 
behavioral and biological differences between a sample and a target context may lead to harmful or 
diminished responses to treatments in the target population (see Clarke et al. 2014; Parkkinen et al. 
2018).  
Where the mechanistic approach diverges from the statistical approach is in its assumptions 
about the probability of there being differences between a sample and target context. They assume 
that there is a high probability of there being differences between contexts. This, it is argued, is a 
result of typically strict inclusion and exclusion criteria set for clinical trials. Parkkinen et al. (2018: 
5) claim that “a study population is typically highly idealized, and thus differs from the target 
population in important ways”. And in his explanation of SEU, Stegenga states: 
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Given the large number of criteria that many clinical trials employ which stipulate the 
properties that a potential subject must have (and other criteria which they cannot have) 
to be included in the trial, there are almost always differences between a particular real-
world patient and the subjects in a clinical trial (2015: 69).  
Proponents of the mechanistic approach thus adopt a differential view of contexts and their 
populations—there is a high probability that a sample and target context differ in relevant respects. 
This differential view is a largely overlooked motive behind the evidential dualist’s claim that 
mechanistic evidence should be considered alongside statistical evidence. It is not just that both types 
of evidence augment one another, but also because some characteristics of clinical trial methodology 
(e.g., participant inclusion and exclusion criteria) make it very likely that the features of target 
contexts are different in some relevant way to those of the sample. If relevant differences mean that 
the intervention will not have the same effect in the target as it did in the sample, and the probability 
of relevant differences between a sample and target are high, then, so the argument goes, having 
evidence about those relevant differences will improve predictions about the effects of treatments. 
For the evidential pluralist, this information comes in the form of mechanistic evidence:  
it is almost never the case that clinical studies in the study population will directly 
establish both a suitable association and mechanism that will apply to the target 
population … one typically needs to consider evidence of mechanisms arising from 
sources other than the clinical studies that establish a correlation in the study 
population. (Parkkinen et al. 2018: 25) 
Given the claim that we need evidence about the relevant differences between a sample and target to 
improve our predictions, it would help to know what kinds of features may be relevant across 
contexts.   
2.3.3 Causal Consistency 
The essential concern in the debate about evidence in the context of medical effectiveness is whether 
results from randomized studies and meta-analyses can be reliably applied to target contexts. For 
proponents of the mechanistic approach, the difficulty is that once a causal relationship between an 
intervention I and an outcome O (I–O relation) is well-established in a sample setting S (say by a 
well-designed RCT), all we have is evidence of a causal law, or causal model, governing the relation 
in that setting. Put another way, we have evidence of efficacy—the measure of the causal strength of 
an intervention in a controlled environment (see the Introduction of this dissertation). What limits 
our confidence to the sample context is (i) its reliance on relevant contextual features of S and, 
importantly, (ii) that S and a target setting T are likely differ with respect to these features.  
For evidential dualists and pluralists, accepting (i) and (ii) above entails that we require evidence 
of what the features on which the I–O relation relies in S are, and second, we need evidence that 
those features are present in T. Without such evidence, our confidence in the claim that I will bring 
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about O in T should be lower than our confidence that I will bring about O in S. Put another way, 
in order to consider a prediction of medical effectiveness reliable, we need compelling reasons to 
think that the relevant features of the sample and target contexts are sufficiently similar (Parkkinen 
et al. 2018).7 What it means for two contexts to be sufficiently similar in relevant respects is a two-
part question. First, we need to ask what the relevant features, which must be shared between the 
sample and target contexts, are. And second, we need an idea of what counts as “sufficiently similar” 
enough for a prediction to be reliable. In this section, I consider the first of these issues and how 
mechanistic evidence helps evaluate these features. The relevant features have been well-theorized 
and explicated by others, most notably Cartwright (2012), so I will provide only a brief overview of 
my own. My motivation for putting these features into my own terms here, besides what I see as 
being a simpler characterization, is so they can more easily be included in the heuristic developed in 
the next section.  
When it comes to predicting the effectiveness of medical interventions, what we are concerned 
with is whether a causal law or causal model, which we have established governs a relationship 
between two variables in one context, governs the same relationship in another. This idea can be 
captured by the idea of causal consistency. That is, the prediction that I, which brings about O in S, 
will be effective at bringing about O in T, is the claim that S and T are causally consistent with respect 
to the I–O relation. Two contexts are causally consistent with respect to a given causal relation to 
the extent that they share causally relevant properties. There are three properties of causal 
consistency: 
Causal structure : The causal structure of the I–O relation in the S and the causal 
structure of the I–O relation in T are consistent with one another.  
Causal enablers :  The factors which enable the I–O relation in S are present in T.  
Causal inhibitors : Factors which inhibit the I–O relation, which are absent in S, are also 
absent in T. 
Evaluating these properties is key to assessing overall causal consistency across two contexts. 
Evaluating the first, causal structure, involves directly comparing the components of the causal 
pathway from I to O in the sample context to the components of the causal pathway from I to O in 
the target context. The second and third are features of the context which may influence the 
components of the causal pathway such that the I–O relation is modified in some way. Causal 
enablers are based on the reasoning that the I–O relation does not depend solely on the introduction 
of I  but also on other factors, external to its causal structure, without which, I  would not cause O.8 
 
7 In Chapter 4, I refer to this approach as extrapolation by sufficient similarity. 
8 This point is well known in philosophical discussions about interventions in social sciences and medicine. Cartwright 
makes the point by appeal to Mackie’s (1965) INUS causes to clarify what she calls having “the right support team” 
(2012: 976); Stegenga expresses it as part of ignoring background knowledge about how an intervention works when 
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Evaluating this property involves making sure that the relevant background conditions of a target 
context are sufficiently similar to those which enable the intervention to bring about its outcome in 
the sample context. Assessing causal inhibitors requires having information about those factors which 
could obstruct the I–O relation. If these factors, which were not present in S are present in T, then 
there is less chance that the I–O relation will obtain.  
The more homogenous these properties are across contexts, the more causally consistent the 
contexts. Total causal consistency refers to the case where all three properties are homogenous across 
separate contexts. This would ensure that an intervention which is effective in one context would be 
effective in the other. As noted, though, such consistency rarely, if ever, occurs. Yet, when 
extrapolating claims of effectiveness, it is often assumed that the two contexts in question are 
sufficiently causally consistent. Standard RCTs may be a good starting point for establishing such 
claims in target contexts but we need to evaluate causal consistency as well; if we have an idea of the 
extent to which two contexts are causally consistent, then we can revise our confidence in the 
suitability of the causal law or causal model for the target context and make better predictions. 
Evaluating causal consistency involves finding evidence. We need evidence which increases (or 
decreases) our confidence in the homogeneity of causal structure, causal enablers, and causal 
inhibitors.  Evidence of causal consistency comes in numerous forms and from any methodology 
associated with the different levels on evidence hierarchies. But mechanistic evidence, when 
available, is particularly well-suited for this task because it gives us the kind of information needed 
for evaluating each property of causal consistency. By providing appropriate-level information 
specific features of a causal process, mechanistic evidence gives us information about differences 
between the sample and context which will affect I’s capacity for producing O. 
When it comes to causal structure, we are concerned with the components that make up the 
causal pathway from I to O. Plainly, mechanistic evidence is most suited for this. If we can establish 
that the mechanism of action of a drug in the sample context MS and the mechanism of action of the 
drug in the target context MT are consistent with respect to the I–O relation, then we have good 
reason to believe that the underlying causal structures of both are consistent with one another. This 
means first gathering evidence for MS. This evidence should, as stated in Section 2.2, be about 
appropriate-level specific components of the causal pathway from I to O. Once we have evidence of 
MS we can gather evidence that the MT will be similar if the intervention is deployed in that context. 
If it is similar enough, then we can have increased confidence in our prediction. If there is evidence 
to the contrary, then we should decrease our confidence in the prediction.  
For example, the CYP2D6 enzyme plays an important role in the mechanism of action of the 
pain reliever codeine. This gene is responsible for metabolizing the drug into morphine, its active 
metabolite which is required for its analgesic effect. However, people who carry two inactive copies 
of the CYP2B6 gene (various combinations of *4, *5, and *6 alleles) are far less likely to experience 
 




an adequate analgesic effect. This is because two inactive CYP2B6 genes are poor metabolizers of 
codeine and thus produce reduced morphine levels (Bhandari et al. 2011). Having this mechanistic 
information is crucial to predicting whether codeine will be an effective pain reliever for an 
individual patient. In cases like this, we are concerned with comparing the mechanism in the sample 
with the mechanism in the target to find differences in the actual mechanism.  
Often, we either cannot gather, or have not yet collected sufficient evidence about all the 
components involved in MS and MT to do a complete comparison, which can be a problem for 
assessing causal structure. One proposed solution to these issues is to compare those stages of MS and 
MT where differences are most likely to occur (see Steel 2008). Another solution is to perform RCTs 
that have been specially designed to investigate the componential features of a proposed mechanism 
(Marchionni and Reijula 2019), which as I have outlined previously, produce mechanistic evidence.  
At first it may seem strange to speak of causal enablers and causal inhibitors in the context of 
medical interventions which often involve biological mechanisms. These properties of causal 
consistency are seemingly more compatible with disciplines like economics and behavioral policy 
where background features of contexts have more obvious effects on the causal pathway between an 
intervention and an outcome. However, it is often the case that socioeconomic and epidemiological 
differences can indirectly affect drug response in target contexts. Furthermore, there are contextual 
pathobiological factors which are not directly associated with the mechanism itself, that may 
influence the components of the causal pathway between a drug and its intended outcome.  
Appropriate-level mechanistic evidence, can help unpack how these features can influence the 
components of the causal pathways between I and O. Take ß-lactam antibiotics for S. aureus 
infection. The mechanism of action for these drugs is well-established: ß-lactam antibiotics inhibit 
synthesis of the peptidoglycan layer of the bacterial cell-wall. This happens by virtue of the 
antibiotics having a similar structure to d-alanyl-d-alanine, an amino acid ending on the 
peptidoglycan layer. The antibiotic targets and binds to active penicillin binding proteins which are 
essential for cell-wall synthesis. However, this mechanism of action has a better chance of occurring 
when the strain in question is methicillin-sensitive S. aureus (MSSA). Thus, if we find evidence that 
a person is infected with MSSA, then we can be quite confident that ß-lactam antibiotics will be 
effective. If, on the other hand, we find evidence that the person is infected with methicillin-resistant 
S. aureus (MRSA), then we should have less confidence (but importantly, not zero confidence) that 
ß-lactam antibiotics will be effective. This is because we have a well-established mechanistic theory 
that MRSA is resistant to ß-lactam antibiotics. This resistance occurs due to the acquisition of a non-
native mecA gene which encodes a penicillin-binding protein (PBP2a), with significantly lower 
affinity for ß-lactams. This allows cell-wall biosynthesis to continue even in the presence a ß-lactam 
antibiotic (Peacock and Paterson 2015).  
Being infected with MRSA is a slightly different case of a biological factor influencing drug 
effectiveness to the one in the codeine example above. Here, instead of a component of the casual 
pathway itself being different, we are presented with a factor external to that pathway being 
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different, which inhibits the mechanism of action of the drug from occurring effectively. 
Mechanistic evidence helps us determine whether this causal inhibitor is absent or not and thus helps 
in predicting whether a ß-lactam antibiotic will be effective for treating this case of S. aureus 
infection. 
It is compelling that if appropriate mechanistic evidence is available, it should be included in our 
predictions about the medical effectiveness of an intervention for a target context. One issue facing 
the mechanistic approach, particularly those in the EBM+ movement is the lack of method for 
integrating mechanistic evidence with statistical evidence. If we are to accept the evidential pluralist’s 
augmentive approach to evidence, then we ought to have methods for amalgamating these two types 
of evidence.  
2.4 The Toulmin Model: A Schema for Integrating Mechanistic 
Evidence with Statistical Evidence. 
In this section, I offer a schema for the systematic integration of mechanistic evidence with statistical 
evidence based on the Toulmin model of argumentation. The Toulmin model offers a simple, 
informal method for assessing causal consistency using available mechanistic evidence and 
evaluating the validity of predictions of medical effectiveness. I begin by explaining the key elements 
of the Toulmin Model and then outline how the model is applied to predictions of medical 
effectiveness. Following this, I use the case of the rollout of the HIV drug efavirenz in Zimbabwe to 
demonstrate how the model can be applied to integrate available mechanistic evidence with 
statistical evidence. This case had disastrous results that may have been avoided had relevant 
mechanistic evidence been included in policy considerations. I end the section by replying to the 
possible objection that Bayesian networks already provide a good method for amalgamating 
mechanistic evidence with statistical evidence.  
2.4.1 The Toulmin Model and Predicting Medical Effectiveness 
The Toulmin Model is a fixed procedural model, which, according to Toulmin (2003), all 
arguments must follow. The simple Toulmin Model consists of three elements (Figure 2.1). The 
first is a claim (C): the assertion, proposition, judgement, or view expressed in the argument. Since 
claims are open to challenges, those who make them should be in a position to provide a defense. 
Typically, this is done by producing or appealing facts or evidence on which the claim is based. The 
second element then, is data (D) (sometimes referred to as grounds) which support the claim being 
made. Naturally however, just how the data supports the claim can be questioned and so a third 
element is necessary: Warrant (W), which links the claim to the data. This can be a general principle 
such as “if D then C”, however it can also be articulated in more extended ways as required by 
substantial arguments. It might, for instance, be the case that D makes C more likely, or D entitles 
one to claim C. Consider the following simple example: Introducing more legislation to regulate 
motor-vehicle emissions will reduce overall carbon emissions in Canada (C). In Canada, 
 
45 
transportation is responsible for about 43 percent of overall greenhouse gas emissions (D). As part 
of the transport category, motor-vehicles contribute to Canada’s overall carbon emissions (W).  
 
If the data is accurate and the warrant effectively links the data with the claim, then the claim is 
justified. However, if there were an exception to the claim, then a rebuttal (R) should be 
acknowledged and, if necessary, a condition of qualification (Q) included. Furthermore, if the 
warrant is questionable, then backing (B), which provides support for the warrant, is needed. These 
three elements, in addition to those of the simple Toulmin Model, constitute the extended Toulmin 
Model. Going back to the example above (see Figure 2.2), one may argue that vehicle sales may 
increase such that the effects of the legislation introduced are negated (R). Given this rebuttal, the 
claim needs to be qualified. The force of the qualification depends on the strength of the rebuttal. 
In this simple case, we can settle for a probabilistic qualifier. One may also question the warrant by 
arguing that the contribution to transport emissions from motor-vehicles is negligible and that other 
modes of transport, such as air travel and shipping, are the real problem. By providing the backing 
that motor-vehicles are responsible for approximately 85 percent of greenhouse gases in the transport 
category (B), the warrant is vindicated.  
 
In Canada, transportation 
is responsible for about 43 
percent of overall 
greenhouse gas emissions 
(D) 
Introducing more 
legislation to regulate 
motor-vehicle emissions 
will reduce overall carbon 
emissions in Canada 
(C) As part of the transport 
category, motor-vehicles 
contribute to Canada’s 
overall carbon emissions 
(W) 
Figure 2.1. An example of the simple Toulmin Model 
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The elements of the simple Toulmin Model are present in every argument. The warrant, 
however, is often not overtly expressed, but rather implicit to the argument. Also note that further 
data can be used to support the warrant itself and thus serve as backing. Moreover, data can be used 
to support claims for or against a rebuttal to a given argument. The three elements of the extended 
Toulmin Model are also not always necessary. A backing is only required when the warrant is not 
immediately accepted. A qualifier is needed whenever there is a rebuttal to the argument. 
Conversely, sometimes in the absence of a rebuttal, a qualifier may still be necessary. With this, we 
have a general schema the Toulmin model (Figure 2.3). 
 
The Toulmin model can be used to systematize available evidence to infer its overall support 
for a prediction of medical effectiveness. Consider the Toulmin model in Figure 2.4. Here, the claim 
is that the measure of effectiveness of a particular intervention I in target T, EfT, will be the same as 
the efficacy measure established in a sample S, EfS. The warrant for this claim is that S and T are 
sufficiently causally consistent which is supported by data in the form of evidence from well-
designed RCTs or meta-analyses establishing EfS.  
 
As mentioned above, the mechanistic approach’s augmentive attitude toward evidence calls for 
the inclusion available mechanistic evidence. This is the backing for the warrant, and so should 
further support causal consistency by illustrating the homogeneity of its three properties: The causal 
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S and T are causally 
consistent  
(W) 
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(Q) 
S and T are not causally 
consistent 
(R) 
Figure 2.4. The Toulmin model for integrating mechanistic evidence with 
statistical evidence.  
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enablers in the sample are present in the target (CES ≡CET); and the causal inhibitors absent in the 
sample are also absent in the target (CIS ≡CIT).  
The mechanistic approach’s dismissive view regarding contextual similarity captured in the 
qualifying rebuttal that S and T are not causally consistent. The qualification entailed by this 
rebuttal is determined by the inclusion of relevant mechanistic evidence supporting the 
heterogeneity of the three properties of causal consistency: The causal structure in the sample is 
heterogenous with the causal structure in the target (CSS ≢CST); causal enablers in the sample are 
absent in the target (CES ≢CET); and causal inhibitors absent in the sample are present in the target 
(CIS ≢CIT).  
Given that there is still ongoing debate between the statistical and mechanistic approaches (see 
Sections 2.1 and 2.3.1), one may justifiably ask when the Toulmin model should be employed. The 
evidential monist may hold that the model should rarely be used, while the evidential dualist may 
argue that it should always be used. Recall though, both evidential monists and dualists agree that if 
there were relevant differences between a sample context and target context, then that information 
would be found by looking at pathophysiological, socioeconomic, and epidemiological information 
about the case at hand. It seems reasonable then that even those in the EBM movement, who actively 
endorse the statistical approach and simple extrapolation unless, would accept that such a model 
could be used to explicitly demonstrate that there is no good reason to doubt the generalizability of 
a particular meta-analysis or RCT. Indeed, proponents of EBM admit that there are cases where the 
expected effectiveness of medical interventions fails to manifest in target populations. Even if these 
such instances are rare, the Toulmin model is helpful in demonstrating that a particular case is not 
one of those rare instances. The routine use of the Toulmin model then is not inconsistent with the 
central tenets of EBM. 
To illustrate how the Toulmin model just described might be applied, I will use the case of the 
failed rollout of the HIV drug efavirenz in Zimbabwe. In the next subsection, I briefly outline the 
details of the case and, following this, briefly explain how the available mechanistic evidence could 
have been integrated with statistical evidence about the drug. Doing so may have helped convince 
policy makers to avoid deploying the treatment before establishing its safety, and thus may have 
mitigated the harms this caused.  
2.4.2 Applying the Toulmin Model 
There are several examples of cases where the consideration of mechanistic evidence affords us more 
accurate estimates of medical effectiveness. Some of these include variability in the effectiveness of 
codeine based on understanding how polymorphisms of the CYP2D6 genotype influence the 
metabolism of the drug (Madadi et al. 2013), the role of pulmonary, extrapulmonary, and behavioral 
factors in the treatment of severe asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (Agustí et al. 
2017; McDonald et al. 2019), and dosage adjustment based on renal function and metabolism for 
the effective treatment of deep vein thrombosis with the drug enoxaparin (Nutescu et al. 2016). 
Another striking example, which clearly demonstrates the importance of considering available 
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mechanistic evidence has been thoroughly detailed by Park et al. (forthcoming): The case of 
efavirenz in Zimbabwe.9 Park et al. use this case to usefully demonstrate the importance of 
mechanistic reasoning and how Pearl and Bareinboim’s (2014) do-calculus may be used to 
amalgamate statistical and mechanistic evidence. Given its applicability, and the thorough 
explanation provided by Park et al., I will use the Zimbabwe-efavirenz case to illustrate how the 
Toulmin model can be used to effectively organize existing evidence prior to such a quantitative 
analysis.  
Efavirenz is an antiretroviral used in the treatment of HIV/AIDS. It was initially proposed as a 
cheap alternative to existing treatments, and as such was seen as a good candidate for developing 
nations, especially those with a high incidence of HIV/AIDS. Given this appeal, and statistical 
evidence from RCTs supporting the efficacy of the drug, the government of Zimbabwe adopted 
and endorsed the use of efavirenz in its population in 2015. However, soon after its deployment, 
reports of patients suffering from adverse neuropsychological events began surfacing, which led to 
mass withdrawals from the treatment (Nordling 2017).   
Notably, mechanistic evidence claiming that this may occur already existed. Park et al. 
(forthcoming) explain that pharmacogenomic research that provided such evidence had been 
conducted since around 2008.10 The research showed that a particular gene polymorphism (the 
CYP2B6*6 allele), that occurs in approximately 20 percent of the Zimbabwean population, led to 
lower rates of metabolization of efavirenz and that this could cause adverse neuropsychological 
effects. The evidence fits my characterization of mechanistic evidence in Section 2.2. It provides 
appropriate-level information (the prevalence of the CYP2B6*6 allele in the Zimbabwean 
population) about the specific entities (the CYP2B6*6 allele), specific activities (a low rate of 
efavirenz metabolism), and specific organizational structures of the causal pathway between two 
variables of interest (diminished response to efavirenz that may lead to neuropsychiatric effects).  
Importantly, this evidence was ignored during the approval process of efavirenz in Zimbabwe 
despite vocal warnings from the researchers involved. Park et al. (forthcoming) persuasively argue 
that a good explanation for the dismissal of this evidence is that it is mechanistic and not the result 
of RCTs and meta-analyses. They suggest that, as a WHO member state, Zimbabwe is committed 
to following the organization’s recommended guidelines regarding evidence. Since WHO guidance 
endorsed the statistical approach, the argument goes, it is likely that the Zimbabwean government 
adopted a dismissive attitude to the existing mechanistic evidence. Not only does this case clarify 
significant aspects of the debate regarding the statistical and mechanstic approaches, it provides an 
 
9 I do not provide an in-depth explication of the Zimbabwe-efavirenz case here; for this, I direct readers to Park et al. 
(forthcoming) for a thoroughly informative exegesis of the events leading to the drug’s disastrous rollout in Zimbabwe.  
10 Park et al. cite work by a team led by Zimbabwean geneticist Collen Masimirembwa, particularly Nyakutira et al. 
(2008). Other work from the same team, including Aklillu et al. (2007), Maimbo et al. (2012), and Dhoro et al. (2015) 
was dismissed as well. This shows that a large amount of mechanistic evidence that could have been considered existed. 
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illustrative example of how the Toulmin model I propose can be used to organize existing evidence 
in a systematic accessible way.  
 
Let us apply the Toulmin model to this case to see how mechanistic evidence can be systematically 
amalgamated with statistical evidence (Figure 2.5). In this case, the claim was that the effectiveness 
of efavirenz in the target population of HIV sufferers in Zimbabwe would be similar to that of the 
efficacy achieved in RCTs sample contexts. No mechanistic evidence was cited in support of the 
consistency of causal structures, causal enablers, and causal inhibitors across the two contexts. Thus, 
there is no backing to support the warrant that the predominantly North American populations on 
which efavirenz was tested would be causally consistent with the target Zimbabwean population. 
The rebuttal however has support in the form of mechanistic evidence regarding heterogeneity in at 
least causal structure and causal inhibitors across the two contexts. Available mechanistic evidence 
shows that around 20 percent of Zimbabweans possess the CYP2B6*6 allele which makes them low 
metabolizers of efavirenz. Moreover, there is mechanistic evidence that, with efavirenz, the 
CYP2B6*6 allele is strongly associated with adverse neuropsychological effects which will likely lead 
to patients abandoning treatment. Therefore, there is a causal inhibitor present in at around 20 
percent of the target population. Together, the mechanistic evidence above indicates that the claim 
should be qualified to recognize that the effectiveness of efavirenz in the Zimbabwean population 
will likely be substantially lower than it was in the sample populations. 
2.6 Why the Toulmin Approach? 
In this Section, I respond to a possible objection to my suggestion that the Toulmin model provides 
a useful way to integrate mechanistic evidence. It might be argued that the Bayesian networks models 
on offer are better options for mechanistic evidence integration and that the Toulmin model 
proposed above is superfluous to predicting medical effectiveness. Indeed, Park et al. (forthcoming) 
Well-designed RCTs 
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EfS for efavirenz in in S 
Efavirenz will have 
effectiveness EfT = EfS 
for T = Zimbabwean 
HIV sufferers 
 
S and T are causally 
consistent  
EfT < EfS 
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Figure 2.5. Applying the Toulmin model for predicting medical effectiveness 
of efavirenz in Zimbabwe.  
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suggest that Pearl and Bareinboim’s (2014) do-calculus can be used to combine quantitative 
information about mechanisms with existing statistical evidence. But there are several reasons for my 
suggestion for a Toulmin model-based alternative. One reason involves recognizing that there are at 
least two senses of evidence amalgamation. The first is mathematical amalgamation—the synthesis 
of different sets of evidence to produce a numerical measure of the phenomenon of interest. For 
example, in the context of measuring the effectiveness of medical interventions, the aim of a meta-
analysis is to combine statistical results from two or more separate clinical studies to estimate the 
overall effect of a treatment. Similarly, a Bayesian network aims to accurately determine the 
probability of an outcome given numerous conditional factors. These methods are thus apt for 
amalgamating numerical evidence—efficacy measures in the case of meta-analyses and probabilities 
in the case of Bayesian networks. 
The second sense of evidence amalgamation is systematic amalgamation—the collection, 
organization, and evaluation of different sets of evidence such that we know which is relevant to the 
inferences we draw, and which may should be included in any mathematical amalgamations we 
might perform. In EBM, this sense of amalgamation commonly takes the form of systematic reviews, 
which are a performed prior to meta-analysis. A systematic review is the process of identifying, 
selecting, and evaluating relevant research for a particular research question. The Toulmin model I 
propose above is similar in this sense in that it involves the organization of existing relevant statistical 
and mechanistic evidence into a model of reasoning for a particular prediction of medical 
effectiveness. From this we may see what evidence may be included in Bayesian network models for 
the given prediction.  
Another reason for suggesting the Toulmin model is that relevant evidence is often not 
translatable into the kind of information used in Bayesian networks. Concrete values for the 
probabilities in a Bayesian network can sometimes be inaccessible. A Toulmin diagram can help with 
this by at least sorting out what kind of information should be considered when making predictions 
regarding a drug’s effectiveness in some target context. Although the sophisticated apparatus 
proposed by others is appealing, the simpler model proposed above may be quite helpful in cases 
where evidence cannot be straightforwardly included in a Bayesian network model.  
One final consideration concerns science communication. Intervention policy options often 
need to be communicated to policy decision-makers, and decisions conveyed to the public. Often 
effective decision-making and public trust in those decisions relies on understanding how outcomes 
from the methods were inferred. However, mathematical amalgamation methods, and thus Bayesian 
networks, are usually difficult to communicate to non-experts (Douglas 2012). One option to 
mitigate this drawback is to develop ways in which such methods can be communicated to the 
uninitiated. Since the Toulmin model I propose can be used to survey which evidence is relevant for 
Bayesian network methods, it may be seen as one way to communicate the outcomes of such models 




The mechanistic approach to evidence claims that mechanistic evidence—appropriate-level 
information about the components of the causal pathway between two variables—is important for 
improving predictions of drug effectiveness. With this approach gaining increasing support in recent 
years, a deeper understanding of how it differs from the evidential monism of the statistical approach 
is vital for explaining the different attitudes each has toward evidence in the context of predicting 
medical effectiveness. Where the statistical approach adopts a dismissive attitude toward mechanistic 
evidence, the mechanistic approach, whether in its stricter evidential dualist or more amenable 
evidential pluralist form, embraces an augmentive attitude toward both types of evidence.  
The underlying reasons for these disparate attitudes are often said to be based on views regarding 
evidence quality. The dismissive attitude results from the EBM-centric view that mechanistic 
evidence is lower in quality than statistical evidence, particularly that gathered from RCTs and meta-
analyses. The augmentive attitude, on the other hand, is said to be based on the EBM+ argument 
that good mechanistic evidence should be considered equal in quality to statistical evidence. 
However, proponents on both sides agree that mechanistic evidence can be helpful in causal 
inference. There is thus more to the reasoning behind the dismissive and augmentive attitudes—
assumptions regarding contextual similarity. The dismissive attitude is also due to the assumption 
that there is a low probability that there will be relevant differences between a sample and target 
context, while the augmentive attitude arises from the assumption that there is a high probability of 
there being such differences. 
The kinds of differences which may be relevant for predicting effectiveness can be captured by 
the concept of causal consistency. Two contexts are causally consistent to the extent that they are 
homogenous across three categories: Causal structure, causal enablers, and causal inhibitors. 
Mechanistic evidence helps in evaluating causal consistency by providing appropriate-level 
information about which components make up the causal pathway between a drug and its intended 
outcome, and information about how factors external to the causal structure impact the relation in 
question.  
The view that mechanistic evidence is important for predicting medical effectiveness is 
unproductive without methods for integrating such evidence with statistical evidence. Based on the 
Toulmin model of argumentation, I offer a model for the systematic integration of mechanistic 
evidence with statistical evidence. This model incorporates the concept of causal consistency to 
organize available mechanistic evidence and evaluate its effect on predictions of effectiveness. The 
suitability of the model is demonstrated using the case of failed rollout of the HIV treatment, 
efavirenz, in Zimbabwe. The model I propose is not necessarily an alternative to the Bayesian 
network methods proposed by others. The latter are good for mathematical amalgamation—
integrating quantifiable mechanistic evidence with statistical evidence—whereas the former is 
appropriate for systematic amalgamation—collecting, organizing, and evaluating mechanistic 




P-hacking: Its Costs and When It Is 
Warranted 
3.1 Introduction 
P-hacking involves the use of analytic techniques that may lead to exaggerated experimental results. 
While it is widely condemned, some have suggested that there are some contexts where the practice 
may be warranted. I have three aims in this Chapter. First, I provide a sorely needed definition of p-
hacking. Second, I use philosophical tools from decision theory to articulate the prevalent position 
on p-hacking and illustrate how serious its effects on obtaining false-positive results can be. And 
third, I argue against the prevalent position, defending the view that there are scenarios in which p-
hacking may be warranted, with a particular focus on non-epistemic judgements.  
P-hacking is typically criticized on epistemic grounds. Given that it raises the probability of 
acquiring false-positive results, the argument goes, there is little warrant for believing the conclusions 
of studies where p-hacking has occurred (Simmons et al. 2011; Simonsohn et al. 2014). Indeed, such 
practices have been linked to the replication crises in various fields like psychology and medicine 
(Munafò et al. 2017; Open Science Collaboration 2015). While these arguments underscore 
pertinent epistemic features of the case against p-hacking, others mention its practical consequences. 
Because p-hacking increases false-positive report rates, its regular practice, particularly in fields like 
medicine, could lead to harmful policies and recommendations based on false findings (Head et al. 
2015) and may foster a general distrust of science (Colquhoun 2017). 
Such arguments against p-hacking are common in disciplines like economics and psychology, 
yet few have illustrated the potential severity of its consequences for obtaining false-positive results. 
Moreover, there seems to be a dearth of philosophical work about how serious the epistemic and 
practical costs of p-hacking can be. This is an important project; pernicious p-hacking is an ongoing 
problem, especially in medical research where it could have extremely negative effects on patients in 
the clinic. I use tools from decision theory, particularly expected utility, to articulate the most 
common argument against such practices, which I refer to as the prevalent position on p-hacking. 
Framing the argument in this way is useful for at least two reasons. First, it illustrates the enormity 
of one aspect of the epistemic costs of p-hacking, and second, it describes precise claims of 
proponents of the prevalent position.  
Despite these arguments, some have argued that such practices are, under certain conditions, 
appropriate (Gelman 2004; Hitzig and Stegenga 2020). I offer my own defense of the thesis that p-
hacking can sometimes be warranted. Here, I argue that the prevalent position fails to recognize 
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other important epistemological and practical features of the debate. I argue that the propriety of 
analytic choices depends, in part, on there being some reasonable link between the hypothesis and 
data in question. Such a link may involve some combination of relevant prior knowledge, analogous 
reasoning, plausible mechanism, or value-based judgement. In this Chapter, I focus on the last of 
these. I apply features of the argument from inductive risk to the case of COVID-19, arguing that 
value-based judgements can warrant p-hacking (Douglas 2000). I conclude that while p-hacking 
should generally be considered epistemically pernicious, there is a limited set of cases in which 
practical concerns may warrant such practices.  
Given that there is little in terms of a precise definition of p-hacking in the literature, I begin in 
Section 3.2 by describing the key features which distinguish it from other related practices. In 
Section 3.3, I articulate the prevalent position on p-hacking. I begin by outlining a study of 
progestogen research (Prior et al. 2017) which illustrates the importance of understanding the 
impacts p-hacking can have on medical inferences. Then, for simplicity, I describe a hypothetical 
case where a researcher chooses to use methods which amount to p-hacking and acquires statistically 
significant results. I express this choice as a decision problem and develop an expected utility 
framework which I use in the rest of the section. Then, by linking previous work on false-positive 
report rates (Ioannidis 2005) with seminal work on p-hacking (Simmons et al. 2011), I illustrate the 
potential severity of its epistemic consequences on research results. Incorporating this into the 
expected utility framework, I describe how the potential epistemic costs of p-hacking are linked to 
its practical consequences, and articulate the conditions under which proponents of the prevalent 
position argue p-hacking is harmful. The prevalent position maintains that p-hacking is always 
epistemically and practically pernicious. I then argue that the prevalent position fails to recognize 
key epistemic and practical features of p-hacking, suggesting that once these are considered, we can 
see how p-hacking may be warranted. In Section 3.4, I defend the view that sometimes, analytic 
choices which amount to p-hacking may be considered appropriate, following which, I outline how 
practical considerations can be used to warrant practices that many may consider p-hacking. Section 
3.5 concludes.  
3.2 What is P-hacking? 
Strikingly, there is a lack of explicit definition of p-hacking provided in the literature. Without this, 
assessments of allegedly p-hacked results risk being hindered by needless debates over different 
interpretations of the practice. Therefore, before addressing the severity of its consequences, it 
would be worthwhile to have an explicit definition of p-hacking. This involves the conceptual 
analysis and explication of disparate accounts of the term. I analyze how p-hacking has been 
characterized in existing work, noting important similarities and inconsistencies between these 
different descriptions. Then, by outlining its necessary features, I offer a precise definition of p-
hacking that I suggest should be used in discussions of the practice.  
Exactly what is meant by ‘p-hacking’ is largely taken for granted and the term is used 
ambiguously and somewhat unreflectively in the literature. Some scholars have offered conflicting 
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characterizations of p-hacking. For instance, Simonsohn et al. (2013: 534) describe it as the practice 
of placing statistically insignificant analyses in the file drawer, alluding to intentionally opaque 
reporting. Yet elsewhere Simonsohn is favorably quoted as stating that “‘P-hacking…is trying 
multiple things until you get the desired result’” (see Nuzzo 2014: 152). Similarly, Gelman and 
Loken (2013) see it as an issue concerning multiple comparisons but emphasize, as does Nuzzo 
(2014), that it may be intentional or unintentional.  
Common to most characterizations, then, is the idea that p-hacking involves multiple analyses 
that may lead to overstated research results. However, this broad description is too vague, making it 
difficult to differentiate between p-hacking and other related practices, such as HARKing 
(hypothesizing after results are known), data fishing, or circular analysis. Indeed, several scholars 
equate p-hacking with other analytic misdeeds and biases. Some prominent biologists, for example, 
have suggested that p-hacking is synonymous with “inflation bias” or “selective reporting” (Head et 
al. 2015: 1), and Nuzzo (2014: 152), a leading statistician, has stated that p-hacking is “also known 
as data-dredging, snooping, fishing, significance-chasing and double-dipping". A good definition of 
p-hacking should help differentiate between these practices.  
Perhaps what explains the conflation of p-hacking with other related practices is that they all 
lead to the same bias—data-dredging bias. This is a distortion of results arising from probing data in 
unplanned ways (Erasmus et al. 2020). P-hacking, HARKing, data fishing, and circular analysis all 
involve the unplanned testing of data and could produce exaggerated results. It is thus tempting to 
lump these practices together into one general category. While not entirely wrong, there is something 
to be gained by splitting these practices apart. For one thing, there are nuanced differences between 
them, which may result in disparate consequences. For instance, where p-hacking, as I illustrate 
below, can have a large effect on analytic results, HARKing may have less severe consequences.  
One way in which p-hacking differs from these related practices, is that it involves probing a 
data in unplanned ways such that the chance of obtaining the desired results for a particular 
prespecified hypothesis increases.11 Unlike HARKing, which involves analyzing data, obtaining 
results, and then developing various hypotheses, p-hacking involves having a given hypothesis in 
mind and examining data in various ways to confirm that hypothesis. Likewise, where data fishing 
involves analyzing different constellations of variables from datasets from multiple sources for 
putative correlations, p-hacking analyzes different ways in which fixed variables—such as between a 
specific medication and a particular outcome—may be correlated. As a final comparison, p-hacking 
is different from the practice of circular analysis in that, where the former analyzes a single dataset in 
different ways to find a correlation between two variables, the latter analyzes a single dataset, finds a 
correlation, then uses that result with the same dataset to find other putative correlations.  
What makes it possible to test a single prespecified hypothesis in various ways is that there are 
numerous analytic choices that must be made to complete the analysis of any single hypothesis. 
 
11 Note that a “prespecified” hypothesis in this case is not the same as having a pre-analysis protocol.  
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These choices, often referred to as “researcher degrees of freedom” (RDFs), may be exploited to 
obtain results which seemingly confirm the hypothesis of interest (Simmons, et al. 2011; Gelman 
and Loken 2013). RDFs include, but are not limited to, how to define study parameters, how to set 
exclusion and inclusion criteria, which variable attribute(s) to measure, or what statistical test should 
be performed on the data. If, for instance, an initial analysis produces results which are close to being 
statistically significant, then one can make further analytic choices which may produce a statistically 
significant p-value.12  
To illustrate, suppose a researcher wants to know whether a new triptan medication is effective 
for treating migraine pain. The researcher sets up a randomized control trial (RCT) to test the 
hypothesis that the drug is effective when compared to a placebo. They perform the RCT and gather 
self-report data about pain relief from participants in both the control and treatment groups, and 
demographic information for the patients is available. Immediately, there are countless ways in 
which the difference between the drug and placebo can be compared, all of which are consistent 
with the collected data. The researcher can measure the difference between men in each group, or 
the difference between women only. They might measure the effect for certain age ranges, say 
participants between 31 and 40 years of age. A difference might be observed between participants 
from a particular socio-economic category (whose classification is open to different measurements), 
or between those from a particular ethnic background. The researcher might take data about how 
long it took for participants to no longer feel pain into account and observe a difference. There could 
very well be no difference for any of these attributes, but one when all participants from each group 
are considered. And we are yet to even consider the different statistical tests that may be performed 
on the data.  
Overall, there are two important features of RDFs. First, these analytic choices are consistent 
with the data in question. It is possible that one or more combinations of RDFs may yield statistically 
significant results that support the hypothesis in question. And second, such choices are 
unavoidable. We are required to settle on some combination of RDFs to test a hypothesis.  
The first important feature of p-hacking, then, is that it is the misuse of analytic techniques for 
a single hypothesis. This misuse of analytic techniques is possible due there being RDFs that must 
be decided on when testing the hypothesis. The second feature we can derive from the above 
discussion is that the hypothesis in question is prespecified—the researcher is interested in 
confirming the hypothesis they started with in the first place. These two features already go some 
way to differentiating between p-hacking and other related practices. 
There is another important feature of p-hacking that helps set it apart. It does not necessarily 
involve the intentional exploitation of RDFs (Gelman and Loken 2013). That is, p-hacking 
 
12 Note that despite the ‘p’ in ‘p-hacking’ referring to p-values, the practice can occur in studies regardless of what 
statistical inference tools are being used, including null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), and other frequentist 
or Bayesian approaches. That is, one may exploit analytic choices in these other approaches to obtain “attractive” results. 
Given its ubiquity in research and its relative simplicity for my arguments, I focus on NHST in this Chapter. 
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sometimes arises from a lack of awareness rather than deliberate misconduct. There are times when 
one’s RDFs appear entirely appropriate given what we see in the data. Imagine a hypothesis is tested 
by using a (perhaps pre-planned) course of analysis 𝜑𝜑, using a unique classical test statistic T, applied 
to data 𝑥𝑥, thus yielding an outcome T(𝑥𝑥;𝜑𝜑). Now consider two scenarios: 
(Scenario 1):  The test is performed 𝑛𝑛 times, with each analysis applied to different 
constellations of the data, T(𝑥𝑥;𝜑𝜑1–𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥)) and only the best, or most attractive result is 
reported, thus yielding T(𝑥𝑥;𝜑𝜑𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏(𝑥𝑥)).  
(Scenario 2):  The test is performed based on data 𝑥𝑥 thus yielding T(𝑥𝑥;𝜑𝜑(𝑥𝑥)), but had 
different data been observed, a different test would have been performed. 
Scenario 1 describes a case of deliberate p-hacking. There are times when researchers 
intentionally explore a given dataset to attain positive results for a hypothesis of interest, although, 
as expected, this often occurs with other misconduct like the direct manipulation of data. For 
example, consider the triptan case above. The researcher might test several constellations of RDFs 
and find a statistically significant result for women between the ages of 31 and 40, but not for any 
other combinations. Scenario 2, on the other hand, involves the unintentional exploitation of RDFs. 
Here, 𝜑𝜑 is a function of the data observed. In such a scenario, it may be that the human tendency to 
unconsciously interpret ambiguity in a self-serving fashion leads to these analytic choices, 
particularly when these decisions are not strictly prespecified. To illustrate, say the triptan researcher 
initially tests for a difference between women in the control and treatment groups and observes a 
near-significant p-value. Based on this, they then analyze women between 31 and 40 years of age and 
find a statistically significant difference. This result seems reasonable given the previous near-
significant result, however, she has unconsciously exploited the RDFs for the hypothesis. Moreover, 
had the results from her initial analysis not been near-significant, she would not have performed the 
age-based analysis. In other words, many researchers assume they are properly analyzing the data 
when, in fact, they are unintentionally p-hacking. This may be a more common occurrence than the 
first scenario, but it should be noted that both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 involve the exploitation of 
RDFs and both should be considered p-hacking.   
We are now well-positioned to provide a definition of p-hacking that should be used in practice.  
P-hacking is the intentional or unintentional exploitation of researcher degrees of 
freedom, which may lead to exaggerated results regarding a single, prespecified 
hypothesis of interest.  
This definition helps to more reliably identify cases of p-hacking and differentiate between its 
practice, and other analytic offenses. 
Before focusing on the possible consequences of p-hacking, it is worth addressing a potential 
concern about my definition. It may be argued that p-hacking is not just a question of analytic 
practices, but also one of scientific integrity. Put another way, it comes down to whether one is 
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transparent about their analytic procedures. It therefore may be argued that another necessary 
feature of p-hacking is that it involves some opaque, selective, or inaccurate reporting of analytic 
procedures or results. Head et al. (2015: 1), for instance, claim that p-hacking “is the misreporting 
of results”. Generally, transparently reported courses of analysis are considered acceptable because 
knowing what analyses took place in a study can help calibrate one’s confidence in the results 
(Ioannidis 2008).  
However, failure to accurately report one’s analytic procedures is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for p-hacking. A researcher can p-hack without being any more opaque, inaccurate, or 
selective in their reporting than any non-p-hacked study. For instance, in the triptan example, the 
researcher may have exploited RDFs and listed all their assumptions, analyses, and accurately 
reported the results they acquired. That they were transparent in their reporting may justifiably 
lower our confidence in their results, but it does not change the fact that they exploited RDFs and 
acquired possibly inflated support for their hypothesis. Besides, the norms of evidence reporting do 
not require that one disclose every assumption made and every analysis performed. A researcher can 
selectively or inaccurately report their methods or results without having p-hacked. The triptan 
researcher may not have exploited RDFs at all and still not have accurately reported their analyses. 
This may explain why some have interpreted the case against p-hacking as one of scientific integrity 
and not the typical failure to understand its consequences. In the next section, I turn the question 
of how serious those consequences can be. 
3.3 The Impact of P-hacking on Results 
Arguments against p-hacking operate on the logic that the chance of discovering a statistically 
significant result from numerous analyses is higher than if just one analysis is performed (Ioannidis 
2005, 2008; Simmons et al. 2011; Nuzzo 2013). Although compelling, this reasoning does not quite 
capture the extent to which p-hacking may affect the probability that a given result is false. In this 
section, I provide a detailed formulation of the prevalent position on p-hacking, which is consistent 
with intuitions about multiple analyses, and which illustrates the magnitude of its epistemic 
consequences while linking practical concerns. I begin by outlining a real case of medical research 
where p-hacking is suspected of producing exaggerated results. This case illustrates why we should 
worry about p-hacking in the first place.  
3.3.1 Why P-hacking Matters 
Some of the characteristics of p-hacking make it difficult to detect in published results. One 
proposed method, p-curve analysis, aims at detecting selective examines the distribution of 
statistically significant p-values for a set of results (Simonsohn et al. 2014, 2015). However, such 
methods require vast amounts of data from many studies for effective detection, and there is little 
evidence for the validity of the method. What is more, in non-randomized studies, confounding may 
make tests for p-hacking inaccurate (Bruns and Ioannidis, 2016). An in-depth analysis of such 
techniques would constitute a project on its own, and so these discussions are beyond the scope of 
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this particular Chapter.13 It should be noted, however, that the challenges to detecting p-hacking 
make its incidence difficult to gauge and its effects hard to correct for in practice. Even so, whatever 
impacts there are will directly influence medical inferences. For example, if the evidence we have for 
an efficacy claim consists of p-hacked results, and p-hacking increases the chance that those results 
are false, then our predictions will be distorted from the start. An example will make this point 
clearer.  
Progestogens, a treatment aimed at mitigating pregnancy loss, have been found to be effective 
in several trials and meta-analyses. However, more recent trials have concluded they are ineffective. 
These conflicting findings led to a recent systematic review and meta-analysis which included only 
the results of primary outcomes of preregistered trials (Prior et al. 2017). Researchers scoured 
professionally recognized trial registries finding 194 relevant studies, 29 of which were systematic 
reviews with meta-analyses; these were grouped together into a Total Study Group (TSG). 
Altogether, the TSG reported the results of 93 RCTs.  
Of the 93 RCTs used in the TSG meta-analyses, 22 were judged as having a low susceptibility 
to p-hacking because they reported pre-registered primary outcomes. Of these 22 trials, only one 
produced statistically significant results favoring progestogens over placebo. A meta-analysis of these 
trials found that there was no evidence that progestogens prevented pregnancy loss. In contrast, 19 
out of 29 previous meta-analyses found that progestogens were effective. Prior et. al. (2017) suggest 
that the difference is likely due to the inclusion of p-hacked studies in the previous meta-analyses. 
While it may be the case that there are many other biases at play here, this is unlikely. If, for example, 
this difference were the result of publication bias, then, given the 21:1 ratio of non-significant to 
significant results in pre-registered trials, we should expect that there are over 1,000 unpublished 
studies which found no statistically significant effect.  
This example shows that if (enough) p-hacking occurs, it may lead to questionable efficacy 
claims, which meta-analyses may not be able to overcome. This, added to arguments for the ubiquity 
of p-hacking, make it an important issue, not just for predictions of medical effectiveness, but for 
other medical inferences too. These include inferences about clinical resource allocation policies 
derived from studies comparing the outcomes of different approaches to care, diagnostics based on 
studies aimed at reducing error rates, and prognostics based on studies on disease risk factors.  
Indeed, there are arguments for the ubiquity of p-hacking in published research. Some claim 
that if all research were analyzed properly and published accordingly, then we should see roughly the 
same proportion of p-values just above and just below p = 0.05 in the published literature. But there 
are an unexpectedly large number of studies which report a p-value just below this threshold in 
medical journals (Jager and Leek, 2014; Albarqouni, et al., 2017; Perneger and Combescure, 2017; 
Ioannidis, 2019).  
 
13 Indeed, a prior question is how p-hacking should be defined. This may be particularly important if different 
techniques used to detect p-hacking utilize definitions that are inconsistent with one another.  
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Despite the perceived pervasiveness of p-hacking, there is debate about the severity of its 
epistemic and practical consequences. Head et. al. (2015) conclude that while p-hacking is rife, it is 
unlikely to have substantial effects on meta-analyses. This, they argue, is because only smaller studies 
are vulnerable to p-hacking, and these have negligible effects on the results of meta-analyses. 
However, their argument assumes that meta-analyses will include large studies with smaller ones. 
One problem here is that meta-analyses typically consist of small studies. Indeed, there is reason to 
think that p-hacking may affect downstream medical inferences. It would thus be good to have an 
idea of just how much impact p-hacking can have on efficacy claims. By illustrating how serious the 
impacts of p-hacking on the probability of obtaining false-positive results can be, I demonstrate that 
most researchers may be greatly underestimating the consequences of such practices.  
3.3.2 A Case of P-hacking 
Consider the following hypothetical study: 
(H-trial): A researcher performs a well-designed RCT to test the efficacy of a drug for 
reducing the risk of heart attack. She chooses to measure the effect of the drug on two 
variables, blood pressure (BP) and low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL), analyzing 
each individually and then by combining them. She finds that there is no significant 
difference in either BP or its combination with LDL between the drug and control 
groups, but she notices that the result is close to p < 0.05 for LDL, so she decides to 
collect more data. Further analysis reveals that she is closer to obtaining statistical 
significance for the LDL variable, so she decides to control for the interaction of gender 
with the treatment and detects an ostensibly better effect in males. Convinced she is onto 
something, she analyzes the data again by running low effect, medium effect, and high 
effect conditions. By dropping the low effect condition, she obtains the statistically 
significant result she knew was there all along: the drug is effective for reducing LDL 
cholesterol in males and thus, she infers, for reducing risk of heart attack.14 
The practices in H-trial amount to p-hacking. The researcher exploits RDFs through redefining 
study parameters, dropping and combining different variables, and performing multiple analyses.  
The researcher’s choice to p-hack in H-trial can be described using tools from decision theory. 
The points at which the researcher decides to manipulate and reanalyze the data can be expressed as 
acts, either p-hack or ¬p-hack. Her results will either be positive or negative, viz. either exhibit a 
statistically significant correlation or not, and they will either be true or false. One of the following 
states will thus occur: true-positive results (r1), false-positive results (r2), true-negative results (r3), or 
false-negative results (r4). Further, these states will occur with some probability P(r i) and, since we 
 
14 This example is formulated by combining parts of an example given by Hitzig and Stegenga (2020) and statistical 
methods simulated by Simmons et al. (2011).  
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are dealing with one set of results from the study, the sum of these probabilities will be unity: P(r1) 
+ P(r2) + P(r3) + P(r4) = 1. Lastly, utilities can be attached to each outcome of the researcher’s chosen 
act over the possible states (see Table 3.1). 
 r1 r2 r3 r4 
p-hack u 1 u 2 u 3 u 4 
¬p-hack u 1 u 2 u 3 u 4 
 
 
Without knowing that p-hacking occurred, when presented with positive results we would 
arguably believe that they are true, and if they are in fact true, then we would put them to good 
practical use. Thus, assume we believe that the consequences, and thus the utilities, of obtaining 
true-positive results will be the same regardless of whether p-hacking occurred or not. This goes for 
all other states too, hence: 
u (p-hack·r1) = u (¬p-hack·r1) = u1 
u (p-hack·r2) = u (¬p-hack·r2) = u2 
u (p-hack·r3) = u (¬p-hack·r3) = u3 
u (p-hack·r4) = u (¬p-hack·r4) = u4 
With all these elements in place, we can articulate the argument from proponents of the 
prevalent position and examine the severity of the consequences of p-hacking on false-positive report 
rates using an expected utility approach.  
3.3.3 The Prevalent Position and the Consequences of P-hacking 
Broadly, proponents of the prevalent position claim that researchers should not p-hack because it is 
epistemically detrimental, and thus could have practically harmful consequences. This suggests two 
elements to the argument against p-hacking, one epistemic and one practical. By way of caveat for 
this section, I am not arguing that we should agree with the prevalent position, but rather 
articulating what I see as the typical argument against p-hacking. Ultimately, I will argue that the 
prevalent position neglects key features of the discussion around p-hacking, and that, once these are 
considered, there are scenarios where p-hacking can be warranted (Section 3.4). 
Besides the influential work of Ioannidis (2005) and Simmons et al. (2011), which I discuss in 
detail here, the literature is replete with admonitions of p-hacking for its epistemic effects. These 
criticisms have come from leading scholars, academic societies, and governmental organizations. The 
American Statistical Association (ASA), for example, released a statement affirming that p-hacking 
“leads to a spurious excess of statistically significant results in the published literature and should be 
vigorously avoided” (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016: 132). Indeed, Simonsohn et al. (2014: 534) state 
that “p-hacking can allow researchers to get most studies to reveal significant relationships between 
Table 3.1.  
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truly unrelated variables”. This view is also exemplified in calls for journals to require that studies be 
preregistered to qualify for publication, which many argue helps prevent p-hacking (Simmons et al. 
2017; Hawkes 2018). The American Psychological Association, for instance, notes that one 
promising feature of preregistered trials is that they are less susceptible to p-hacking (Gonzales and 
Cunningham 2015). Additionally, the European Union recently released a report titled ‘As 
Predicted: Preventing p-hacking’ stating that there “is increased awareness about the benefits of 
preregistration to combat p-hacking” (European Commission, Directorate-General for Research 
and Innovation 2019: 11).  
Many have noted that the epistemic problems caused by p-hacking could potentially have dire 
practical consequences. One broad consequence is encouraging a general distrust of science 
(Colquhoun 2017). More concretely, some highlight issues that may arise from developing of policy 
based on incorrect inferences which result from p-hacking (Head et al. 2015). For instance, despite 
the increased probability of the false-positive results in H-trial, the drug might, on account of the 
significant result, be deemed safe and effective by administrative bodies. This could result in the it 
being prescribed to patients with high cholesterol, which may cause harm through possible side 
effects, costs, or ineffectiveness. Put another way, the prevalent position argues that because its 
epistemic problems could potentially have harmful practical consequences, not p-hacking is 
preferable to p-hacking. Unpacking this prevalent position against p-hacking will reveal specific 
features of the argument that have been overlooked, and which help us recognize the circumstances 
under which p-hacking may in fact be warranted. 
A useful way of understanding the conditions set out in the prevalent position is to articulate it 
in terms of expected utility (see Appendix 1). Not p-hacking is preferable to p-hacking just in case 
the expected utility of not p-hacking is greater than the expected utility of p-hacking: 
not p-hacking ≻ p-hacking iff EU (¬p-hack) > EU (p-hack) 







                                    (3.1) 
Note that one cannot appeal to differences in utilities under each state to account for any 
difference in the expected utility of each act. These, as previously explained, are equal given the state 
in question. However, the inequality can be defended by appealing to differences in the probabilities 
of each state occurring. Here, we are interested in the probability of a state rk obtaining, given that 
either p-hack or ¬p-hack occurs. This is the prevalent position’s epistemic argument against p-
hacking—we should always choose not to p-hack because if we do and obtain positive results, then 
the fact that p-hacking occurred makes it more likely that those results are false. In other words, 
proponents of the prevalent position argue that the probability that the result is a false-positive given 
that p-hacking occurred is higher than it would be if the results were not p-hacked: 
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 P(r2|p-hack) > P(r2|¬p-hack) (3.2) 
This formalization represents the typical epistemic stance on p-hacking. It relies on the intuition 
that multiple analyses increase the chance of getting desired results. Imagine you were given the 
following two options: 
(a) I will toss a coin. If it lands heads, I will pay you £100.  
(b) I will toss a coin twenty times. If it lands heads on any toss, I will pay you £100.  
Most people would correctly choose option (b) because they realize that, despite the probability 
of the coin landing heads in each toss is 0.5, there is a higher probability of it landing heads at least 
once in twenty tosses than there is of it when tossed once. The reasoning can be applied to p-hacking. 
Since p-hacking involves performing multiple analyses on a set of data, there is a higher chance of at 
least one of these analyses producing a statistically significant result than there is of a single analysis 
of the same data producing a statistically significant result.  
Still, it might be argued that the intuition alone does not give us reason to doubt the validity of 
a statistically significant result. To understand this, consider the following: Say that we accept the 
typical α-value cut-off of 0.05. This essentially means that in a study of the relationship between two 
variables there is a 5% chance of finding a significant result even if there is no true relationship 
between the two variables. Now say that we perform the 20 separate analyses on the data and all but 
1 of these produces non-significant results. Knowing that 19 out of 20 results were non-significant 
throws serious doubt on the 1 significant finding. The more separate analyses performed on a set of 
data, the more likely it becomes that a significant result will be found and if all the analyses bar one 
result in non-significant findings, the more likely it is that the one significant result is a false-positive. 
This is akin to a company in the business of producing parachutes securing contracts by only 
showing clients the 1 instance in 20 in which their parachutes in fact bring someone safely to ground. 
If the client knows about the 19 failed tests, they will very likely not buy any parachutes from the 
company. 
Returning to H-trial, the researcher has performed numerous analyses and not acquired a 
significant p-value in all but one. Given that all but one of her analyses produce non-significant p-
values, it is less certain that the one significant result is true. Of course, the researcher has only 
performed four analyses on the data, and so, one might be inclined to think that this is not as 
questionable as performing 20 analyses. This conclusion would be too hasty, however. In what 
follows, I illustrate the extent to which p-hacking affects the probability of obtaining false-positives. 
To do this, and to show more precisely how (3.2) holds, I appeal to two discussions. In the first, 
Ioannidis (2005) famously illustrates how to get an idea of the likelihood that a published positive 
result is false. For simplicity, take the following example:15 Given a set of 1000 testable hypotheses, 
assume that 100 of them are true—the proportion of true hypotheses is 10%: π = 0.1. When testing 
 
15 This example is taken from Forstmeier et al. (2017), who neatly outline the essential point of Ioannidis’ argument.  
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the other 900 false hypotheses, we typically allow a 5% false-positive rate: α = 0.05. Thus, we will 
obtain 45 false-positive results. Further, we will reject a number of the 100 true hypotheses because 
the data does not provide significant support. This false-negative rate β is determined by our sample 
size and effect size. The larger the dataset, the lower the risk of failing to obtain significance. Hence, 
a large dataset means that the study has high statistical power: 1– β. Given the large sample size in 
the example, we have a power of 80%, and thus there is a 20% false-negative rate: β = 0.2. Importantly, 
when considering the set of positive outcomes where a hypothesis has evidentiary support from the 
data, a larger proportion than we might expect will be false. The fraction of positive results which 
are false is the false-positive report probability (FPRP): 
FPRP =
α(1 – π)
α(1 – π)+(1 – β)π
                                                  (3.3) 
By substituting the values from our example into (3.3), we get a probability of 0.36 that an 
obtained positive result is false. Ioannidis thus demonstrates that stipulating that α = 0.05 does not 
actually entail that only 5% of positive results are false.16 Note that in Ioannidis’ argument, (3.3) gives 
us an idea of the probability that a positive result is false without taking p-hacking into account: 
P(r2|¬p-hack) = 0.36.  
Whereas Ioannidis provides a way to determine the FPRP where p-hacking has not occurred, a 
second account, by Simmons et al. (2011), can be used to illustrate how it is affected by p-hacking. 
In other words, with this account we can determine the probability of obtaining false-positive results 
given p-hacking: P(r2|p-hack). This discussion highlights how a lack of constraints on RDFs allows 
one to obtain statistically significant results from just about any data. Computer simulations show 
that just four combined decisions to use an analysis that is better for producing lower p-values, much 
like the choices made in H-trial, increases α from 0.05 to 0.607. This means that making repeated 
choices to p-hack substantially increases probability of producing statistically significant results 
when no real effect exists.  
This illustrates how massive the effect of p-hacking on the FPRP can be. Many take the 
increased α-value to mean that if p-hacking occurs, up to 61% of obtained positive results are false 
(see Simmons et al. 2011). But this, despite seeming like a huge effect, is an underestimation. To see 
why, we just need to substitute the simulation findings into the example of 1000 hypotheses from 
before. The effect this has on the FPRP is enormous. With α = 0.607 the FPRP increases from 0.36 
to a colossal 0.87. Put another way, if the data were repeatedly p-hacked, then there is an 87% chance 
that a given positive result is false: P(r2|p-hack) = 0.87. 
Taking Simmons et al. and Ioannidis’ accounts together illustrates just how epistemically 
problematic p-hacking can be—such practices can increase the probability that a given positive result 
 
16 Things get worse when we consider that many published studies have lower power due to small sample sizes. If a study 
has a statistical power of 25%, then the probability of a positive result being false goes up to 0.66. 
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is false from 0.36 to 0.87.17 Second, in doing so, it vindicates (3.2)—it shows that P(r2|p-hack) > 
P(r2|¬p-hack). Finally, it illustrates the following epistemic condition given by proponents of the 
prevalent position (PPE): P-hacking increases the probability that an obtained positive result is false. 
Of course, PPE does not, on its own, entail that (3.1) holds. Despite not being able to appeal to 
differences in utilities under each state, (3.1) relies on differences in utilities across states, viz. 
differences such that (3.1) results in a higher expected utility for not p-hacking than for p-hacking.  
It is reasonable to assign utilities based on what we hope the research will achieve. Since having 
a true effect will help those with high LDL cholesterol and a false effect will not, a true-positive result 
in H-trial will have better consequences than a false-positive one, u1 > u2. Having a true-negative and 
a false-negative in H-trial will arguably result in the same utility since there will be no consequences 
given that no policy will be developed thus, u3 = u4. And since, in this case developing no policy is 
better than developing policy based on false findings, obtaining a true-negative result is better than 
obtaining a false-positive one, u3 > u2. Finally, a false-negative result would be worse than a true-
positive one, u1 > u4 , because we do not develop an effective policy when we may have. In line with 
this, suppose that u1 = 100; u3 = u4 = 50; and u2 = 25.  
Now we can substitute these utilities and the probabilities from before into (3.1). Assuming a 
positive result is obtained without any p-hacking occurring, P(r1|¬p-hack) = 0.64 and P(r2|¬p-
hack) = 0.36. Thus, the expected utility of not p-hacking is calculated as: 
EU (¬p-hack) = (0.64 × 100) + (0.36 × 25) = 73 
Now, assuming a researcher decides to perform four consecutive analyses like those in H-trial, 
P(r1|p-hack) = 0.13 and P(r2|p-hack) = 0.87. Thus, the expected utility for p-hacking the data is: 
EU (p-hack) = (0.13 × 100) + (0.87 × 25) = 34.75 
This shows that, at least in this case, the practical consequences of p-hacking are worse than 
those of not p-hacking. Moreover, those who argue for the prevalent position suggest that this is true 
for all cases in which PPE holds and where u1 > u2. This latter conjunct is the practical condition 
given by proponents of the prevalent position (PPU): Obtaining true-positive results entails more 
beneficial outcomes than false-positive results.  
The argument from expected utility I have outlined above illustrates the potential severity of p-
hacking on false-positive report rates, and how p-hacking can lead to harmful practical 
consequences. Additionally, it outlines two central claims of the prevalent position: Proponents of 
the prevalent position hold that p-hacking should always be avoided because it increases the 
probability that obtained positive results are false, and because false-positive results are always less 
desirable than true-positive results. However, the prevalent position faces some immediate 
 
17 Simmons et al. (2011) state that the results of their simulations may actually be conservative. Their simulations do not 
consider other common practices in statistical research which may increase α-values. Furthermore, they illustrate that 
with just one p-hacking decision, the α-value increases from 0.05 to 0.08 which results in an FPRP of 0.47.  
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challenges. In the next subsection, I outline some of these and then, in Section 3.4, expand on the 
argument that p-hacking can, in fact, sometimes be warranted. 
3.3.4 Immediate Challenges to the Prevalent Position 
There are striking issues facing the typical argument for the prevalent position. The first is that it is 
not so clear that the p-hacking is always entirely epistemically harmful. To see why, we need to 
consider the overall probability of error due to p-hacking.18 Consider a straightforward example in 
which the following probabilities occur when one does not p-hack. The probability of accepting 
hypothesis H and H is true is r1 = 0.2, the probability of accepting H and H is false is r2 = 0.05, the 
probability of rejecting H and H is false is r3 = 0.35, and the probability of rejecting H and H is true 
is r4 = 0.4 (see Table 3.2).  
 
 H is True H is False 
Accept H 0.2 0.05 
Reject H 0.4 0.35 
 
 
Now suppose that one p-hacks and this results in the following probabilities, which are consistent 
with there being an increase in the probability of obtaining false-positive results. The probability of 
accepting hypothesis H and H is true is r1 = 0.555, the probability of accepting H and H is false is r2 
= 0.3, the probability of rejecting H and H is false is r3 = 0.1, and the probability of rejecting H and 
H is true is r4 = 0.005 (see Table 3.3). 
 
 H is True H is False 
Accept H 0.555 0.3 
Reject H 0.005 0.1 
 
 
Notice that the overall probability of error in the non-p-hacked experiment represented in 
Table 3.2 is P(r2 ∨ r4) = 0.45, while the overall probability of error in the p-hacked experiment in 
Table 3.3  is P(r2 ∨ r4) = 0.305. Therefore, we have a case where, when the overall probability of error 
is considered, p-hacking is less epistemically harmful than not p-hacking. Notice too that in Table 
3.3, the probability that we accept a true hypothesis has risen from 0.2 to 0.555. While p-hacking 
raises the probability of obtaining false-positive results, it also raises the probability of obtaining true-
positive results. Indeed, this is one of the key insights of Hitzig and Stegenga’s (2021) Bayesian 
analysis of the epistemic harms of p-hacking.  
 
18 I would like to thank Daniel Steel for his insightful remarks, which contributed greatly to formulating this point.  
Table 3.2.  
Table 3.3.  
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The above considerations reveal a further challenge to the prevalent position. The prevalent 
position focuses on the probabilities and consequences of accepting false-positive results at the 
expense of the probabilities and consequences of rejecting false-negative results. This is evident in 
claims from vocal critics of p-hacking cited previously. To reiterate, Simonsohn et al. emphasize that 
p-hacking allows researchers to obtain spurious “significant relationships between truly unrelated 
variables” (2014: 534), while the ASA claims that p-hacking should be avoided because leads to an 
“excess of statistically significant results in the published literature” (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016: 
132). Common to these criticisms is an overemphasis on the negative consequences of false-positive 
results, and neglect of considerations about the consequences of rejecting results that are in fact true. 
Note that the prevalent position’s conditions, PPE and PPU , do not constitute necessary and 
sufficient conditions for p-hacking being worse than not p-hacking. Consider a simple toy example 
where P(r1|p-hack) = 0.3, P(r2|p-hack) = 0.25, P(r3|p-hack) = 0.25, and P(r4|p-hack) = 0.2. Further, 
say that P(r1|¬p-hack) = 0.25, P(r2|¬p-hack) = 0.2, P(r3|¬p-hack) = 0.3, and P(r4|¬p-hack) = 0.25. 
Note that these probabilities satisfy PPE , P(r2|p-hack) > P(r2|¬p-hack). the utility of a true-positive 
(u1) is 100, the utility of a false-positive (u2) is –10, a true-negative (u3) 10, and a false-negative (u4) is 
–100. Note that these utilities satisfy PPU : u1 > u2. These result in the following results for the 
expected utilities for p-hacking and not p-hacking: 
EU (p-hack) = (100 × 0.3) + (–10 × 0.25) + (10 × 0.25) + (–100 × 0.2) = 10 
EU (¬p-hack) = (100 × 0.25) + (–10 × 0.2) + (10 × 0.3) + (–100 × 0.25) = 1 
So, while the upshot of the prevalent position seems compelling, there are toy examples in which 
it does not hold. For the prevalent position to hold, not only do PPE and PPU need to hold, but, at 
the very least, the probabilities attached to all possible outcomes and the consequences of rejecting 
false-negatives would always need to be such that p-hacking results in lower utility than not p-
hacking. Put another way, PPE and PPU are insufficient for the biconditional represented by 3.1 to 
hold. It may be these conditions show why p-hacking in H-trial is epistemically and practically 
harmful, but ultimately this is because rejecting a true association will not result extremely negative 
utility since there are other treatments for high cholesterol on the market.  
It remains to be seen if there are legitimate examples of cases like those in the toy examples 
provided above. In the next section, I argue that p-hacking can sometimes be warranted by appealing 
to features of the argument from inductive risk and provide an example of a case where the 
consequences of rejecting a false-negative result may have severe enough consequences that p-
hacking is warranted. 
3.4 Warranting P-hacking 
While many maintain that p-hacking is both epistemically and practically harmful, there are some 
who argue that it is sometimes warranted. Gelman (2004), for example, advocates a two-stage 
analysis where the first is an exploratory stage in which p-hacking (and other related practices) are 
acceptable, and the second is a confirmatory stage where the findings from the first stage are 
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(dis)confirmed. In this section, I argue for the view that the choices about which observed data and 
methods to use when testing a hypothesis can be appropriately made and, following this, use 
elements from the argument from inductive risk to show how p-hacking may be warranted. 
3.4.1 The Propriety of Analytic Choices 
As mentioned, RDFs are unavoidable in hypothesis testing (Gelman and Loken 2013). In H-trial, 
for instance, the researcher had to make a decision about whether to examine the relationship 
between the drug and either BP, LDL, or both because the results from all three have something to 
say about the overarching hypothesis. This decision, in particular, highlights an important detail 
about analytic decisions: Some choices are more appropriate than others. For example, choosing to 
examine the relationship between the drug and, say, BP is more appropriate than choosing to analyze 
the relationship between the drug and average body temperature. On the one hand, since there is no 
established relation between one’s average body temperature over time and the risk of heart attack, 
examining this relation would be questionable. The researcher’s decision to examine the relationship 
between the drug and BP, on the other hand, is more appropriate given that there is well-established 
background knowledge regarding the relation between persistent high BP and the risk of heart 
attack. The choice is made, in this case, based on previous evidence and background knowledge.  
This reasoning can be similarly applied at the level of choices regarding RDFs. Recall that after 
getting the results from the initial analyses on BP, LDL, and the combination of the two in H-trial, 
the drug has an ostensibly better effect on LDL. Imagine now that in addition to this, the chemical 
structure of the drug in question is similar to other pharmaceuticals which reduce LDL. This, taken 
with the ostensibly better effect add to the propriety of the researcher’s choice to collect more LDL 
data, particularly when compared to a case in which there were just an ostensibly better effect. This 
suggests that there are scenarios in which there is good reason to think that a particular combination 
of RDFs is appropriate.  
Recall Scenario 1 and Scenario 2  from Section 3.2. Gelman and Loken (2013) distinguish 
between cases of blatant p-hacking—where RDFs are intentionally exploited to obtain an attractive 
result—and cases of unintentional p-hacking—where the test is chosen based on observed data. In 
these latter cases, analytic choices appear entirely appropriate to a researcher given what they see in 
the data.  What I am proposing here is the existence of scenarios like the following: 
(Scenario 3): The test is performed based on data 𝑥𝑥 and background knowledge 𝑏𝑏 which 
links the observed data to the hypothesis of interest, thus yielding T(𝑥𝑥;𝜑𝜑(𝑥𝑥; 𝑏𝑏)), but 
had different data been observed, no other test would have been performed. Here, 𝜑𝜑 is 
a function of the data observed and the background knowledge linking the hypothesis 
to the data. 
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Cases like Scenario 3 are appropriate because they include information beyond the data in 
question, which links the observed data with the hypothesis of interest. This information increases 
one’s confidence in that the analytic choice is warranted. 
The information underlying the propriety of a particular analytic choice in such scenarios will 
differ from case to case but may include some combination of prior knowledge regarding variables, 
a proposed plausible mechanism, or as above, reasoning from analogous theories or cases. Put 
another way, just because a testable hypothesis can be (dis)confirmed by multiple constellations of 
evidence does not always mean that the decisions regarding how to interpret and analyze observed 
data are always unfounded.  
Besides those listed above, another possible set of information for making decisions about RDFs 
may come from non-epistemic considerations of inductive risk. By applying the argument from 
inductive risk (AIR) (Rudner 1953), particularly Douglas’ (2000) extension of the argument, to 
what is revealed in the expected utility approach, I argue that there are cases in which p-hacking may 
be warranted on practical grounds.  
3.4.2 Warranting P-hacking using Non-Epistemic Judgments 
Another way to argue against the prevalent position is to object to PPU. Recall, this is the condition 
states that obtaining true-positive results entails more beneficial outcomes than false-positive results. 
So, one would need to demonstrate that there are hypotheses for which the expected utility of false-
positives is higher than for true-positives. Here, since u2 > u1 entails that p-hacking will bring about 
a higher expected utility than not p-hacking, we acquire the strange result that p-hacking is preferable 
to not p-hacking. However, this argument is implausible since practicing researchers would seldom 
think that false-positive results are more beneficial that true-positive ones. Of course, p-hacking 
cannot be warranted based on the utility of obtaining false-negative results.  
Another question to ask, however, is whether a researcher’s exploitation of RDFs—and thus 
decision to p-hack—could ever be warranted based on non-epistemic judgements of the 
consequences of being wrong. This involves appealing to an extended version of the AIR, which 
claims that non-epistemic judgements of inductive risk are not restricted to setting significance 
thresholds but are also present within the research process itself. Douglas (2000) convincingly 
illustrates that there are at least three areas within a study where researchers could make errors which 
may have non-epistemic consequences: the characterization of data; the choice of model; and the 
interpretation of results. RDFs is another such area, fraught with inductive risk, where non-
epistemic values play a role. This, after all, is another way of characterizing the prevalent position: 
Because wrongly deciding to use a particular combination of RDFs can have serious consequences, 
we should avoid using them. However, I argue here that the extended AIR provides a more nuanced 
approach to such choices, one more amenable to situations where such practices can be valuable. 
The prudent researcher knows that making analytic decisions which amount to p-hacking 
increases the probability that an obtained positive result is false. That said, it is plausible that if the 
consequences of wrongly rejecting a hypothesis are serious enough, then such decisions can be made 
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despite this increased risk. Since wrongly rejecting the hypothesis in H-trial would not necessarily 
entail that there are no potentially effective treatments available, such considerations may not be a 
factor for the researcher. Yet, there are cases in which such considerations are extremely important. 
One such set of cases are those which require urgent discovery. For example, in the context of a 
sudden pandemic, such as the that of COVID-19, researchers may be warranted, to a certain extent, 
in combining RDFs (in a way that amounts to p-hacking) in order to discover potentially effective 
treatments. It seems that just this sort of reasoning has contributed to calls for the repurposing of 
existing drugs for COVID-19 research. Given the “high infectivity” of the virus, some scholars have 
stated that “efficacious treatment, prevention of spread, and vaccine development are global 
imperatives” (Farne et al. 2020: 1186). The urgency of discovering effective treatments and vaccines 
for such a pandemic could make accepting false-positives more tolerable.  
Of course, possible candidates for treatments and vaccines should and do undergo further 
scrutiny before being approved, but in cases where urgency is a factor, and the consequences of not 
finding an effective intervention fast are potentially very serious, it could be argued that such 
practices may be just what is needed. This is because, while p-hacking raises the probability of 
uncovering false-positives, it also increases the chances of discovering true-positive results. To be 
sure, as the prevalent position illustrates, there will be a high probability that such positive results 
represent spurious correlations. But in cases where the need for discovery is pressing, such results can 
be examined further and evaluated in terms of background knowledge. And if confirmation 
increases, these results may turn out to be reliable. What is more, if the consequences of wrongly 
rejecting a potential candidate treatment may lead to extensive loss of lives, then polity may be 
somewhat guided by research that engaged in practices which amount to p-hacking.  
There is some evidence that these kinds of research practices took place in the early stages of 
COVID-19 research. To illustrate, consider the case of dexamethasone. As of November 2020, this 
corticosteroid is strongly recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) for “the 
treatment of patients with severe and critical COVID-19” (WHO Living Guidance 2020). This 
recommendation, introduced in late July 2020, was initially based on preliminary reports from the 
RECOVERY trial (The RECOVERY Collaborate Group 2020; Horby et al. 2020). The goal of the 
trial is to assess the efficacy of various readily available treatments against COVID-19. These 
treatments, of which one is dexamethasone, have previously been tested for other uses, so, for the 
most part, their safety has been established (Farne et al. 2020). Researchers in the trial tested the 
efficacy of dexamethasone against severe COVID-19 for at least four difference subsets of a single 
group of participants.19 The results showed that the use of dexamethasone significantly reduced 
mortality in patients receiving machine ventilation and those receiving supplemental oxygen 
without ventilation. Results also showed a significant overall reduction in mortality in patients 
taking the drug, but no benefit for those not receiving any respiratory support.  
 
19 They may have tested the drug’s efficacy for other stratifications, and not reported these analyses or results and the 
researchers mention that p-values were not adjusted for multiple testing.  
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While this research may not present a clear-cut case of p-hacking, it does suggest that trying out 
different combinations of RDFs is warranted in instances where needs are urgent. At the time, there 
were no available treatments that reduced mortality in patients with severe COVID-19 and already 
scarce healthcare resources were becoming increasingly under threat. Regarding how it decided on 
its guidelines, the WHO states: 
“The panel ranked the outcomes and attributed a high value to even a very small 
reduction in mortality. In addition, the panel also placed a high value on even a small 
reduction in the need for mechanical ventilation, which places a large physical burden 
on patients and an emotional burden on patients and families. A second reason the panel 
placed a high value on a small reduction in mechanical ventilation concerns health 
resource issues: the availability of mechanical ventilation stands out as an important 
vulnerability during the COVID-19 pandemic.” (WHO Living Guidance 2020: 9) 
Moreover, there was less concern for potential harms caused by the drug given that the relative 
safety of the drug had previously been established, and the treatment was readily available and 
reasonably priced. That said, the WHO categorized their recommendation for dexamethasone as 
“strong” but indicated that it was “based on moderate certainty evidence”. This seems indicative of 
tolerance for a somewhat looser evidence base than typically desired for their guidelines. 
While the AIR does not necessarily defeat the strict conditions of the prevalent position, it does, 
to a certain degree, vindicate the argument that choosing to p-hack can, under certain circumstances, 
be warranted. That is not to say that p-hacking is valuable for establishing the truth of hypotheses, 
but rather for discovery, particularly when the stakes are high. Non-epistemic judgements of 
inductive risk can warrant decisions to p-hack. Furthermore, these considerations imply that the 
prevalent position may be too strict a view of how researchers should conduct research, particularly 
when non-epistemic values of wrongly rejecting a hypothesis are severe. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The analyses and arguments I have offered have potential implications for future discussions of p-
hacking. For one, it seems plausible that different interpretations of p-hacking will have some 
influence on the techniques for its detection. Indeed, those techniques which claim to be detecting 
p-hacking, may in fact be detecting a range of questionable practices. Another area of philosophical 
interest involves the role of funding in encouraging or discouraging p-hacking and related practices, 
particularly when it comes to the interaction between epistemic and financial resources. Finally, 
during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic in particular, much has been said about increased 
amounts of “bad” science (see Scheirer 2020; New Scientist 2020). Once it has passed, it would be 
interesting to investigate the extent to which p-hacking contributed to this dissemination of 
misinformation. To be sure, tackling these issues relies on knowing how to characterize p-hacking, 
how severe its consequences can be, and when it is warranted.   
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I set out to achieve three things in this Chapter. First, I unpacked the different features of p-
hacking to provide a much-needed explicit definition of the practice and clarify its importance for 
efficacy claims and medical inference. P-hacking is characterized as the intentional or unintentional 
abuse of researcher degrees of freedom, which may lead to exaggerated results regarding a particular 
hypothesis of interest.  
Second, I articulate the prevalent position on p-hacking and, in doing so, also illustrate just how 
serious the consequences of p-hacking can be. While p-hacking is widely condemned on epistemic 
grounds, it is also important to consider its practical consequences. My expected utility approach 
captures both concerns. In this regard, I appeal to influential work on false-positive report rates and 
p-hacking to argue that just four decisions to exploit researcher degrees of freedom entails an 
extremely high probability that a given positive result is false. Applying tools from expected utility 
theory illustrates how the enormity of the epistemic effects can have significant practical 
consequences. Moreover, these tools clarify precise conditions under which p-hacking is practically 
harmful: Just in case p-hacking increases the probability of obtained positive results being false, and 
acquiring true-positive results will have more beneficial outcomes than acquiring false-positive ones, 
then we should choose not to p-hack. 
Finally, I argue that analytic choices regarding researcher degrees of freedom can sometimes be 
appropriate. I analyze whether considerations of inductive risk can be used to warrant p-hacking. 
While it is unavoidable that p-hacking increases false-positive report rates, non-epistemic judgements 






Curb Your Effectiveness: Correcting for 
Meta-Biases in Therapeutic Prediction 
4.1 Introduction 
It is commonly assumed that results from medical research can be used to determine the general 
capacity of medical interventions to bring about their intended effects. This is done by inferring 
from measurements of treatment efficacy to estimations of treatment effectiveness. In this Chapter, 
I argue that such estimations are prone to failure because they do not account for the effects of a 
particularly nefarious set of biases on measures of medical effectiveness: Meta-biases. To help remedy 
this, I offer a novel model for correcting the results of clinical studies based on evidence about these 
meta-biases. I refer to this framework as the bias dynamics model. 
Clinical research is performed to measure the efficacy of medical treatments. When conducting 
a clinical trial, researchers quantify the effect of an intervention as an effect size using some outcome 
measure.20 This is a measure of the net difference that exposure to an intervention makes to a 
particular outcome in a population. Effect sizes are calculated by performing statistical tests on data 
gathered in clinical trials, such as cohort studies or randomized control trials (RCTs). If a trial meets 
certain standards, the measured effect size is thought to accurately quantify the relationship between 
exposure to the treatment and the outcome for the study population in the trial. In other words, the 
study will exhibit a high degree of internal validity. The results from clinical trials are subsequently 
used to predict the effectiveness of medical interventions. In other words, measures of medical 
efficacy are used to estimate the general capacity of medical interventions to bring about their desired 
effects in populations outside of trial settings.   
One major challenge facing clinical trials is that, even if they are internally valid, they may 
nevertheless fail to be externally valid—the conclusions drawn about the study population may not 
be true of the target population. Put another way, an effect measure can be true for a sample 
population but not true when it is generalized to a target population. Establishing the external 
validity of clinical trials is a crucial concern in medicine, having received a lot of attention from 
medical researchers, methodologists, and philosophers alike. One proposed method for establishing 
external validity is to develop a reliable approach to extrapolation by outlining the principles under 
which we would be justified in generalizing an effect size from a sample population to a target 
population.  
 
20 See Appendix 2 for a breakdown and explanation of commonly used outcome measures in medicine.  
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There are currently two dominant approaches to extrapolation proposed in the medical and 
philosophical literature. The first is what Stegenga (2018) refers to as simple extrapolation unless 
(SEU). According to SEU, generalizing a result from a clinical trial is admissible if there is no good 
reason to believe that the target population differs from the population in the trial in some relevant 
way (Post et al. 2013; Walsh et al. 2015; also see Chapter 2). Proponents of this approach argue that, 
usually, no reason will be found and thus we can extrapolate the findings from clinical trials without 
risk (Guyatt et al. 2008). The second approach is to explicitly establish the sufficient similarity of the 
sample and target populations before extrapolating research results. Generalizing a result from a 
clinical trial is admissible, on this approach, if it has been established that the target population is 
shares salient features with the sample population from the trial. This strategy has received more 
philosophical attention in recent years, with several different approaches to what counts as relevant 
for establishing such similarity and how best to do so (Steel 2008; Cartwright 2012; Broadbent 2013; 
Fuller and Flores 2015; Parkkinen et al. 2018).  
While these two approaches to extrapolation provide possible solutions to the problem of 
external validity, they rely heavily on having accurate and reliable results from clinical trials in the 
first place. Typically, discussions about the reliability of clinical trial results center on biases that may 
manifest in the process of the trial itself and which threaten the internal validity of medical research. 
Such biases include confounding, confirmation bias, reporting bias, and various forms of data-
dredging. However, a problem that is often overlooked in discussions about the application of 
results from clinical trials is another form of biases that affect medical research at the meta-level, and 
thus only indirectly affect the reliability of research results. I refer to these biases as meta-biases. 
Widespread meta-biases present a serious challenge to the reliability of medical evidence, particularly 
in cases where that evidence is used to estimate the effectiveness of medical interventions. Negative 
analyses and studies are often relegated to the file drawer, and industry sponsored research tends to 
promote commercial interests. Some researchers argue that the ubiquity of research biases 
contributes to a large proportion of published scientific conclusions being false (Ioannidis 2005; 
Horton 2015). More recently, others have suggested that these such biases, including meta-biases, 
can, and typically do, lead to systematically exaggerated claims of medical effectiveness (Stegenga 
2018; Fuller 2021).  
My first aim in this Chapter is to expand on this line of reasoning, by arguing that, despite a 
growing body of evidence on their impacts, we often fail to account for the effects of meta-biases in 
medical research. That is, despite evidence that estimations of medical effectiveness based on the 
results of clinical trials are often overstated due to pervasive meta-biases, we do not have procedures 
to correct for their effects. My second aim is to offer a strategy to help remedy this problem. I outline 
a framework for correcting measures of efficacy in line with empirical evidence about the prevalence 
and effects of meta-biases prior to inferring claims about effectiveness. The model I propose is 
loosely based on the methods used in the field of dynamics, a branch of classical mechanics, whereby 
calculations of the forces impinging of the motions of objects are adjusted to account for friction. 
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Just as such calculations employ empirical friction coefficients to modulate estimates of the forces 
acting on objects, I propose the use of empirical bias coefficients to adjust estimates of medical 
effectiveness. Such bias coefficients, I argue, should be regularly updated to reflect the best current 
evidence about meta-biases—they thus change over time. Because of its relation to dynamics 
calculations, and because I propose that bias coefficients be amended frequently based on empirical 
findings, I refer to my proposed framework as the bias dynamics model for estimating the 
effectiveness of medical interventions. 
 I begin, in Section 4.2, by providing a definition of meta-biases. Here, I draw a key distinction 
between what I refer to as methodological biases and the higher-level concept of meta-biases (Section 
4.2.1). Methodological biases are those biases that are directly linked to the methodological features 
of clinical research. Meta-biases, on the other hand, are connected to meta-level properties of a 
scientific discipline. This distinction helps demonstrate that disciplinary guidance often focuses on 
methodological biases and often overlooks the effects of meta-biases. In Section 4.2.2, I argue in line 
with other epidemiological and philosophical work, that inferences of medical effectiveness are often 
exaggerated due to the impacts of these types of biases. I appeal to two prominent meta-biases, 
publication bias and sponsorship bias, to illustrate the point that the problem of meta-biases should 
lead us to attenuate our estimations of the effectiveness of medical interventions. Meta-biases lead 
to systemic exaggerations of research results, which are then used to make inferences about the 
effectiveness of medical interventions. Thus, such estimations are prone to unreliability, regardless 
of whether the principles of simple extrapolation unless or extrapolation by sufficient similarity are 
satisfied. In Section 4.3, I outline the bias dynamics model, a strategy that corrects for meta-biases 
when inferring effectiveness. I argue that estimations of effectiveness can be attenuated using what 
I refer to as bias coefficients, which represent the effects of meta-biases on specific outcomes in 
particular subdomains of medical research. I then briefly outline a provisional research program for 
calculating bias coefficients in Section 4.4. In line with novel contemporary work in meta-science, I 
propose the use of simulation studies to help model the effects of meta-biases on measurements of 
treatment efficacy based on existing research on the prevalence of such biases. Following this, I 
conclude.  
4.2 What are Meta-Biases? 
Medical research is plagued by various forms of bias. The Cochrane Group defines a bias as “a 
systematic error, or deviation from the truth, in results or inference” (Cochrane Handbook 8.2.1) 
Biases are typically thought to occur due to some property of either the design or implementation of 
a research method or the interpretation of the data gathered through experimentation. It is worth 
asking whether this conception of bias fully captures the full range of ways in which medical research 
can be systemically distorted. Below, I draw a useful distinction between the standard 
characterization of biases, which focuses on methodological aspects of clinical research, and biases 
that occur at the meta-level of scientific disciplines.  
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4.2.1 Methodological Bias and Meta-bias  
Standard examples of bias include confounding, confirmation bias, the Hawthorne effect, and 
reporting bias. Biases like this are relatively well-understood. They are directly linked to 
methodological features of clinical research. As such we have a good idea of how they manifest and 
have invested a great deal into developing strategies to mitigate and prevent them. Take 
confounding, the underdetermination of the association between a treatment and an outcome due 
to an imbalance of some factor in the experimental and control groups of a study. Some strategies 
for lowering the chance of confounding in clinical research are randomization, matching, 
stratification, and multivariate analysis. Another oft-cited example of bias is confirmation bias, a 
catchall term for various ways in which one tends to give more weight to evidence that supports their 
hypothesis than to evidence against that hypothesis. Good experimental blinding and having 
rigorous procedures for finding, reporting, and correctly weighting all relevant evidence are widely 
endorsed practices for preventing confirmation bias. Because of their direct relation to the processes 
within clinical trial methodology, these types of bias may be referred to as methodological biases. 
Perhaps the most damaging form of methodological bias is reporting bias. This bias occurs 
when results are distorted due to the selective disclosure of the analyses performed and results 
obtained in a clinical trial. Practices that lead to reporting bias include withholding unfavorable or 
nonsignificant results, publishing only a subset of the analyzed data, reporting secondary outcomes 
as primary outcomes when the original primary outcomes yielded nonsignificant results,21 and 
adding entirely new outcomes to the published study. While difficult to detect, there is evidence that 
practices that constitute reporting bias are widespread in clinical research. Between October 2015 
and January 2016, The COMPare Trials Project, run by the Centre for Evidence Based Medicine 
Outcome Monitoring Project, found that just nine of 67 published clinical trials in leading medical 
journals were reported without error (Goldacre et al. 2016). The implication here is that reporting 
bias, whether intentional or not, is rampant in medical research. Elsewhere, a six-month study of top 
medical journals, including The Lancet, British Medical Journal, the Journal of American Medical 
Association, Annals of Internal Medicine, and New England Journal of Medicine, found that 18% 
of RCTs had inconsistencies in their reporting of primary outcomes when compared with 
corresponding trial registry entries (Fleming et al. 2015). The researchers also found that 64% of trials 
had discrepancies relating to non-primary outcomes, including the omission of outcomes listed in 
registry entries and addition new.  
Because of the scrutiny reporting bias has received, the mechanisms responsible for it are 
relatively well-understood and strategies to prevent it have been developed with some success. 
 
21 A primary outcome is a variable that is the most relevant to answer a research question; it is the main measure in a 
study. A secondary outcome is an auxiliary variable which is measured to help interpret the primary outcome. Sometimes 
there are more than one primary and secondary outcome. It may be the case that an intended primary outcome does not 
yield positive results, but a secondary outcome does. Without a pre-registered study protocol, it is difficult to determine 
if the intended primary outcome has been abandoned and replaced by a secondary outcome.  
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Requiring that studies be recorded on official trial registries is thought to greatly mitigate outcome 
reporting bias. Some studies show that there was a reduction in some of the mechanisms that lead to 
the bias, such as questionable design and analytic practices, after trial registration was introduced at 
the turn of the millennium (Kaplan and Irvin 2015). However, there is evidence that reporting errors 
have, at least in some fields, remained consistently high (Nuijten et al. 2016; Howard et al. 2017), 
and a quick comparison of research on the rate of selective reporting in Cochrane reviews shows that 
the risk of bias has increased (cf. Kirkham et al. 2010 and Shah et al. 2020). Therefore, 
preregistration, at least in its current form, is evidently insufficient for preventing outcome reporting 
bias. However, new, and updated efforts to decrease outcome reporting bias are being pursued.  
Methodological biases like those described above are emphasized in influential EBM guidelines. 
For example, the Cochrane Group offers a tool to assess the ‘risk of bias’ for studies intended for 
inclusion in systematic reviews (Cochrane Handbook 8.5.a). The tool lists six broad categories of 
bias: Selection bias, performance bias, detection bias, attrition bias, reporting bias, and a final 
category for other bias. Researchers are advised to assess the risk of a particular bias by looking at 
specific methodological aspects of the clinical trial in question. For instance, to assess the risk of 
detection bias, one should assess the extent to which the analysts in the study were blinded in their 
assessments of each outcome. Confounding, confirmation bias, and detection bias (and other similar 
biases) fit well under the standard characterization of bias in medicine. They are indeed linked to 
problematic procedures in data collection, analysis, and interpretation.  
Another set of biases, however, cannot be so explicitly connected to features of the experimental 
process. Rather, these biases are linked to meta-level properties of science, such as entrenched values 
of the relevant scientific community or inveterate norms of its research system. Because of their 
connection to meta-level properties that are external to experimental methodology, I will refer to 
these biases as meta-biases. Of course, meta-biases can influence how research is conducted—they 
may indeed precipitate or manifest via questionable practices such as p-hacking (see Chapter 3) or 
selective reporting—yet their effects cannot be seen by looking at single studies, as one would the 
effects of methodological biases. The distortions in results due to meta-biases are only observed when 
comparing sets of studies with particular meta-level properties.  
An exemplar of meta-bias is publication bias. After completing a clinical trial and analyzing the 
data, researcher will decide whether to publish the results. The publication of clinical trial results is 
skewed by decisions not to publish results: It is common for negative outcomes, results that indicate 
no causal relationship between a treatment and an outcome, to go unpublished. There is strong 
evidence for this. Murad et al. (2018), for instance, have found that studies with positive results are 
3.90 times more likely to be published than those with negative results. This leads to a general 
weighting toward positive results in published medical research. Here, the distortion may be 
observed by comparing the set of all published studies to the set of all completed studies. 
Another example of meta-bias involves observed differences between the findings of industry 
funded studies and those of non-industry funded studies. The majority of clinical trials are funded 
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and conducted by private organizations that have vested interests in the outcomes of those trials.  
There is evidence that industry funded studies tend to generate a higher ratio of results that promote 
the interests of the funding organization when compared to non-industry funded studies.22 A recent 
Cochrane systematic review concluded that industry sponsored trials were 1.27 times more likely to 
report beneficial outcomes, 1.34 times more likely to show less evidence of harms, and 1.37 times 
more likely to present more favorable overall conclusions when compared with non-industry funded 
studies (Lundh et al. 2017). The tendency of clinical trials to generate results that promote a 
sponsor’s interests know as sponsorship bias.23  
Understanding that sponsorship bias is a meta-bias is somewhat more complicated than the 
more straightforward case of publication bias. This is because it is perhaps common for 
methodological biases, such as reporting bias, to occur in efforts to generate findings that benefit a 
trial sponsor. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that the meta-level properties of studies, namely 
‘industry funded’ and ‘non-industry funded’, are associated with a broad systemic distortion 
towards positive results that favor trial sponsors’ interests. Indeed, industry sponsorship is not a 
necessary feature of trials where related methodological biases occur. Nor is it necessarily the case 
that researchers in industry sponsored trials with positive findings have committed methodological 
biases. It is simply that industry sponsored trials tend to generate positive findings in favor of 
sponsors’ interests. And since most trials are sponsored by industry, and most industry-funded 
studies report positive findings in favor of their sponsor, there is good reason to believe that industry 
sponsorship leads to a general positive skew in research results.  
Still, it may be argued that, on its own, evidence that industry sponsored trials tend to report 
beneficial outcomes when compared to non-industry funded trials is insufficient for establishing the 
existence of the funding effect. After all, pharmaceutical companies will often halt research programs 
that run the risk of failure before they reach clinical trials. And non-sponsored research is often slow 
of the mark in this regard. This provides an ostensible explanation for the higher rates of positive 
results from sponsored trials. However, there is evidence that sponsored head-to-head trials tend to 
generate results that favor the sponsor’s drug over a competitor when compared to non-sponsored 
head-to-head trials (Ridker and Torres 2006; Flacco et al. 2015). In other words, industry funded 
trials are more likely to conclude that their drug is superior or, at least, not inferior to competitor 
drugs than non-industry funded trials. More precisely, industry funded trials tend to find that the 
sponsor’s drug is better than other competitor drugs, while non-industry funded tend to find that 
those drugs are not superior competitors. This failure to reach similar conclusions regarding 
particular treatments further supports the existence of sponsorship bias in medical research.  
A major issue facing the problem of meta-biases is that they have not been explored to the same 
extent as methodological biases. As a result, strategies to help prevent them are nascent and 
somewhat limited. The Cochrane risk of bias tool gestures toward this concern in its ‘other bias’ 
 
22 See, for example, Bekelman (2003) Lexchin et al. (2003); Sismondo (2008a); Lundh et al. (2012). 
23 Sponsorship bias is also known as industry funding bias, funding bias, and the funding effect.  
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category, recommending that systematic reviewers simply “State any important concerns about bias 
not addressed in the other domains in the tool” (Cochrane Handbook 8.5.a.). This leaves much open 
to interpretation and risks allowing further subjectivity into the process of evidence amalgamation 
(see Stegenga 2011).  
Failing to commit resources to researching meta-biases risks hindering efforts to limit their 
effects. In order to prevent publication bias, for instance, some journals have made it policy to solicit 
and publish research with negative results. However, there are other factors that lead to publication 
bias besides the historical tendency of journals favoring positive results. For instance, positive results 
are more likely to be cited and having highly cited results increases the one’s change of funding and 
career promotion. Other initiatives to mitigate publication bias include governmental and 
organizational policy requiring that the results of certain studies be reported on clinical trial registries 
within a year of completion be passed.24 Yet, such laws are often undercut by non-compliance on 
behalf of researchers and regulatory loopholes (Goldacre et al. 2018).  
Another more recent strategy, the use of funnel plots, is directed at detecting publication bias. 
This formal method, as Holman (2019: 12-13) notes, does not require access to unpublished studies 
and is routinely used in medical research. While useful for assessing the risk of publication bias in 
meta-analytic research, funnel plots do not provide a way to correct for its effects. Researchers who 
utilize funnel plot analysis and find that there is a risk of bias typically mention this risk as a caveat 
in the discussion sections of their studies. Thus, while helpful, funnel plots do not directly tackle the 
challenge of publication bias, but rather further reveal the extent of the problem. Overall, 
publication bias is a multifaceted problem and preventing it involves immense coordinated efforts.  
The same can be said of sponsorship bias. Doucet and Sismondo (2008) describe five 
interconnected sources of sponsorship bias, including elements of trial design, the practice of 
performing multiple trials with predictable outcomes, outright fraud, the manipulative use of 
rhetoric in published articles, and overlap with publication bias. Proposed solutions to sponsorship 
bias include financial disclosures, standardized reporting, and trial registration. However, these 
policies fail to cover all the contributing factors (Doucet and Sismondo 2008). Financial disclosure 
has been common practice for many years, yet industry funded trials continue to regularly favor 
sponsors’ interests. Standardized reporting cannot fully address trial design concerns. And while it 
may make fraud more difficult, developing strict reporting guidelines will not fully deter those 
whose goal is to manipulate data through outright fraud. Furthermore, the complexities of rhetoric 
in articles are hardly solved by the introduction of reporting standards. Such standardization may 
contribute to what Steel (2018) refers to as inferential asymmetries in the interpretation of clinical 
results, whereby some stakeholders are less able to infer true conclusions than others due to the way 
in which research results are reported. Trial registries may help solve sponsorship bias as it relates to 
publication bias, but one could follow registration procedures correctly and still introduce industry 
 
24 See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, European Medicines Agency (2014), and National 
Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services (2016). 
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favoring design features, perform multiple studies, directly manipulate data, and present finding in 
a way that promotes the sponsor’s interests.  
Ultimately, sponsorship bias cannot be so easily reduced to issues of methodology. It is doubtful 
that the five contributing factors outlined by Doucet and Sismondo (2008) are all there is to 
sponsorship bias. The funding effect can manifest via multiple first order methodological biases or 
through outright fraud. It is, in this sense, multiply realizable—in individual trials, different 
constellations of biases may be responsible for generating results that favor sponsor interests. 
However, it is often difficult to know whether methodological biases have occurred in a trial, and 
when we do know, it is somewhat challenging to explicitly connect these to a desire or tendency to 
favor a funding organization’s interests. Moreover, existing quality assessment tools (QATs) for 
evaluating evidence, which include assessments of the risk of bias for particular studies, often have 
poor inter-rater and inter-tool reliability leading to uncertainty regarding how sources of evidence 
should be weighed against each other (Stegenga 2015c; 2018). In other words, there are often 
epistemic gaps regarding first order methodological biases connected to the sponsorship bias and 
their effects on the quality of evidence. Here, the higher order concept of sponsorship bias can be 
useful since we can have clearer evidence to show how industry funding is correlated with favorable 
results.  
Sponsorship bias can, in this sense, be thought of as a more distal bias responsible for the 
systemic distortions in clinical research in comparison to the more proximal methodological biases 
that it precipitates or from which it manifests. Indeed, it seems like the funding effect is a problem 
of bad barrels rather than bad apples—when it comes to results skewed in favor of industry, it is the 
entrenched seating of private sponsors as the majority curators of clinical research, not simply 
pervasive methodological biases, that is responsible for the general disparity in results. That is what 
makes sponsorship bias a meta-bias. Thus, preventing sponsorship bias involves the mammoth task 
of completely overhauling clinical research, with some suggesting that private sponsors be excluded 
from research (Angell 2005; Sismondo 2008b).  However, even if this were possible, it would require 
an enormous amount of time and resources, all while the effects of sponsorship bias persist.  
This discussion should make three things clear. First, it is often helpful to use the higher order 
concept of meta-biases. While it might be the case that a particular meta-bias is constituted by 
methodological biases, we may not have epistemic access to those first order biases. Second, the 
problem of meta-biases is difficult to solve because such biases are typically linked to structural-level 
properties of a scientific discipline. Current strategies for the prevention of meta-biases require more 
revision and evaluation, and even when successful, the results take time. Despite this, research on 
meta-biases can be utilized in our inferential practices. In Section 4.4, I offer an alternative to 
prevention, one that corrects for the effects of meta-biases on clinical research results that are used 
in extrapolation. Prior to this, it is worthwhile explaining the effects of meta-biases on extrapolation 
in medicine. Doing so makes clear that there the need for methods directed at correcting for the 
effects of meta-biases.  
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4.2.2 How Meta-Biases Affect Estimations of Medical Effectiveness 
The distortions in results caused by pervasive meta-biases are a serious problem for medical research. 
For example, a growing body of evidence shows that publication bias leads to a systemic 
overestimation of effect sizes generated through meta-analyses of clinical research (Hopewell et al. 
2009; Kicinski 2014; Murad et al. 2018). Because there is a higher proportion of positive findings 
than negative findings in the published literature, the pooled results of the published studies will 
show greater effectiveness than if all studies were included. Likewise, we can infer from evidence 
about sponsorship bias that it generally skews results such that medical effectiveness is overestimated. 
If most clinical trials are industry funded and if industry funded trials tend to generate industry 
favoring results when compared to non-industry funded trials, then this gives us good reason to 
believe that (a) any given industry funded trial is more likely than not biased, and (b) amalgamations 
of evidence from all relevant published trials will bake sponsorship bias into their results. Because of 
this, there are principled reasons to lower our confidence in the results of a particular industry 
funded RCT and meta-analyses that include industry funded trials.  
The impact of meta-biases is not restricted to evidence amalgamation techniques but extends to 
extrapolation. Here, the problem is that extrapolation involves estimating the effect of an 
intervention in some target population based on what we take to be the true effect in the sample 
population. However, because of the amplifying impact of meta-biases, the effect in the sample 
population of a meta-analysis could in fact be less than that which was measured. Notably, the meta-
analysis could include risk of bias assessments, and include funnel plots for detecting publication 
bias, and still the results may be used to extrapolate. If there is no correction to the results based on 
evidence of meta-biases, the extrapolation will fail for reasons antecedent to there being relevant 
differences between populations. Stegenga makes clear why publication bias, in particular, is a 
problem for simple extrapolation unless:  
Even if there are in fact no substantial differences between the experimental subjects and 
target patients—and thus the overriding clause of SEU were not satisfied, and so 
extrapolation could be warranted—the results of published trials from which one is 
extrapolating could be entirely misleading, because the published trials may represent 
only a fraction of the trials that have been performed (2018: 127) 
Stegenga’s argument has an ontological character. He notes that even if there were in fact no relevant 
differences between the study and target populations, publication bias would be a problem. The 
argument can be couched in epistemic terms too: Even if we have no good reason to believe that the 
study and target populations were different in relevant ways, and thus according to SEU 
extrapolation is justified, publication bias would be a problem. Either way, because positive results 
are generally favored for publication, the results from the set of published trials will report a higher 
degree of efficacy than if unpublished trials were included, thus extrapolating effect sizes derived in 
meta-analyses of those studies would result in inflated claims of effectiveness in the target.  
 
81 
This argument can be extended to other meta-biases and extrapolation by sufficient similarity 
too. Even if (there is good evidence establishing that) the individuals in the target population are 
sufficiently similar in all relevant respects to that of the pooled published studies, and thus 
extrapolation is warranted by ESS, the favoring of positive results over negative results for 
publication will lead to exaggerated estimates of effectiveness in the target population. There will be 
similar consequences given sponsorship bias. The results of industry funded studies, which make up 
the majority of clinical trials, typically report outcomes that favor the sponsor’s treatment. Thus, the 
set of trial results being extrapolated could be positively distorted due to the tendency of published 
studies to favor industry treatments, even if either SEU’s or ESS’s principle of extrapolation is 
satisfied. In other words, the problem and other meta-bias transcends concerns about the internal 
and external validity of clinical trials. A study may score high on internal validity by satisfying typical 
methodological criteria, such as whether it randomized its participants and whether it was double-
blinded, and may also satisfy the principles of extrapolation aimed at external validity set out by SEU 
or ESS, and yet the results may deviate from the true effect of the intervention due to meta-biases.   
Of course, this is not to say that the problem of meta-biases is a direct problem for extrapolation 
in medicine, but rather that if we do not have methods to correct for their effects, then extrapolations 
will likely fail. Moreover, without meta-bias corrections, it would be more difficult to assess whether 
such failures of extrapolation are due to faulty measurements of efficacy or due to there being 
relevant differences between populations. This provides more reason for medicine to have ways to 
correct for meta-bias effects.  
I will not belabor the point further. Meta-biases present a major problem for estimating medical 
effectiveness, and, more indirectly, for extrapolation, because they lead to exaggerated measures of 
treatment efficacy. In the absence of effective strategies for preventing meta-biases, there should be 
a way to attenuate measures of efficacy based on what we know about the influence of meta-biases. 
In the next section, I describe a model for how this can be done and outline how research on the 
incidence and effects of meta-biases can be utilized to modulate estimations of medical effectiveness. 
4.3 Correcting for Meta-Biases: The Bias Dynamics Model 
In this section, I offer a model to correct for the effect of meta-biases on estimations of medical 
effectiveness. The model I propose is loosely based on friction force dynamics calculations in physics. 
In these calculations, empirical friction coefficients are used to estimate the effect of friction between 
two surfaces in calculations of the motions of objects. I propose a similar approach for predicting 
medical effectiveness, whereby empirical bias coefficients can be used to estimate the effect that 
meta-biases have on measures of medical efficacy. I refer to my model for correcting for meta-bias as 
the bias dynamics model.25  
 




Assume a meta-analysis is conducted to measure the effect of some treatment on some 
dichotomous outcome. After the data is collected and the analyses are completed, the researchers 
calculate an effect size measured as an absolute risk reduction (ARR). In keeping with established 
terminology, the ARR counts as evidence that supports what is referred to as a claim about 
efficacy—a proposition about the capacity of an intervention to bring about its intended outcome 
in a group of individuals in a particular population, such as one in a study setting (see Cartwright 
2009). I will use ARRS to refer to an effect size, measured as an absolute risk reduction, that stands 
as evidence for a claim about efficacy, one calculated for a given study population. 
Of course, when conducting such a study, we are not just interested in whether the intervention 
is effective for the study population, but also whether it will be effective more generally. In other 
words, we are interested in what is referred to as a claim about effectiveness—a proposition about 
the capacity of an intervention to bring about its intended outcome in populations other than the 
one in the study, some target population. Since we usually do not have direct evidence about the 
extent to which an intervention will work in a target population, we estimate effectiveness using the 
empirical results from clinical studies. The effect size from a study, in this case ARRS, is used to 
estimate the general capacity of the treatment in the target population. I will use ARRT to refer to 
the estimated effect size for the target population, the claim about the effectiveness of the 
intervention.26 This target effect size represents an expectation about how effective the intervention 
will be once meta-biases have been considered. We can treat ARRT as an expected frequency, 
representing the predicted rate of at-risk individuals who would benefit from the intervention in 
question.  
The aim here is to take what we believe to be a true measure of a treatment’s effect in the study 
and infer the general capacity of the intervention that is as close to the truth for a target population. 
Many, including those in the EBM movement, assume that, barring threats to internal validity and 
relevant differences between sample and target populations, we can straightforwardly apply such 
results. Thus: 
ARRT = ARRS 
However, as I and others have argued, pervasive meta-biases should lead us to attenuate clinical 
trial results—there is good reason, besides differences between populations and traditional failures 
of internal validity (i.e., methodological biases), to expect that the effectiveness represented by ARRT 
is lower than the efficacy represented by ARRS.  
 
26 While there are concerns about the generalizability of effect sizes measured as absolute risk reductions (see Glasziou 
and Irwig 1995), I do not have the space to deal with them here. It is worth noting that Glasziou and Irwig recommend 
using relative risk over ARR as a measure of effectiveness because it is more mathematically reasonable. Fuller (2021) 
provides an argument against the use of relative risk, in the same vein as that used against ARR. And Stegenga (2018) 
recommends the use of absolute outcomes measures, in particular ARR. Of course, one’s choice of effect size is relevant 
to the reliability of extrapolation, however that is not of immediate concern here since the bias dynamics model can be 
modulated to work with different outcome measures.  
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Lowering the expected effect size can be done by introducing what I refer to as a bias coefficient, 
δ, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Ideally, the bias coefficient represents the effect of all meta-biases on effectiveness 
claims. By multiplying the effect size obtained in the trial by the bias coefficient, we lower the 
expected effectiveness of the treatment in question: 
ARRT = δ ARRS 
Since the magnitude of the bias coefficient is between 0 and 1, it will always attenuate the value of 
ARRT. The closer δ is to 0, the more meta-biases affect ARRT, and likewise, the closer δ is to 1, the 
less meta-biases affect ARRT. It is theoretically possible that the effects of meta-biases are sufficient 
(δ = 0) for us to expect that the intervention will have no effect in the target (ARRT = 0). On the 
other hand, meta-biases could, in principle, have no effect (δ = 1), and thus we could conclude that 
the estimated effectiveness in the target will be equal to the measured efficacy in the trial (ARRT = 
ARRT).27 However, given the prevalence of meta-biases, these scenarios are unlikely in practice.  
The bias dynamics model provides a way for researchers to correct measures of effectiveness by 
taking the effects of meta-biases into account. As mentioned, the bias coefficient ideally represents 
the effect of all meta-biases on research results, yet, in practice, it is very unlikely that we would have 
access to such knowledge. This does not, however, preclude the use of bias coefficients. We can 
determine bias coefficients based on what is known about meta-biases. This is the next step to calls 
for the evidence we gather about the medical research system and its practices—typically the purview 
of the burgeoning field of meta-research—to be used for adjusting confidence in clinical findings 
(Ioannidis 2008; Fuller 2018a; Stegenga 2018). Furthermore, bias coefficients can fill the gap left in 
recognized guidelines on biases by helping researchers account for the effects of meta-biases, which 
are not explicitly listed in quality assessment tools (QATs). That is to say, once a QAT, such as 
Cochrane’s risk of bias tool, has been used to rate single studies for bias, the bias coefficient can be 
used to determine an overall rating for a given research program based on evidence about meta-
biases. In line with this, an organization like Cochrane might, for instance, publish domain specific 
bias coefficients in their guidelines. Furthermore, at least in the case of publication bias, bias 
coefficients can be used in conjunction with funnel plot analyses. Here, researchers may detect 
publication bias and have more justification for the use of a correcting bias coefficient based on their 
findings.   
Bias coefficients should be categorized by research area and outcome. Meta-biases occur at 
various rates in different research programs—the prevalence of outcome reporting bias in cancer 
research differs to that in research on statins (cf. Vera-Badillo et al. 2016 and Rezende et al. 2018). 
Likewise, different outcomes within each research program will have different rates of meta-biases—
the rate of publication bias in research on the association between statins and heart attack may differ 
 




from that research on the association between statins and stroke. Naturally, because of this, the 
values of bias coefficients for given outcomes in particular fields will differ. 
Unlike their analog in physics, bias coefficients should be dynamic. That is to say, the values of 
bias coefficients should be updated over time with the observation of new evidence about meta-
biases. Such an approach is in keeping with the central tenets of EBM and its related organizations, 
which aim to update their guidelines based on the best available evidence. For example, the Cochrane 
Group has already gestured toward this sort of approach with updates to its research into the effects 
of industry funding on research outcomes. In 2012, evidence showed that industry funded studies 
were 1.32 times more likely to report results that favored the sponsor’s interests (Lundh et al. 2012). 
This study was updated to reflect the 2017 evidence-base, finding that industry funded studies were 
1.27 times more likely to report favorable results (Lundh et al. 2017). Regular updates to bias 
coefficients in line with research like that cited here will provide researchers with a means to provide 
more accurate estimations of medical effectiveness. 
To briefly demonstrate the bias dynamics model, consider a study by Chou et al. (2016) in 
which several meta-analyses of evidence for the effects of statin therapy on various outcomes were 
conducted. In the study, one meta-analysis of 12 clinical trials found that statin therapy is associated 
with a 0.81% decrease in heart attacks over six years. That is, the absolute risk reduction of heart 
attack when taking statins for six years for the pooled participants from these trials is 0.81%, a 
beneficial outcome. Thus, in the statin study ARRS = 0.81%. We want to know if using statins will 
decrease the risk of heart attack in more general populations of individuals with high cholesterol, a 
risk factor for heart attack; in other words, we want to estimate the general effectiveness of statins in 
decreasing the risk of heart attack. Most would assume that ARRT = 0.81%. We can expect that 
around 0.81% of individuals in other populations of individuals with high cholesterol will benefit 
from statin therapy. As argued though, evidence about meta-biases in statin research should be 
considered.  
While there is little indication about the extent of publication bias in statin research, others have 
found evidence of serious industry funding bias. For instance, when it comes to RCTs comparing 
competing statins for cholesterol reduction, Bero et al. (2007) found that the odds of statistically 
significant results in favor of statin therapy in drug-drug comparisons were 16 times greater  for 
industry funded trials than for non-industry funded trials. While these findings do not indicate 
exactly how much meta-biases affect statin research regarding one’s risk of heart attack, they do 
warrant assuming a relatively low bias coefficient (indicating a large effect from meta-biases). In line 
with this, assume that research of the kind I outline in Section 4.4 below is performed to determine 
the bias coefficient for statin research on cholesterol reduction. Now assume that this results in an 
approved bias coefficient for research into the effect of statin therapy on one’s risk of heart attack 
of, say, δ = 0.45. This would attenuate the expected frequency of individuals who would benefit 
from statin therapy, ARRT = 0.37%.  
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One might wonder why I do not propose applying my framework at the level of methodological 
biases. This is, after all, a compelling route to take. Having bias coefficients that represent the effects 
of methodological biases may, in principle, generate more accurate claims of effectiveness. Yet, there 
is at least one practical reason to prefer employing the bias dynamics model at the level of meta-biases. 
As previously discussed in Section 4.3.1, there are often epistemic gaps relating to first order 
methodological biases. They are difficult to detect and thus it is challenging to assess their prevalence 
and effects, which is key to generating bias coefficients. This, added to commonly poor inter-rater 
and inter-tool reliability of evidentiary quality assessments based on judgements about 
methodological biases (Stegenga 2015; 2018) makes achievability of the accuracy hoped for by 
applying the model at the first order level unlikely. Of course, employing the bias dynamics model 
at the level of meta-biases also provides only approximations of effectiveness. But the type of 
evidence used is less susceptible to the kinds of epistemic gappiness we currently find at the level of 
methodological biases. Furthermore, many meta-biases manifest via methodological biases, and thus 
correcting for meta-biases indirectly corrects for at least some methodological biases. 
The bias dynamics model provides a straightforward strategy for researchers correct for the 
effects of meta-biases. The bias coefficient functions as a regularly updated attenuating variable 
representing the known effects of meta-biases. But how should the value of the bias coefficient be 
determined? In the next section I outline several plausible routes to determining bias coefficients.    
4.4 A Provisional Proposal for Determining Bias Coefficients 
Determining bias coefficients involves conducting meta-research on the incidence and effects of 
meta-biases in various subdomains of medicine. Studies like those of Murad et al. (2018) on 
publication bias and Lundh et al. (2017) on sponsorship bias are important for ascertaining how 
prevalent these biases are, yet these studies do not provide estimates of the differences in measured 
effects due to meta-biases. Perhaps the best way to determine the influence of meta-biases is to 
perform clinical trial type studies on existing clinical trials. RCTs are lauded by those in the EBM 
movement as the gold-standard of evidence (GRADE Working Group 2013). However, conducting 
RCTs on the effects of meta-bias is somewhat of a non-starter since this would mean introducing a 
meta-bias (the intervention) into a population of trials randomized to a treatment group (who 
receive the meta-bias) and a control group (who do not to receive a meta-bias) to understand the 
effect of the meta-bias. It would be impossible to implement the mechanics of such an RCT in a 
real-world situation since we cannot idealize the situation in the right ways. We cannot run multiple 
trials for inclusion in our trial, some of which we introduce a meta-bias to, and others we do not. 
And running such an RCT on real world trials would be both epistemically and ethically 
questionable; given that trials are themselves meant to be free from meta-bias, we cannot go 
introducing some for the purpose of meta-research. 
A reasonable alternative to conducting an RCT in this case, would be to perform what is 
essentially a retrospective cohort study on studies from a specific subdomain of medicine that differ 
according to the meta-level property in question. A standard retrospective cohort study is an 
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observational study where the difference in the risk of an outcome between two populations that 
differ according to some exposure is analyzed. Such a study in the context of research on meta-bias 
would be akin to one conducted by Hrobjartsson et al. (2012) on the effect of unblinded assessment 
in clinical trials.28 This study compared the results calculated by blinded assessors with results 
calculated by nonblinded assessors by reviewing 21 trials which had both kinds of assessors. 
Hrobjartsson et al. (ibid.) found that effect sizes nonblinded assessors exaggerated effect sizes by 36% 
in comparison to blinded assessors. A similar approach can be adopted in research on the effects of 
meta-biases. Say we are interested in estimating the influence of publication bias on measurements 
of heart attack risk in statin research. This entails comparing the pooled estimate of the effect of 
statin therapy on heart attack risk in published studies to the pooled estimate of the effect of statin 
therapy on heart attack risk in all completed studies, published or unpublished. Here, instead of 
analyzing the outcomes of being exposed to a particular phenomenon, we are analyzing the 
outcomes of trials that share a common high-level property—in this case those trials that have been 
published versus those trials that have been completed.  
While the retrospective cohort study model gives us an estimate of the influence of publication 
bias in practice, it suffers from a significant problem. The measures of effectiveness generated in 
clinical trials are not just subject to the problem of meta-bias, but other various challenges, from 
methodological biases to the encroachment of researcher subjectivity. Without a means to control 
for these problems, measurements of the effect of the meta-bias in question run the risk of being 
corrupted. A related problem is that meta-biases rarely occur in isolation—areas of research that are 
affected by publication bias are also affected by sponsorship bias—and thus, measures of the effect 
of one meta-bias risks being affected by another meta-bias. Controlling for these issues would require 
access to knowledge of the different phenomena at play in the various trials included in the meta-
research study.  
One plausible solution to this problem, proposed by Tabatabaei Ghomi and Stegenga (n.d.), is 
to simulate trial-level data using the higher order reported results of published trials, such as means 
and effect sizes. Importantly, using simulations allows researchers to not only specify the true 
effectiveness of the intervention in question prior to analyzing the effect of the meta-bias in 
question, but also control for methodological biases, researcher idiosyncrasies, and other 
overlapping meta-biases. Tabatabaei Ghomi and Stegenga (ibid.) have applied this methodology to 
research on antidepressants to measure the effects of publication bias on estimations of 
effectiveness.29 In the study, different rates of publication bias are tested against different specified 
magnitudes of efficacy. The simulations show that publication bias has little effect on treatments 
 
28 Peter Gøtzsche (2013) argues that we should correct for lack of blinding in clinical research, using the results of this 
trial to demonstrate his proposed method.  
29 In their study, Tabatabaei Ghomi and Stegenga (2020) also simulate the effects of methodological aspects, particularly 
choices regarding categorization as a ‘responder’ to the treatment and the use of placebo run-in periods, on estimations 
of effectiveness in antidepressants research. 
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that were specified as highly effective but leads to overestimations for treatments that were specified 
as having low efficacy. While these simulations weigh different possible rates of publication bias, 
similar studies can be conducted using meta-research findings on the prevalence of various meta-
biases. In doing so, we can measure their effects on different outcomes in different subdomains of 
medicine, and from there determine bias coefficients for these specific areas of research.  
4.5 Conclusion 
I began this Chapter by arguing that estimations of medical effectiveness are prone to failure because 
they do not account for the effects of what I refer to as meta-biases—aspects of medical research that 
lead to exaggerated research results, and which can only be detected by comparing sets of studies 
with particular meta-level properties. Meta-biases, I argue, distinct from methodological biases in 
that they are not directly linked to the methodological features of clinical research. Rather, they are 
connected to meta-level properties of a scientific discipline, such as the deep-rooted values of the 
medical research community or entrenched norms of the system in which medical research is 
conducted. I describe how meta-biases affect medical research and estimations of medical 
effectiveness by explaining two prominent exemplars of this type of bias, publication bias and 
sponsorship bias. Meta-biases lead to the systemic exaggeration of research results, which are then 
used to infer the general capacity of medical treatments (Stegenga 2018). As such, meta-biased results 
may lead to inaccurate estimations of medical effectiveness and indirectly affect extrapolation, 
making it difficult to assess whether the problem lies in measurement in clinical trials or evaluations 
of relevant differences between populations.  
To remedy this, I offered a framework, which I call the bias dynamics model, for correcting 
measures of effectiveness in accordance with evidence on the effects of meta-biases. By employing 
this model, measures of effectiveness can be attenuated using empirical bias coefficients representing 
the effects of meta-biases. The bias dynamics model, and its use of bias coefficients, is appealing for 
at least two reasons. First, it has the potential to fill a gap in current evidence-based medicine 
guidelines, which emphasize the risks of methodological biases. In line with this, I argue that 
organizations like the Cochrane Group should publish regularly updated Second, bias coefficients 
provide a straightforward way for researchers to use up-to-date evidence to generate more accurate 
estimations of medical effectiveness. 
Finally, I briefly outlined a provisional research program for determining bias coefficients. 
Extending on the work of Tabatabaei Ghomi and Stegenga (n.d.), I argue that simulations of patient-
level data based on empirical results in published work can be used to measure the effect of meta-
biases in clinical research. This proposal is in keeping with current trends in the relatively nascent 
field of meta-research. Such simulations should use evidence about the prevalence of meta-biases in 
specific subdomains of medicine to determine their effects on specific outcomes. The simulated 
results can then be used to generate bias coefficients for that area of medicine, which can be 




Medical Artificial Intelligence: What is 
Interpretability? 
5.1 Introduction 
Two sets of conceptual problems have gained prominence in theoretical engagements with artificial 
neural networks (ANNs). The first is whether ANNs are explainable, and, if they are, what it means 
to explain their outputs. The second is what it means for an ANN to be interpretable. In this 
Chapter, I argue that ANNs are, in one sense, already explainable and propose a novel theory of 
interpretability. 
These issues often arise in discussions of medical AI systems (MAIS), where reliance on artificial 
decision making in medical contexts could have serious consequences. There is evidence that some 
of these systems have superior diagnostic and predictive capabilities when compared to human 
experts (Esteva et al. 2017; Fleming 2018; Rajpurkar et al. 2017; Tschandl et al. 2019). Indeed, many 
MAIS are already deployed in the clinic, including algorithms aimed at diagnosing retinal disease 
(De Fauw et al. 2018), and breast cancer treatment recommendations (Somashekhar et al. 2018) and 
screening (McKinney et al. 2020). For some, accomplishments like these are a precursor to the 
promising incorporation of machine learning (ML) into effective medical decision making (Wiens 
and Shenoy 2018). However, others have noted problems facing MAIS, including vulnerabilities to 
nefariously motivated adversarial attacks by various stakeholders in the healthcare system (Finlayson 
et al. 2019) and algorithmic racial biases in the prediction of future health care needs due to objective 
functions and training procedures (Obermeyer et al. 2019). 
These problems have led to calls for MAIS, and ANNs in general, to be explainable—that is, if 
an ANN makes a recommendation, there should be an explanation for its decision (Athey 2017; 
Aler Tubella et al. 2019). In the context of healthcare, motivated by the need to justify artificial 
decisions to patients, some argue that maximizing the benefits of MAIS requires that their outputs 
be explainable (Watson et al. 2019). Others argue that having explainable MAIS makes it easier to 
recognize and remedy algorithmic rules which lead to inaccurate outputs (Caruana et al. 2015). On 
this view, having an explanation allows us to evaluate a MAIS’ recommendations, which some argue 
is necessary for assessing the trustworthiness of such systems (see Ribeiro et al. 2016; Mittelstadt et 
al. 2019). 
Issues of explainability have become problematic due to the prominent view that the accuracy 
of an AI system trades off against its explainability. Call this the Accuracy-Explainability (AE) trade-
off (Gunning 2017; London 2019). Many of the problems MAIS are designed to solve are 
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complicated enough that achieving a high degree of accuracy requires highly complex ANNs. This, 
together with the assumption that highly complex ANNs are “less explainable,” leads to the peculiar 
reasoning that if an AI system being more accurate entails low explainability, and if low 
explainability entails an inability to assess trustworthiness, then a highly accurate AI system entails 
an inability to assess trustworthiness. However, this strikes as unintuitive since, presumably, 
accuracy should count towards trustworthiness. 
There are three common strategies for dealing with this problem. Some argue that simplicity 
should be favored over accuracy when developing MAIS (Adkins 2017; Athey 2017). Others claim 
that we simply need to develop ways of increasing explainability (Gunning 2017). And for some, 
there is no problem at all since either we face similar issues when dealing with human decision makers 
(London 2019; Zerilli et al. 2019) or because simpler models may sometimes achieve the same degree 
of accuracy as more complex algorithms for the same task (Rudin 2019). Yet, all these approaches 
turn on what we mean by explanation and what features make explanations “good” or “fitting” for 
a given account. The literature on ANNs in general, and MAIS in particular, often makes use of the 
concepts of explainability, understandability and interpretability, but offer little critical engagement 
and contain persistent disagreement on the definitions of these terms (Lipton 2018; Krishnan 2019). 
Moreover, a central problem plaguing the ML literature is the conflation of these concepts: 
Explainability and understandability are typically treated as if they are synonymous with 
interpretability. 
Several philosophers have analyzed these concepts more carefully. Zednik (2019), for instance, 
offers a pragmatic account of opacity to provide a normative framework detailing different kinds of 
knowledge that ought to be required by different stakeholders. Explanations, on this view, are the 
basis for how such knowledge is acquired. Creel’s (2020) account of transparency aims at 
illuminating recent successes in reducing algorithmic opacity and providing AI-explanations. 
Krishnan (2019) argues that pursuing definitions of interpretability, and related terms like 
explainability and understandability, is misguided because doing so reduces solutions to opacity-
related problems to merely finding ways to make ANNs more transparent. Her claim that there are 
other solutions to these problems, while compelling, does not entail that defining interpretability in 
the context of ANNs should be wholly abandoned, particularly given the apparent conflation of 
terms. Páez (2019) recommends that focus should be shifted from explanation to understanding, 
arguing that traditional explanations of opaque systems are impossible and that understanding can 
be acquired by other means which do not require such explanations. Such strategies, Páez argues, 
exist in ML in the form of interpretive models aimed at understanding how an ANN functions, and 
post hoc interpretability aimed at understanding individual decisions. Taken together these 
accounts go some way to establishing interpretability as an important concept in its own right and 
its use within ML. However, none provide an explicit account of the term or how it should be used 
in analyses of ANNs. 
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The first aim in this Chapter is to clearly set the concepts of explainability, understandability, 
and interpretability apart. The explosion of different notions of ‘explanation’ in the context of AI 
has reinvented the wheel; philosophers of science have been developing notions of scientific 
explanation for nearly a century. I begin, in Section 5.2, by outlining four prominent accounts of 
explanation—the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New 
Mechanist models—and argue that increasing the complexity of an explanation for some 
phenomenon does not make the phenomenon any less explainable. Then, in contrast to Páez’s 
(2019) claim that traditional explanations of ANNs are impossible, I argue in Section 5.3.1 that the 
four accounts I outlined in Section 5.2 indeed apply to neural networks, as they would to any 
scientific phenomenon. In this sense there is no AE trade-off. The source of much confusion within 
the literature is the conflation of the notions of explainability, understandability, and interpretability 
in cases where they are not interchangeable. Many claims within and surrounding the ML literature 
are explicitly lodged as calls for “explainability”, when it is the understandability of existing 
explanations that should be at issue. In Section 5.3.2, I briefly unpack the relationship between 
understanding and explanation, demonstrating that it is understanding that is defeasible by 
increasing complexity. 
I then provide an explicit account of interpretability and offer a typology of interpretation 
methods in Section 5.4. I argue that interpretation is a relation between two explanations. During 
the process of interpretation, one explanation gives rise to a more understandable explanation. As 
with explanation, there are varieties of interpretation: Total or Partial, Global or Local, and 
Approximative or Isomorphic. This account of interpretability is consistent with many uses within 
AI, in keeping with philosophy of explanation and understanding, and provided with special 
attention to the accuracy-complexity relationship in MAIS. 
5.2 The Indefeasibility of Explanation 
In aiming for explainable AI (XAI) we ought to work with well-theorized conceptions of 
explanation. There are many accounts of scientific explanation; here, I employ those most germane 
to the problem of separating out “interpretability” as a special epistemic activity. While the recent 
uses of concepts of ‘interpretability’ and ‘interpretation’ are variously and sometimes inconsistently 
defined (see Section 5.4), “explanation” has a far longer and more rigorous conceptual history. 
Philosophers have reflected on the nature of explanation since before Socrates, but the modern 
discussion began in the late 1940s with Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). 
I focus on the four models of explanation that have received the most significant attention: The 
Deductive Nomological model; the Inductive Statistical model; the Casual Mechanical model; and, 
more recently, the New Mechanist model. In this section, I briefly outline each of these models and 
then argue that explanations of each variety are indefeasible to complexity; that is, increasing the 
complexity of a phenomenon does not make it any less explainable. Establishing the indefeasibility 
of explanation is the first step to recognizing that the alleged trade-off between accuracy 
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(complexity) of ANNs and their explainability is misguided. Conceiving of this trade-off in terms of 
explainability has led to confusion in the debates surrounding interpretability and trust in MAIS.  
5.2.1 Four Kinds of Explanation 
Each model of explanation has the same broad structure. An explanation consists of an 
explanandum—the phenomenon being explained—an explanans—the elements of the explanation 
doing the explaining—and some process of explanation connecting the explanans to the 
explanandum (see Figure 5.1). 
For Deductive Nomological (DN) explanation in particular, a successful explanation must 
satisfy two conditions (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1965). First, the process of 
explanation must take the form of a sound deductive argument. Second, the explanans must have an 
essential nomic premise, i.e., at least one law of nature or law-like proposition without which the 
deduction would be invalid (see Figure 5.2). For example, the movement of a steel bearing on a flat 
table can be explained using the law, “all ferrous metals are physically attracted to magnetic fields” 
in conjunction with the fact that magnet has been brought close to the bearing. 
 
While the DN model is good for illustrating the explanation of phenomena which result from 
deterministic laws, it does not capture the characteristics of probabilistic events. In response to this, 
Hempel (1965) introduced Inductive Statistical (IS) explanation. IS explanation involves the 
inference of an individual event from a statistical law and empirical information about the event (see 
Figure 5.2). For example, the increased probability of having breast cancer given a mutated BRCA1 
gene in conjunction with a particular patient having a mutated BRCA1 gene explains the patient 
having breast cancer. Here, the relation between the explanandum and the explanans is inductive 
because all that can be inferred from the information given is there being a higher or lower 
probability that the patient has breast cancer. If the probability of having breast cancer given that 
the patient has a mutated BRCA1 gene were lower, then even if the patient has breast cancer, this 
Figure 5.1. The general structure of explanation. 
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information cannot be used to explain it. The basic idea then is that the success of an IS explanation 
depends on whether the explanans entails a higher probability of the explanandum obtaining.  
 
Two decades after Hempel’s work on the DN and IS models, Salmon (1984) proposed the 
Causal Mechanical (CM) model, which he claims highlights the central role of causation in 
explanation.30 The idea behind the CM model is that explanation involves showing how the 
explanandum fits into the causal structure of the world. There are two important aspects of 
causation which feature in CM explanations. The most basic of these, a causal process, is the ability 
to transfer a mark or its own physical structure in a spatiotemporally continuous way. An example 
of this would be the movement of sound waves through air, or the movement of a particle through 
space. The second, a causal interaction, occurs when causal processes interact with one another 
resulting in a modified structure. Examples include sound wave interference, or the collision of 
particles. A successful CM explanation involves citing some parts of the causal processes and causal 
interactions which lead to the phenomenon in question (see Figure 5.3). We might, for instance, 
explain the phenomenon of noise cancellation by citing the existence of two sound waves, one with 
inverted phase to the other (the causal processes) interfering with one another (the causal 
interaction). 
A cluster of views of explanation has recently emerged, all termed New Mechanist (NM). These 
views all center on the idea that providing a mechanism is important for explanation, and originate 
largely from the work of Machamer et al. (2000), Bechtel (2011), and Craver and Darden (2013). 
The idea behind NM accounts is that providing an explanation involves showing how some 
 
30 Prior to this, Salmon (1971) proposed his statistical relevance model of explanation. Although we do not cover it here, 
it is worth noting that he does not wholly abandon the notion of statistical relevance, but rather claims that one typically 
acquires information about statistically relevant relations before providing a CM explanation. 
Figure 5.2. The structures of DN and IS explanation. 
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phenomena arise from a collection of entities and activities (see Figure 5.3).31 A successful 
explanation involves identifying the entities and activities that bring about a phenomenon with 
regularity and without gaps, missing entities or activities. For example, an explanation of protein 
synthesis will need to identify the entities involved (ribosomes, aminoacyl-tRNAs, mRNAs, GTP, 
etc.) and the activities (binding of mRNA to the ribosome, hydrolysis of GTP, translocation of 
mRNA within the ribosome, etc.), which are typically depicted in the form of a mechanistic diagram 
of the sort familiar from textbook mechanisms. A mechanism also includes two special collections 
of entities and activities, the initial or “set-up” and the final or “termination” conditions, in this case 
the binding of mRNA to the ribosome and the final release of a synthesized protein respectively. 
However, to better describe biological mechanisms exhibiting cyclic organizations, some argue that 
such conditions are not necessary for mechanistic explanations (Bechtel 2011). Yet, since ANNs are 
never cyclic, Machamer et al.’s characterization of mechanisms is apt for explaining such systems. 
Moreover, when ANNs are recurrent, the pathways can always be unrolled and mechanistically 
depicted.  
 
There are several criticisms of the accounts of explanation described above (see Salmon 1989; 
Skillings 2015; Godfrey-Smith 2016). While I do not have the space to engage with all of these, there 
are two that may have implications for the arguments that follow, and are thus worth addressing. 
First, it may be argued that some of the typically cited challenges facing DN, IS, and CM 
explanations, such as explanatory asymmetry and explanatory irrelevance, are the result of disregard 
for, or inadequate treatment of the role of causation in explanation (Woodward 2003). Woodward’s 
(2003) causal-interventionist account of explanation, according to which successful explanations 
 
31 As Levy (2013) notes, advocates of the explanatory value of mechanisms are “fairly coy” (p. 102) about defining the 
key notions, a matter further complicated by a lack of universal terminology. E.g., sometimes “parts” are discussed 
instead of “entities” (Bechtel 2006). However, for present purposes only the outlines of the NM approach are required. 
Figure 5.3. The structures of CM and NM explanation. 
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exhibit patterns of counterfactual dependence, may help deal with these issues, particularly when it 
comes to the problem of explanatory relevance. Since I argue in Section 5.3 that ANNs are 
explainable using the traditional models described above, it may be argued that our account of 
interpretability could inherit some of these issues. I agree that the causal-interventionist account may 
be useful for solving some questions about explainability, understandability, and interpretability in 
AI (Páez 2019). Indeed, I describe interpretability processes in Section 5.4.3 some of which result in 
understandable explanations which include counterfactual information, however, the causal-
interventionist account includes pragmatic elements that we maintain should not count against a 
phenomenon’s explainability, namely that an explanation should be “deeper or more satisfying” 
(Woodward 2003: 190) than those provided by DN, IS, or CM explanations. Of course, I agree that 
some explanations can be more preferable than others given some explanatory virtue, such as 
simplicity, but we disagree that such virtues should be considered when evaluating the explainability 
of a phenomenon. 
Second, proponents of the ontic conception of explanation, according to which explanations 
are physical composites of the entities being represented, may argue that the characterization of NM 
explanation above is misguided. Explanations, on this view, are not depictions or representations of 
the mechanisms which constitute the phenomenon, but rather physical entities themselves which 
actively contribute to the causal structure of the world. Accordingly, there is “no question of 
explanations being ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ or ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ They just are.” (Craver 2007: 27). The ontic 
conception supports my position regarding the indefeasibility of explanation below. It does so, 
however, in a problematic way. On a strongly ontic conception of explanation, there is an objective 
explanation of ANNs, provided only that there are ANNs. Since there are ANNs, they would be 
automatically objectively explainable on this conception of NM. But this purchases the 
indefeasibility thesis at the cost of relevance to issues of explainability in ML. Calls for XAI are not, 
to my mind, calls for objective explanations. 
I agree with Craver (2007) that what makes something an explanation is not some set of 
pragmatic conditions such as whether it produces understanding, or whether it is a “good” 
explanation because it satisfies some set of explanatory virtues, but rather whether it accurately maps 
onto the world via any one of the explanation processes outlined above. My concern with 
explanations and use of the concept of explanation are with “explanatory texts” (Craver 2007), that 
is, how explanations are given by scientists, ML researchers in particular. Nonetheless, the rejection 
of the involvement of pragmatic conditions does not entail or require the strong ontic thesis above. 
Even if one finds an explanation undesirable because it does not satisfy some particular set of 
explanatory virtues or pragmatic conditions, that does not make it any less an explanation. And if 
there is an explanation for a given phenomenon, then that phenomenon is explainable. 
5.2.2 The Indefeasability Thesis 
Unfortunately, the well-developed typology of explanation described above is largely neglected in 
discussions of explainability in neural networks. Those who argue for the inverse relationship 
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between complexity and explainability for ANNs have overlooked an important feature of 
explanation as it is understood above: its indefeasibility. They often treat complex MAIS as though 
they had outgrown their explainability, but this is not quite right. In fact, the explainability of a 
phenomenon— such as the output of an AI system—depends only on the relationships between 
our background theories and evidence, and the procedures of the explanation process used. In other 
words, in each of the accounts of explanation introduced above, the features that make something 
an explanation turn out to be invariant with respect to the complexity of both the explanans and the 
explanandum. What the considerations in this subsection illustrate is the following indefeasibility 
thesis for explanation of the phenomena characteristic of ANNs: Adding complexity to the 
explanation of the phenomenon does not entail that the phenomenon is any less explainable. 
This is not a claim about the quality, superiority, or goodness of a given explanation. The 
concern is whether increasing the complexity of a given explanation makes it no longer an 
explanation. While increasing complexity may reduce the quality of the explanation, by making it 
less preferable or understandable (see Section 5.3.2), or even in some cases make it a bad explanation, 
it does not make it any less an explanation, and thus the explainability of the phenomenon of interest 
is unaffected. Let me clarify this position by looking at each kind of explanation in turn. 
Consider a DN explanation of some phenomenon beginning with a simple explanans, a set of 
law-like premises L and empirical observations E, that concludes with the explanandum/description 
of a phenomenon x after a valid deduction. What makes this a DN explanation is just that the 
explanandum is reached deductively using an explanans that is partially law-like. Now consider what 
happens if we expand the explanans to include more premises, which are consistent with our best 
background theories and evidence, say by substituting one of the law-like premises for a set of n laws 
jointly entailing it. This may make the explanans less manageable or more difficult to understand, 
but we still have a DN explanation. That is, if x follows deductively from L + E, then it also follows 
from L* = {L1 + L2 +...+Ln} + E, where L1-n are (complexity-increasing) laws which, taken together, 
entail L. The expansion of the explanans does not make its laws any less law-like nor its conclusion 
any less deductively valid. Put another way, the explanandum is no less explainable, since the 
connection to the explanans, no matter complexity, is still deduction. 
We might also increase the complexity of a DN explanation by substituting the empirical 
observations with a more complex set of observations, say by describing them at a more concrete 
level of abstraction, or with more accuracy. To account for how these observations play a role in 
explaining the phenomenon of interest, we may require a more complex set of laws. Suppose we have 
the explanans L + E as before, and consider some more complex set of true laws L* and/or more 
complex set of empirical observations E* from which x follows. Since L* is a set of laws (or at least 
law-like propositions), and E* is a set of empirical observations, the deduction of x from this (more 
complex) pair constitutes a DN explanation of x. As above, the explainability of x does not depend 
on the complexity of its explanans, but on whether the relationship between explanans and 
explanandum is deductive. To illustrate, consider the example of the steel bearing moving on the flat 
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table from before. We might increase the complexity of the explanation by noting more empirical 
observations, such as the initial distance of the magnet from the bearing, surface friction forces, and 
so on. Or we may explain the movement of the steel bearing by using more detailed laws including 
those governing the total induced magnitude of force on the ferromagnetic material’s volume, and 
laws of motion, among others. These laws, taken together, entail that ferrous metals are attracted to 
magnetic fields. While this more complex explanation may be more difficult to understand and is by 
most accounts less appealing than the simpler one, it is still a DN explanation for the movement of 
the steel bearing on the flat table. 
Importantly, not all ways of changing an explanans are only additions of complexity, some 
changes affect the quality of the explanation produced. For example, we might change a satisfying 
DN explanation of the dissolution of salt to append adjunct claims about the dissolution of “hexed 
salt” (see Kyburg; Salmon 1989). In doing so, we included irrelevant information, since the hexing 
presumably plays no part in the dissolving of salt. However, we do not defeat a DN explanation by 
conjoining it with adjunct, irrelevant premises—though perhaps we worsen it markedly. Note, if we 
had changed the explanans to say only that “all and only hexed salt dissolves” and removed claims 
that “all salt dissolves,” then we would have failed to provide a DN explanation—since that 
assumption is inconsistent with our best background theories and evidence. That sort of change is 
not an addition of complexity, it is a substitution of logically distinct premises. Moreover, the 
complexity introduced in highly accurate ANNs is not irrelevant in this way; there is no worry that 
explainability is defeated by magical or irrelevant suppositions about complex MAIS. 
The situation is somewhat different for IS explanations. Suppose we have an IS explanation of 
some phenomenon starting with statistical laws S and empirical facts E and ending with some 
inductively inferred conclusion as its explanandum, which might be some particular outcome x or a 
probability of such an outcome P(x ) = p (see Woodward 1989, 2019). Now assume we discover that 
some other statistical laws or empirical facts C are relevant to the phenomenon in question. Notice 
that additional statistical laws or empirical facts will, under certain conditions, affect (the probability 
of) the explanandum. However, our aim is not to show that increasing the complexity of the 
explanans does not affect the support for the explanandum. That is, if x follows inductively from S 
+ E with support p (or P(x ) = p follows inductively from S + E), then x follows inductively from S 
+ E + C with support p ± c (or P(x ) = p ± c follows inductively from S + E + C).32 What is important 
here is that despite increased complexity, the process of explanation is the same, so the relationship 
between the explanans and explanandum remains one we are happy to call explanation. Of course, 
the explanandum may thereafter be explained with low probability, making the explanation less 
“successful” or “good,” but not making the explanandum less explainable by the inductive process 
of IS explanation. 
 
32 There are cases where the addition of an empirical fact may lead to a deductive explanation, for our purpose we can 
treat this as a trivial case of inductive explanation, where the probability is zero or one. 
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Similarly, increasing the complexity of the explanans in CM explanations does not make the 
explanandum any less explainable. Consider a CM explanation which appeals to a particular set of 
causal processes P and set of causal interactions I which together bring about phenomenon x . We 
might discover additional causal processes and/or causal interactions, which are relevant to x (say by 
uncovering finer grained details about the particular causal process) such that a more complex set of 
causal processes P* and/or set of causal interactions I* together bring about x. While these new sets 
of causal features may make the explanation harder to follow, they do not make the CM explanation 
any less an explanation than before. In other words, just because P* + I* is more complex than P + I, 
does not make x any less explainable by the former than it is by the latter. Similarly, for an NM 
explanation. Such an explanation will depict relevant entities E and activities A as responsible for the 
phenomenon x in question. While the discovery of additional entities E* and/or activities A* may 
make the explanation of x less intelligible, it does not make the phenomenon any less explainable 
than before. Complex mechanisms are mechanisms no less. 
Indeed, there may be system dynamics of some phenomena, such as a high degree of 
stochasticity (Skillings 2015; Godfrey-Smith 2016), that make the discovery and articulation of 
mechanisms or causal processes difficult, or proposed mechanisms dissatisfying. Nonetheless, 
granted some existing mechanism or process, adding complexity to it in the form of entities and 
activities, even stochastic activities, does not destroy the mechanism. Similarly, some may worry that 
complex ANNs are nondecomposable, which is to say, they are impossible to (mechanistically) 
explain because they are so hierarchically complex that we cannot assume that the interactions 
between the relevant entities and their activities can be described linearly (see Bechtel and 
Richardson 2010). However, even if concerns surrounding nondecomposability are warranted in 
other domains, they do not apply to ANNs since such systems, as we argue below, can be described 
in NM terms. 
Together, these considerations establish the indefeasibility thesis as stated above. One may justly 
worry that this thesis has been bought at too hefty a price, since they are asked to admit many “bad” 
or “dissatisfying” cases as explanations. In part, this is just the price of doing science, where many 
explanations, perhaps even many we find good or satisfying today, turn out not to live up to the 
standards of good explanation. Of particular interest in this connection is when an explanation is 
deemed bad or dissatisfying because it does not produce understanding. Happily, some of the 
procedures of science in general and ML in particular aim directly at remedying this by producing 
better or more satisfying explanations from those less so. I describe and explicate these procedures in 
the context of ML below (Sections 5.4.1–5.4.4), collectively under the heading of interpretability 
methods. Some of these bad explanations are remedied in the course of good science. For now, I turn 
to the specifics of applying these varieties of explanation to MAIS, confident that the complexity 
added to MAIS is immaterial to explainability, even if dissatisfying. 
 
98 
5.3 The Explanation in the Machine: Medical AI Systems 
Having established the indefeasibility of explanation, we can apply it to the explainability of MAIS. 
In this section, I argue that even extremely complex MAIS can be explained using each of the models 
of explanation outlined above. That is to say, we are always able to generate an explanation of an AI 
model based on particular features of the model itself. The upshot here is that the AE trade-off 
problem is in fact not one of explainability—we do have access to explanations of MAIS. Each 
account of explanation applies to ANNs as it would to any other scientific phenomenon of interest, 
what differs is our capacity to understand these explanations. The precise problem is the difficultly 
of understanding the explanations of complex ANNs. This is because, in contrast to explanation, 
understanding is defeasible. The AE trade-off problem should therefore strictly be cast as an issue of 
providing understanding of complex AI systems. Conveniently, a plausible solution to this problem 
has already been proposed: interpretability. A further problem, however, is that there is little 
agreement over exactly what interpretability is, an issue I deal with in Section 5.4. 
5.3.1 Medical AI Systems Are Explainable 
It is possible to explain MAIS using each of the four models outlined above. What follows are 
explanation-sketches (see Hempel 1965) of how ANNs can be explained using each model. To 
illustrate, take a recent deep learning MAIS, developed by MIT and MGH researchers, which is 
designed to identify and assess dense breast tissue, an independent risk factor for breast cancer. An 
associated study shows that this system closely matches the reliability of expert radiologists in 
evaluating breast tissue density and that the MAIS has been successfully deployed in a clinic setting 
(Lehman et al. 2019). It is built on a ResNet-18 convolutional neural network (CNN) used for 
computer vision tasks.33  The model was trained and tested using a dataset of 58,894 randomly 
selected mammograms from 39,272 women between January 2009 and May 2011. Of these, 41,479 
were used for training and 8,977 for testing. In the testing phase, the MAIS matched with expert 
assessment at 77% across a standard Breast Imaging Reporting and Data System (BI-RADS), which 
categorizes tissue in four ways: fatty, scattered, heterogenous, and dense. In binary tests, either dense 
or non-dense tissue, the model matched expert assessments at 87%. Subsequently, the MAIS was 
deployed for testing in a clinical setting at MGH and performed well, matching with expert 
assessments across all four BI-RADS categories at 90% and at 94% for binary tests. The basic idea is 
that the MAIS takes inputted images and outputs a classification according to categories for breast 
cancer risk. 
To understand how this MAIS can be explained, we must know a little about its system 
architecture. The ResNet-18 consists of 18 layers. The first 17 layers are all convolution layers, and 
 
33 A CNN is an ANN particularly adept at detecting patterns in images. It uses convolutional layers to split an image up 
into overlapping tiles, which are then analyzed for learned patterns before the signal is outputted to subsequent layers 
(see Goodfellow et al. 2016, Chapter 9). 
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the last is a fully connected network. This type of ANN model is most commonly used to classify 
images—it takes an image and outputs a classification.34 This is done by feeding the image to the 
ANN’s input layer as a set of numbers which then get processed through the ANNs weighted nodes 
and edges and outputted as a vector of real numbers. Typically, the image will then be assigned to 
the most probable class. 
The DN model can be used to explain any particular image classification produced by this 
MAIS. A DN explanation of how the MAIS assesses an input image involves listing the weights 
attached to each and every node and the informational routes indicated by each and every edge at 
every convolution stage, and the weights of the fully connected network along with the assigned 
numerical values being fed into the input layer and the network architecture. Once we have that, we 
can list the values for the classifications the MAIS learned in the training and testing phases of 
development, and see that its classification of the image is based on comparing the ranges of these 
classifications with the output value of the image. In doing so, we are explaining the explanandum—
here, the MAIS classifying of image I  as classification c—using an explanans consisting of a law-like 
premises—in this case, how the weights of all relevant nodes and edges produced the output value, 
along with the law that an output is assigned to the most probable class—and additional information 
about I—which includes the set of input values assigned to I, and the output value c. 
While the DN model gives us an explanation of specific classifications, the IS model can help 
explain the probability that the MAIS’s classifications are accurate. Broadly, the accuracy of the 
outputs of ANNs can be explained by appealing to details about the training process as statistical 
laws and the nature of the training data used as empirical information.35 If these, taken together, 
inductively entail a probability that the ANN’s outputs are accurate, then we have successfully 
explained the accuracy of the ANN’s outputs. In the case of the MAIS above, we can explain its high 
degree of accuracy, here the matching with expert assessments, by citing the training procedure and 
details about the mammogram image dataset used. 
For CM explanations of ANNs, we would cite the causal processes and causal interactions 
involved. This would entail describing the ANN using oft-used terms of art, drawing on biological 
analogies. ANNs are constituted by connected nodes, sometimes referred to as artificial neurons 
that, like biological neurons, receive and send information, or signals, via connections resembling 
biological synapses, termed edges. Signals are typically approximations of real numbers that, when 
received by nodes as inputs, are processed using some non-linear function of their weighted sum, 
and sent as outputs to other nodes. Nodes typically have weights (and biases), which are tuned when 
the ANN is trained. These weights control the strength of output signals and can, in the case of 
 
34 While we use an example of a diagnostic MAIS, viz. a classifier, our arguments apply to ANNs designed for other goals, 
such as automated planning and personalized recommendations. 
35 Karimi et al. (2020) deploy an approach that allows assessment of the classifications of ANNs on the basis of causal 
information associated with the generation of training data. Provided such causal information is obtained by statistical 
assessment of the target for MAIS classification, it can figure in either IS or CM explanations of ANN accuracy. 
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nodes with thresholds, determine whether a signal is sent at all. The nodes in ANNs are typically 
organized into layers, which can perform different tasks by processing their inputs in different ways. 
Two layers are special: the input layer where information is fed into the ANN and the output layer 
which returns a result. Typically, each of the output nodes provides a probability that the input 
belongs to a particular class. The connections between nodes are essentially functions of the data 
that is fed into them. Information is fed into the input layer and passes through the different layers 
until it reaches the output layer, producing a classification. This sort of description can be applied 
to particular ANNs like the MAIS above. Feeding the mammogram image into the input layer of 
the ResNet-18 and the convolutional operations of each layer are causal processes, while the signals 
sent between the different nodes and layers are causal interactions. These causal processes and 
interactions lead to the output of the MAIS. 
For NM explanations of ANNs one has a choice between levels. We can explain the 
phenomenon of classification at a high level of abstraction, including in our mechanism only the 
coarse input-output depiction of an ANN; at the level of the abstraction of nodes, signals, and edges; 
or delve into the details of a mechanistic explanation at the level of the hardware circuitry involved 
in computation. Jacobson (1959), for example, shows how circuit-board diagrams generally can be 
abstracted into simpler networks of nodes and connecting edges, and the same process can, in 
principle, apply to any ANN. A circuit or hardware-level mechanistic depiction requires specifying 
the relevant entities and activities involved and depicting how their arrangement and 
interconnection results in the computation of a classification output from inputted image data. 
Arguably though, this sort of reduction to electrical signals and processes of computation is not the 
ideal level of mechanistic explanation. Machamer et al. describe the importance of selecting the right 
level of explanation in terms of “bottoming out” of mechanisms—describing mechanisms typically 
ends at a level “accepted as relatively fundamental or taken as unproblematic” (2000: 13) by a given 
discipline. In the context of explaining MAIS classification, we can presumably treat hardware 
processes as elementary and focus on ANN architecture. At least, until there is some indication that 
features of MAIS classification turn on lower-level mechanisms, the explanation ends there. 
Just as with CM explanation above, the essential features of an NM explanation relevant to 
MAIS will involve identifying entities (nodes and layers) and activities (signaling, input and output), 
start-up conditions (input data and configuration of the network) and termination conditions 
(output of and thresholds for classification), the essentials of which are described above. Indeed, 
there may also be “higher level” mechanistic explanations, which identify more intuitive activities of 
specific layers or nodes, and these might be more easily “understood” or “visualized” than the 
mechanistic depiction of the architecture of ANNs (see Section 5.4.1, and Lipton (2018) on 
decomposability). But the existence of higher-level explanations does not prevent NM explanation 
of MAIS at the level of ANNs themselves. 
It is important to distinguish between whether a mechanism is satisfactory or good at some level 
of abstraction, and whether it is a genuine NM explanation. There is justifiable concern about 
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whether a given NM explanation of an ANN is a good one, particularly when that ANN itself is 
treated as a model of some other phenomena we are interested in explaining (e.g., the mammalian 
neocortex, see Buckner 2019). But the provision of an NM explanation must of course precede 
assessment of its quality. Moreover, MAIS are in some ways actually simpler than the usual targets 
for NM explanations—biological neurons—since the NM explanations of MAIS in their current 
form need not account for chemical or analogue features of artificial neurons. 
The above discussion illustrates that explanations of ANNs are available to us. The AE trade-
off, posed as an issue of “explainability” as it commonly is in ML literature, is therefore not as 
problematic as one might think. 
It is worth considering a possible challenge to this position. Some have argued that the 
traditional accounts of explanation outlined above are incomplete because they do not take 
pragmatic elements into account (e.g., van Fraassen 1980; Achinstein 1983). For instance, it has been 
suggested that explanations are only good or successful when they provide understanding, and that 
explanations should exhibit a proper relationship to their audience (Potochnik 2016). 
Consequently, some may contend that my view of explanation fails to adequately account for the 
context or subject for which a given explanation is intended. According to this objection, the 
explanations of ANNs provided by the traditional models outlined above should not really be 
considered explanations at all since they do not guarantee understanding of the outputs given to us 
by AI systems. While my position is bound to be contentious to some ML researchers and 
philosophers favoring pragmatic accounts of explanation, there are several reasons for preferring it 
over such accounts—particularly in efforts to disentangle interpretability from explainability. 
First, my view is compatible with widely accepted pluralism about explanation. Pragmatic 
accounts are also pluralist, but part of the pragmatist argument against traditional accounts is that 
these assume some overarching account of explanation which covers all contexts, but this is 
misguided. When explaining ANNs, we can use the account most suited to our given aims. That is, 
when providing explanations of these traditional sorts, we can account for features of explanatory 
contexts without adopting a pragmatic account of explanation itself.  
Second, these traditional models of explanation share a common structure (Figure 5.1) that is 
helpful in defining interpretation. Indeed, since pragmatists do not dispute this common structure 
but add to it, the general features of the proposed account of interpretation are adaptable to 
pragmatic accounts of explanation. Only, they will need to employ more conceptual machinery than 
necessary to provide an analogous account of interpretability. 
Third, and most important, one of the aims of this Chapter is to argue for the value of separating 
explanation and understanding in the context of XAI. That is not to say that these concepts are 
wholly separate. In the next subsection, I contend, in line with much recent work in philosophy of 
understanding, that explanation and understanding are indeed related, just not as strictly as many 
ML researchers and proponents of pragmatic accounts think. Further to this, setting these notions 
apart demonstrates that the problem of complexity really lies in its tendency to trade off against 
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understandability. This is crucial to developing an account of interpretability which successfully 
describes many of the methods used by many ML researchers for increasing understanding of 
ANNs. 
5.3.2 Separating Explanation and Understanding 
Before developing an account of interpretability, it is worth parsing part of the relationship between 
explanation and understanding. There has recently been a surge of philosophical interest in the 
concept of understanding (see de Regt et al. 2009; Strevens 2011, 2013; Potochnik 2016; de Regt 
2017; Khalifa 2017). Although a full characterization of the concept is well beyond the scope of this 
Chapter, these existing accounts illuminate the important differences between understanding and 
explanation that illustrate the defeasibility of understanding. 
Some contemporary accounts of science affect somewhat of a revolution by switching focus 
from explanation to understanding. Because of this, some may be tempted to align them with the 
pragmatic notions of explanation referred to previously. Common to these accounts, however, are 
the claims that (1) understanding necessarily involves having an explanation and (2) understanding 
demands satisfying some other condition(s) which are not dependent on the qualities of the 
explanation alone.36 Though, there is little consensus about what these other conditions are. Most 
agree with Potochnik (2016) that this will involve some relationship between the explanation and 
the explainer or audience, but disagree about what relationship is required. For instance, de Regt 
argues that, “A phenomenon P is understood scientifically if and only if there is an explanation of P 
that is based on an intelligible theory T and conforms to the basic epistemic values of empirical 
adequacy and internal consistency” (2017: 93, my emphasis). Strevens (2013) argues that 
understanding involves “grasping” a correct scientific explanation and characterizes this in terms of 
possessing a particular psychological state. Khalifa (2017) agrees that one understands a 
phenomenon to the extent that they “grasp” an “explanatory nexus”, adding that grasping refers to 
a cognitive state resembling scientific knowledge. 
In stating that an explanation is necessary for understanding, condition (1) above helps illustrate 
the untenability of the claim that if something fails to give rise to understanding, then it is not an 
explanation. Accepting, in line with much current work on understanding, that (1) is true amounts 
to accepting that if you understand some phenomenon then you can explain it, or contrapositively 
that if you cannot explain some phenomenon then you do not understand it. It would be false to 
conclude from (1) that if you do not understand some phenomenon then you cannot explain it. 
Simply put, you can explain things you cannot understand—doing just this is a part of the learning 
process and perhaps a psychological preliminary to understanding generally—you just cannot 
understand things you cannot explain. 
 
36 A notable exception is Lipton (2009), who argues that we can have understanding without explanation. However 
others, including Strevens (2013) and Khalifa (2017), have disputed this. 
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Where explanation and understanding are set apart is in terms of (2). Whatever particular view 
of understanding one may prefer—whether it is “grasping,” “intelligibility,” “apprehending,” or 
“knowing”—it is, at least in part, subjective or contextual. The intelligibility of a scientific theory, 
which is necessary for understanding in de Regt’s account, is by his own lights dependent on a 
scientist’s being able to “recognize the qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without 
performing exact calculations” (2017: 102; also see de Regt and Dieks 2005). What this means is that 
intelligibility, and thus understanding, partially relies on subjective features of the individual who is 
trying to understand the phenomenon in question. For both Khalifa and Strevens, grasping an 
explanation, and thus whether a given explanation actually provides understanding, will turn on 
psychological features specific to the user of that explanation, for example, on features of the 
scientist, engineer, doctor or patient. Plainly, what is understandable to Mandy might not be to Paul; 
what is understandable to the engineer of an ANN may not be to a radiologist or the person using a 
MAIS. 
Taken together, (1) and (2) show two things: First, the pragmatic objection to the explainability 
of ANNs is misguided, thus strengthening the argument that explainability is guaranteed by the sorts 
of things that appear in the explanans and their relationship to the explanandum. That is why 
explainability is indefeasible by increasing complexity: The properties of the explanans and 
relationship to the explanandum remain the same come whatever complexity. 
Second, because one’s understanding is conditional on subjective features (whether 
psychological, cognitive, or contextual), it is not impervious to complexity. The capacity to 
understand varies between individuals and is sensitive to the complexity of both the explanans and 
the process of relating it to some explanandum, phenomenon. Understanding, in contrast to 
explanation, is defeasible. If ANNs are strictly speaking explainable but often those explanations are 
not understandable, then what is needed is methods for making those explanations more 
understandable. This is precisely the reason that we need to move beyond mere individual 
explanations to interpretation. 
5.4 Interpretability 
Much confusion in the debate about, and push for, XAI can be attributed to a conflation of 
explainability and interpretability. Interpretation has been devised and variously defined within the 
sciences themselves (Ribeiro et al. 2016; Mittelstadt et al. 2019; Lipton 2018; Krishnan 2019; Páez 
2019). Philosophers and scientists are not at fault for misunderstanding the scientific notion of 
interpretation since there is no single such notion on which to rely. Indeed, interpretability is often 
connected directly with explanation and understanding, although by way of unhelpful equation or 
equivocation. Lipton (2018) says of interpretability that it “reflects several distinct concepts,” which 
is to say that it is used inconsistently, or at best equivocally. Indeed some, like Miller (2019, 8), are 
happy to accept equating interpretability with explainability. In contrast, I argue that it is best to set 
these concepts apart. I begin with an account of interpretation, from which an account of 
interpretability follows straightforwardly as the ability to provide an interpretation. 
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5.4.1 What is Interpretation? 
Fundamentally, interpretation is something that one does to an explanation to make it more 
understandable. When we do not find an explanation understandable, we ask for it to be interpreted. 
We can also talk of “interpreting data,” “interpreting a phenomenon,” or “interpreting an ANN” 
but when these do not mean precisely the same thing as “explaining data,” “explaining a 
phenomenon,” or “explaining an ANN” then these uses are derivative of the notion of 
interpretability proposed here. To “interpret data” is to do something to an explanation of/involving 
data; to interpret an ANN is to do something to an explanation of/involving the ANN. An 
interpretation is also something that is performed on each essential part of an explanation: one 
interprets an explanans, process of explanation, and explanandum.37 An interpretation then gives 
rise to another explanation, by one or a combination of the current techniques of XAI, or 
interpretability methods detailed below (Sections 5.4.2–5.4.4). Finally, when successful, an 
interpretation gives rise to an explanation that is, in some way or another, more understandable than 
the explanation we began with. 
Take the example of the breast tissue classifier from before: We might start with a traditional 
explanation, such as a DN explanation, of a particular output from the MAIS. Given the complexity 
of such an explanation, it may be extremely difficult to understand for most users; thus, one may ask 
for a more understandable explanation. We can then apply one of the interpretability methods with 
the aim of producing a new, more understandable explanation. To generate such understanding, 
one might restrict an explanation to only that information pertaining to how an individual patient 
was classified (local interpretation Section 5.4.3 below). In doing so, we obtain a new explanation 
from the old, although one presumably less complex—since localized to a single case—and ideally 
thereby more understandable. 
Terminology about interpretation methods often differs without changing the overall concept. 
Zednik, for example, identifies several techniques to “render opaque computing systems 
transparent” (2019: 8), such as input heatmapping and feature-detector visualization. Insofar as 
transparency involves production of explanations that are more understandable, these are simply 
cases of interpretation (specifically local and approximate interpretation Sections 5.4.3–5.4.4). 
Watson and Floridi (2020) offer a formal framework, which they refer to as an “explanation game,” 
by which proposed explanations are scored on three properties: Accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. 
Accuracy refers to how precisely the explanation models the ANN’s processes from input to output. 
Simplicity is equated with the understandability of the explanation for a given stakeholder. And 
relevance refers to whether the elements cited in the explanation are indeed responsible for the 
output being explained. On this view, the goal of interpretable machine learning is to provide 
explanations that maximize the balance between accuracy, simplicity, and relevance. Given that the 
 
37 Although in real cases, many of these components of interpretation may be implicit or trivial, i.e., one may leave the 
explanandum unaffected (see Section 5.4.2 below on partial interpretations). 
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explanation game aims at producing explanations that are more understandable for a given user, I 
take this framework to be describing cases of interpretation (specifically total and approximate 
interpretation Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.4). Indeed, that there is something like a connection to the 
production of greater understanding is perhaps the only consistent feature across accounts of 
interpretability on offer. 
Lipton (2018) and Krishnan (2019) make it clear that the notion of interpretability is often 
undefined or presumed intuitive and implicit by scientists and engineers. The choice to characterize 
interpretation at the level of explanations themselves is in part an attempt to remedy this by 
providing a workable definition of the process of interpretation. Furthermore, the view of 
interpretation proposed in this Chapter does capture some of the popular formulations of the 
notion offered within the ML community. This account of interpretation attempts to strike a 
balance between consistency with, and unification of, scientific usage. 
Consider the view of Ribeiro et al. on the explanation of ANNs: “An essential criterion for 
explanations is that they must be interpretable, i.e., provide qualitative understanding between the 
input variables and the response” (2016: 1136). One way to read this is as asserting that 
interpretability is merely synonymous with understandability; another is to see it as a special case. If 
an explanation is already understandable, then surely it is interpretable, since it gives rise to an 
understandable explanation (itself), trivially. But, as we have noted, not all interpretable explanations 
themselves provide understanding—qualitative or otherwise. For that, we may have to wait for an 
explanation to be interpreted and to give rise to another explanation capable of providing the 
understanding lacking from the first.  
It is helpful to put this view of interpretation in vernacular like that used to discuss the general 
structure of explanation (Figure 5.1). While in explanation the explanandum is some phenomena, 
diagram, or sentence asserting or describing a phenomenon, in interpretation the thing being 
interpreted, the interpretandum, is an explanation we begin with and that we find difficult to 
understand. Likewise, while in explanation the explanans is a set of propositions which together 
explain the explanandum, in an interpretation, the interpretans also is an explanation (perhaps 
conjoined with some additional premises or observations) provided with the intention of being more 
easily understood. Overall, to provide an interpretation is to show how the interpretans relates to the 
interpretandum via the process of interpretation (Figure 5.4).  
Given this general structure of interpretation, we can then begin to classify interpretation 
strategies and methods. In the remainder of this section, I outline a preliminary classification of 
interpretation methods with special attention given to their application within MAIS. For instance, 
the interpretans might be shown by the process of interpretation to be an approximation of the 
interpretandum, it might be isomorphic to (but more familiar than) the interpretandum, or it might 
match the interpretandum only locally, within a narrower range of explananda we find more easily 




5.4.2 Total and Partial Interpretation 
As noted above, both the interpretans and the interpretandum are explanations; each consists of an 
explanans, explanation process, and explanandum. A case of total interpretation is one in which the 
interpretans is totally different from the interpretandum. In other words, one in which the 
explanans, explanation process, and explanandum contained in the former differ in some way from 
the explanans, explanation process, and explanandum in the latter. For example, consider a simple 
substitution of variables. Suppose we have an explanation, derived from an ANN in a medical 
context, that mentions some variable v in each essential part, the explanandum itself being some 
claim about v, e.g., that it is relevant to breast tissue classification. Coming to this explanation 
without background information about the meaning of v, we might likewise not understand the 
meaning of the explanandum. But supposing we are allowed to provide such a meaning by further 
investigating the set-up of the MAIS, e.g., v = radiologically white tissue, we can construct a new 
explanation that specifies this meaning in place of v in every essential part, thus changing every part 
of the explanation. Here, the replacement of “v ” by “radiologically white tissue” in every part of an 
explanation, thereby generating a new explanation without “v ” is a process of total interpretation. 
The new explanation, for example, will not explain that “v ” is relevant to breast tissue classification, 
but rather that the presence of radiologically white tissue is relevant to breast tissue classification.38 
Often, when we fail to understand an explanation of some phenomenon x, we want to interpret this 
explanation to provide understanding, but still want to obtain an explanation of x. In such cases, 
what we want is to “adduce” an interpretans, the explanandum of which is identical to the 
explanandum of the interpretandum (diagrammed in the triangular Figure 5.5, a special case of 
Figure 5.4). That is, we can sometimes provide a partial  interpretation by showing how one 
 
38 It should be noted that replacing variables everywhere in an explanation also changes the process of explanation. If, 
for example, the explanation was DN, the change of variables will change the content of the deduction of the 
explanandum from the explanans. 
Figure 5.4. The structure of total interpretation. 
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explanans arises from another, by some process of interpretation, itself providing some explanation 
of the very same explanandum. Put another way, a partial interpretation is just a re-explanation of 
the same explanandum, equipped with a relationship between the new explanans and the old. 
 
This type of interpretation is often what is aimed for early on in efforts to generate 
understandable explanations, since the desiderata of the initial explanation of x  is understanding of 
x  and remains so after the demand for interpretation. Indeed, another sort of partial interpretation 
involves interpreting only the process of explanation itself. Suppose we are given a DN explanation 
where the process of explanation, the deduction, is too complicated or long to be held in mind—
consider any explanation which requires a mathematical proof that relies on outsourcing steps to a 
computer, such as Gonthier’s (2005) proof of the four color problem. Here the aim is not to adduce 
any new explanans or explanandum, these are fixed, but to find some new process of explanation, 
e.g., a more simple or succinct deduction. This case is diagrammed in Figure 5.6.  
Failing a partial interpretation, we may aim to provide a total interpretation. But this 
immediately raises a problem: what should the relationship between two explanations be such that 
I come to better understand one by coming to understand the other? If I aim to understand x  but 
its explanation E  is unintelligible to me, and I am given a total interpretation such that a second 
explanation E ′ explains x ′ , then there ought to be a special relationship between E and E ′ if the latter 
is to provide any understanding whatever about x .  
Another way to put the problem of relating different explananda in a total interpretation is by 
asking what sorts of relationships between phenomena are relevant to scientific explanation: Similar 
phenomena can sometimes figure in explanations with the same overall structure. For example, 
explanations of tissue classifications based on radiological whiteness can inform explanations of 
classifications based on tissue density. Provided we have some justification for substituting 
radiological whiteness for tissue density, explanations on the basis of radiological whiteness can be 
totally interpreted by those referring to tissue density instead. The hope being that tissue density 
provides some understanding that radiological whiteness does not. Of course, the similarity of two 
Figure 5.5. A partial interpretation wherein the explanandum 
remains the same in both the interpretans and interpretandum. 
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phenomena does not imply  that there should be any understanding gained about one via 
explanation of the other—understanding is too psychologically contingent for this—but such 
relationships are, methodologically, good places to begin the search for understanding.  
 
In the context of formal explanations, where our concern is not phenomena themselves but the 
diagrams or descriptions thereof, these observations manifest as strategies or methodologies of 
interpretation. That is, we can further classify total interpretations according to whether the 
interpretans and interpretandum are related by approximation or by isomorphism—e.g., if E 
approximates E ′, then we have some reason to think that E ′ can provide understanding about x . 
These two cases are detailed below, but since both of these methods come in “local” and “global” 
forms, we address these notions first. 
5.4.3 Local and Global Interpretation 
The ML literature is replete with claims about “local” explanation and interpretability (see Ribeiro 
et al. 2016, 2018; Doshi-Velez and Kim 2017; Adebayo et al. 2018) that, given the accounts of 
explanation favored among philosophers, are liable to confuse. This is because the accounts of 
explanation are classified according to the nature of their explanans (laws of nature/statistical 
laws/entities and activities) and the process of explanation (deduction/induction/depiction), while 
the designation of an interpretation as “local” is a comparative property of explananda. To our 
minds the distinction between local and global interpretations is best captured as follows. 
Considering a pair of explanations E and E ′, with respective explananda D and D ′, E ′ is local relative 
to E if and only if D ′ is a subset of D. There are many methods of doing this current in ML, however, 
common to all is the identification of such a subset. 
Consider for a common example the Universal Law of Gravitation (ULG ), which states that 
the force of gravitation between any two objects is equal to the product of their masses over the 
square of the distance between them times the gravitational constant. We can use this law in 
Figure 5.6. A partial interpretation wherein the process of 
interpretation used results in a new process of explanation for an 
explanans and explanandum. 
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conjunction with a set of observations (O ) about the masses and distances separating each planet in 
our solar system to explain (or predict) the force that would (absent other interactions) attract every 
pair of planets (G ). Take this to be an explanation E : ULG + O → G. If we restrict ourselves to 
explaining only the forces between each planet and earth (L ), we may likewise restrict the ULG to 
the following Earthly Law of Gravitation (ELG ): the forces of gravitation between Earth and any 
other body is equal to the gravitational constant on earth times the mass of the body over the square 
of the distance of that body from earth. Note that inclusion of explananda can arise due to 
implication between explanans’. In this case, ULG  implies ELG  but not vice versa, and this gives 
rise to an explanation E ′ : ELG  + O  → L . Finally, since L  is a subset of G , E ′ is local relative to E . 
In the context of ML, a function-based example is also illuminating. Consider the ANN which 
has learned to output the absolute value of its inputs. A (DN) explanation of the output of this 
ANN will consist of the statement of the functional “law” together with some input “observations,” 
these being the explanans, concluding with the statement of the output as explanandum. This can 
essentially be seen as the function h (x ) = |x |, giving the explanation E : “h (x ) = |x |” + “O = {xi  = 
−1, xi +1 = 1, ...}” → “D = {xi = | − 1|, xi +1 = |1|, ...}.” Another explanation that only explains the 
outputs of positive inputs could likewise restrict the function h(x) to x > 0, which is essentially the 
same as the function f (x) = x, giving the explanation E ′ : “f (x ) = x ” + “O = {xi  = −1, xi +1  = 1, ...}” 
→ “D ′ = {xi +1  = 1, ...}.” Since D ′ is a subset of D, we conclude that E ′ is local relative to E. Here, to 
“adduce” a local explanation involved recognizing that h (x )|x > 0 = f (x )|x > 0 = x , and while in practice 
applications of constructing local explanations are surely more complex than this, they each share 
this general theme: once we have decided to explain a sub-set of our explanandum, we can sometimes 
make this work by adducing a restriction on our explanans—one intended to make the new 
explanation more understandable. Thus far we have just described “locality” as a comparative 
property of explanations and based entirely on the inclusion of explananda. In practice, we usually 
start with one complex explanation, and wish to interpret it, i.e., provide another, more 
understandable explanation. One way to achieve this is to localize the explanation by adducing 
another explanation that is local with respect to the explanation we began with. Many methods in 
ML (e.g., LIME, SHAP) identify this local subset of D by defining a geometric measure of distance 
between input values and building a model (e.g., a sparse linear model or shallow tree, Section 5.4.4) 
that approximates the more global model in the environment of a particular input, as defined by this 
distance metric. Once we have an explanation in hand (the interpretans) given by the locally trained 
model, we can check to see that indeed it is local (by the process of interpretation) relative to our 
starting explanation (the interpretandum). The process of interpretation in such cases is showing 
that the explanans of the interpretans is somehow restricted from the explanans of the 
interpretandum and demonstrating that the explanandum of the interpretans is included in that of 
the interpretandum. 
In the case of ANNs, our adduction of a restriction on the explanans amounts to a restriction 
on the inputs to that ANN in essentially the same manner as described for ordinary functional 
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restrictions. In the most extreme cases of local interpretation we move to an explanation of a single 
data point, a single classification. And in that somewhat trivializing case, an explanation of the 
classification of the input can be reduced to a selection of features of the input that most affect the 
output; such local interpretations provide counterfactual information about which features of the 
input, if intervened upon, would change the output. For example, local interpretation methods in 
MAIS often identify the particular pixels, present in an input image, that most affect the 
classification output (Páez 2019; Zednik 2019; see also Ribeiro et al. 2016). In practice, methods for 
interpretation of predictions of machine learning algorithms often approximate the explanation, in 
addition to localizing it to a given datum, as examined in the following section. 
5.4.4 Interpretation by Approximation or Isomorphism 
When an explanation is too complex to be understandable to its user, a possible solution is to 
interpret the explanation by providing another, similar yet more understandable explanation. In 
general, measuring similarity depends on a prior choice of some features to compare—mice may be 
similar to humans with respect to the efficacy of some medication, but not similar in eloquence. In 
the context of MAIS, an ANN can be thought of as a highly non-linear function f (x ). 
Approximating the ANN predictions would entail providing a (more understandable) function 
g (x ), such that the outputs of f (x ) and g (x ) are similar on some metric; for example, the square 
deviation, ʃ x (f (x ) − g (x ))2. When an ANN appears in some explanation, this approximation can 
successfully figure in the process of interpretation precisely when we expect g (x ) to be more 
understandable than f (x ). 
Many people find linear functions and decision trees more understandable than ANNs. Indeed, 
methods for interpretation of ANNs often aim to provide g (x ) that is either linear or tree-like, 
despite what some see as scant justification that these models really are any more understandable 
(Lipton 2018). Still, some studies illustrate that sparse rule lists and linear models fare well for 
human-interpretability (Lage et al. 2019; Narayanan et al. 2018). Distillation methods work by 
training one model to approximate the predictions given by another, and can be done either globally 
or locally. 
Linear models are used to provide local explanations. While linear models are not flexible 
enough to globally approximate a neural network, they can provide adequate accuracy when the 
explanandum is small, such as a single prediction. For this purpose, various methods have been 
developed that attempt to determine the set of features that are important to explaining the output 
of a given prediction (Ribeiro et al. 2016; Mishra et al. 2017; Lundberg and Lee 2017; J. Chen et al. 
2018). These methods essentially localize the explanation of an ANN prediction to a small 
neighborhood around a specific prediction (this being the new explanandum) and approximate this 
localized explanation. For example, for the ANN described above for the prediction of dense breast 
tissue, while a global explanation of what makes tissue dense might be too complex to understand, 
an explanation of approximately which pixels in a given mammogram led to it being classified as 
dense may be simple enough to be understood by visual inspection. 
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Since linear models are often not flexible enough to provide sufficient global approximations, 
global ANN distillation in particular involves using decision trees as the approximating model. 
When trees are more understandable, distillations are thereby a method of interpretation by 
approximation. Trees and ANNs both have quite a strong property as approximators. Both are 
universal approximators, meaning that they can approximate any continuous function to an 
arbitrary degree of accuracy (Hornik et al. 1989). Since ANNs are continuous functions, decision 
trees can therefore approximate neural networks to any accuracy. 
The process of distilling a neural network into a tree involves generating input data and using 
ANNs to get a prediction, then training a decision tree on the sets of input-output pairs given by the 
ANN. One can always generate as much data as needed to achieve a desired level of similarity 
between the model outputs. Nonetheless, despite the prima facie understandability of small trees as 
compared to networks, in practice the distillation of useful ANNs tends to result in very large trees 
(Frosst and Hinton 2017). 
Here we are faced with the understandability-accuracy trade-off, since one can also sacrifice 
accuracy of a tree distillation by reducing or fixing its size or depth (Zhou et al. 2018), thereby 
presumably purchasing some understandability at the expense of accuracy. Though we may gain 
some traction of understanding by initially approximating an ANN, the upshot of this is that, as we 
increase the accuracy of the approximating model, we wash out any understanding gained by 
approximation itself and are left only with whatever advantage is offered by modelling (nearly) the 
same process in a different sort of model. When we interpret some explanans that includes an ANN 
into another including a tree, which approximates the first to an arbitrary degree, we have, in a way, 
gone beyond approximation into interpretation by isomorphism. 
Since understanding has a psychological component, it has some mathematically not well-
behaved properties. For one, understanding is not isomorphism invariant. That is, if I understand a, 
the fact that a is isomorphic to b does not imply that I understand b. Intuitively, my understanding 
of some statement of English does not imply anything about my understanding of equivalent 
sentences in another language. This is because our understanding can turn on features of the specific 
presentation of some notion and the background knowledge of the user of the explanation. 
Nonetheless, the converse of this has been put to use as a method of interpretation. Indeed, if I do 
not understand a, I may still understand some isomorphic b (due perhaps to my familiarity with 
constructions in the language of b). 
Perhaps the ubiquity of trees and tree-like structures in our everyday experience explains the 
prevalence of tree distillations in ML; their familiarity evidently leads to the idea that they will be 
understandable, and that may indeed be a reasonable assumption to make. Nonetheless, there is a 
very wide range of types of models that can universally approximate, or are genuinely isomorphic to, 
ANNs. Candidate alternative universal approximators include fuzzy systems (Zadeh 1965; Wang 
1992; Kosko 1994; Castro 1995; Yen et al., 1998, cf. Klement et al. 1999); Neural ODEs (R. Chen 
et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2019; and references therein) and nearest-neighbor methods (Cover and Hart 
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1967; Stone 1977). When we have reason to believe that any of these alternative models are “more 
understandable” than ANNs, we thereby have reason to make use of these isomorphic models to 
provide an interpretans, i.e., an explanation using the alternative model within its explanans, to serve 
the same role that the ANN served in the interpretandum. 
5.5 Interpretation and Understanding 
Up until this point, I have made the case for the explainability of ANNs and MAIS and argued that 
ML researchers have resources for interpretation which allow them to produce more understandable 
explanations of AI systems’ outputs. It may be argued that what is really at stake in discussions about 
the opaque nature of ML models is not about complexity, but rather about the human capacity to 
understand, in a particular way, why certain outputs were generated. To clarify, an ANN is trained 
on some set of data, and it discovers some patterns and associations in the data that are important 
for making accurate recommendations. While the discovered associations and patterns may be 
articulated in terms of weightings in the ANN, no human can really understand the reasons why 
those weightings are generated by the model. In contrast, other similarly complex machinery, such 
as rockets that carry astronauts into orbit or early computerized chess engines, were developed using 
human knowledge. Because these complex machines were developed with existing human 
knowledge, there are at least some humans who can understand them. Where ML models, in a sense, 
make decisions based on their own discoveries, other complex machines are developed using human 
knowledge. So, ML models discover features that are useful in making decisions, but, because these 
features were not the result of human discovery or based on human knowledge, the kind of 
understanding we gain from the kinds of explanations generated by interpretations is impossible to 
evaluate. It may be inferred that the account of interpretation provided here does little to solve this 
problem.   
The above concerns may be unpacked with the distinction between objectual understanding 
and explanatory understanding (Kvanvig 2009). Objectual understanding can be characterized in 
the following way: One objectually understands an explanation if they grasp that its explanans entails 
or is probabilistically or causally relevant to its explanandum. Put another way, the person has that-
understanding. It seems that interpretations, as they are presented here, provide this sort of 
understanding—it makes it clear to the subject that the original explanation’s explanans bears some 
relation to its explanandum, be it deductive, probabilistic, or causal. Take our running example, the 
MAIS which classifies breast tissue. By approximating which values in the input layer of the neural 
network led to tissue being classified as dense, all we seem to be doing is illustrating that these values 
are probabilistically relevant to the tissue being dense. Understanding that there is a probabilistic 
relation between the values and the classification, it may be argued, is not useful for evaluating the 
MAIS’ output.  
However, what we want to understand is why the tissue was classified as dense. Not only would 
this allow us to assess the trustworthiness of the output, but also be able to provide patients with 
some sort of narrative regarding why the diagnosis was generated by the MAIS. Of course, it is not 
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the case that MAIS decisions and recommendations have sole jurisdiction over diagnoses, prognoses, 
and predictions in the clinic, but since they factor into such judgements, explaining the reasons why 
their outputs should be taken seriously is crucial. This sort of understanding is explanatory 
understanding: One explanatorily understands an explanation occurs if they grasp why the 
explanans entails or is probabilistically or causally relevant to its explanandum (see Kvanvig 2009). 
Put another way, the person has why-understanding. Interpretations of ANNs, as they are presented 
here, do not seem to provide this type of understanding.  
It has been argued, however, that objectual understanding can be reduced to explanatory 
understanding. Here, Khalifa (2017) suggests that particular cases of objectual understanding can be 
matched to a corresponding explanatory understanding. Correspondingly, we may be able to reduce 
the objectual understanding provided by AI-interpretation to the explanatory understanding we 
seek. For example (abstracting much detail), the interpretation of the tissue classifier MAIS above 
approximates the input layer values which led to the output classification. These values, however, 
correspond to pixels in the mammogram image in question. We can thus translate the values such 
that we the parts of the mammogram image which led to the categorization can be identified.  
Indeed, just these kinds of strategies, such as saliency methods (Adebayo et al. 2018), are being 
increasingly investigated in ML research. 
A more thorough analysis of the reduction of objectual understanding provided by 
interpretations of ANNs to explanatory understanding is beyond the scope of this Chapter, but the 
upshot is this: After an interpretation is performed, it may be possible to obtain explanatory 
understanding from the objectual understanding provided by the interpretation. However, it should 
be noted that this relies on having objectual understanding in the first place, which in turn relies on 
successfully interpreting ANNs. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Conceiving of explanation according to those accounts offered within the philosophy of science 
disentangles the accuracy-explainability trade-off problem in AI, and in doing so, deflates the 
apparently paradoxical relationship between trust and accuracy which seems to plague debates in 
medical AI and the ML literature. If it is simply that explainability is required for trust, there is no 
cause for worry, since highly accurate (and potentially complex) MAIS are just as explainable as 
simple ones. I resolve this issue by using clearly defined accounts of explanation, and demarcating 
notions of explanation from understanding and interpretation. The account of interpretation 
provided here is explicitly positioned as distinct from accounts of explanation, while making clear 
the connection that both have to understanding.  
While explanation is a well-theorized notion within the theory and philosophy of science, 
“interpretation” and a corresponding notion of “interpretability” are not (see Lipton 2018). I have 
attempted to synthesize a notion of scientific “interpretability,” from cases where it was not used 
synonymously with either “explainability” or “understandability.” This was done to provide a 
theoretical framework that generalizes the methods scientists and ML researchers often use for the 
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purpose of interpretation, and to help remedy this lacuna within the ML literature in particular and 
the neglect of inter-explanatory relationships in philosophy of explanation broadly speaking. In the 
context of MAIS, there never really was a problem explaining artificial networks. Rather, the 
problem has always been understanding the explanations that were available, and our account of 
interpretation shows why. 
Interpretation is a process taking one explanation to another, more understandable explanation. 
Understandability is at least partly psychological, depending not only on the phenomenon or its 
explanation but also on the user of the explanation. Identifying the elements of explanations that 
make them understandable broadly speaking is an active research topic in the social sciences (Miller 
2019), but beyond the scope of a theory of interpretation as such. Just as de Regt (2017) says we 
need a general theory of understanding that is independent of our specific accounts of explanation, 
we require a general theory of interpretation that is independent of both. The framework I provide 
can thereby only be employed once we have made some theoretical choices about what features of 
explanations indeed provide understanding, without which the success of an interpretation cannot 
be assessed. 
The ubiquitous presumption that only simple and/or linear models are “understandable” is 
liable to limit the potential scope of scientific interpretation; the use of non-linear and complex 
models should not be excluded at the outset. It seems a large part of the stress on the point of 
explainability in discussions of ANNs and MAIS boils down to an insistence that they be 
understandable to a non-specific and correspondingly broad audience of clinicians, patients, and 
possibly the general public. With such a diverse audience of users of explanations, perhaps simplicity 
is the only proxy for understandability, and persistent demands for “explainable” ANNs are 
reducible to demands for simple and potentially correspondingly weak MAIS. We can move away 
from this tendency to simplicity by demanding that ANNs be interpretable in the sense defined here. 
That is, by demanding that we find ways to convert explanations that are not understood into those 
that are more understandable in a user-relative way. That way, we might keep many complex and 
thus strong MAIS while achieving broad understandability by, counter-intuitively, adding further 





This dissertation has explored several conceptual and methodological features related to predicting 
the effectiveness of medical interventions. While I do not defend any explicit overarching thesis, the 
arguments presented here are primarily motivated by concerns over how conclusions about the 
general capacity of medical interventions can be improved. There is much room for progress in this 
regard. As I have illustrated throughout the dissertation, important concepts can be conflated, 
clinical methods are commonly exploited, significant forms of evidence are often left out of 
therapeutic predictions, and emphasis is placed on ineffective strategies for improving medical 
inferences. In this conclusion, I give a brief recap of each chapter and discuss two broad themes that 
have emerged from the project.  
Here is a summation of the key topics and claims from each chapter. In the Introduction, I 
provided a definition of medical effectiveness to work with throughout the rest of the dissertation. 
This definition was based on philosophical insights from Cartwright (2009; 2012) and Stegenga 
(2018). I characterized medical effectiveness as a claim about an intervention’s capacity to prevent 
or modulate the physiological dysfunction or disvalued state of a disease generally or in a target 
context.  
In Chapter 1, “A Pragmatic Approach to Disease Classification”, I clarified three prominent 
models of disease classification: the etiological, symptom-based, and pathophysiological models. I 
argued for a pragmatic approach to disease classification whereby one’s choice of model should be 
based on what is best suited for their aims, suggesting that the pathophysiological model should is 
most appropriate for the goal of predicting medical effectiveness.  
In Chapter 2, titled “Integrating Mechanistic Evidence for Inferring Medical Effectiveness”, I 
provided an informal approach for the systematic integration of mechanistic evidence with statistical 
evidence.  
Chapter 3, “P-hacking: Its Costs and When It Is Warranted” focused on the questionable 
research practice of p-hacking. I used philosophical tools from decision theory to articulate the 
prominent view that p-hacking is both epistemically and practically harmful. Using this framework 
allowed me to illustrate flaws in the standard argument against p-hacking. I then argued that there 
are scenarios in which practices which amount to p-hacking may be warranted.  
In Chapter 4, “Curb Your Effectiveness: Correcting for Meta-Biases in Therapeutic 
Prediction”, I argued estimations of medical effectiveness are liable to fail because of a particularly 
harmful set of biases, which I refer to as meta-biases. Such biases lead to systemic overestimations of 
medical effectiveness. I proposed the bias dynamics model as a solution to the problem of meta-
biases, arguing for the use of bias coefficients to correct estimated of medical effectiveness based on 
meta-research evidence about meta-biases.  
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Finally, in Chapter 5, titled “Medical Artificial Intelligence: What is Interpretability?”, I 
proposed a novel theory of AI-interpretability to help remedy confusion in discussions of AI models. 
The confusion, I argued, is due to widespread equivocation on the concepts of explainability, 
understandability, and interpretability in the literature. The theory of interpretability I proposed 
can help clarify the important relationships between these concepts.  
Three broad themes have emerged during the course of this project: the role of mechanisms and 
mechanistic evidence in medical inference; the importance of pragmatic considerations in clinical 
research methodology; and the links between values and epistemic concerns in medicine. These 
themes present promising avenues for future research in medical epistemology generally, and 
predicting medical effectiveness in particular.  
Starting with the least novel of these, I have at multiple points in the dissertation discussed the 
role of mechanisms and mechanistic evidence in medical inference. Take the arguments presented 
in Chapter 1 on disease classification. I argued that pathophysiological classifications of disease are 
often instrumental to predicting whether a particular treatment will be efficacious. This is because 
pathophysiological classifications give us information about the underlying mechanisms of a disease, 
and predicting medical effectiveness sometimes relies on understanding the underlying mechanisms 
of a given disease. In Chapter 2, I do some clarificatory work on the notion of mechanistic evidence 
as it appears in discussions about evidence and medical inference. And in Chapter 5, mechanisms 
play a central role in two models of explanation that may be used to provide interpretations of 
artificial neural networks.  
Since the first articulation of new mechanist philosophy by Bechtel and Richardson (1993), 
mechanisms have become a dominant feature of philosophy of science, especially in philosophy of 
biology and philosophy of medicine (Machamer et al. 2000; Glennan 2002; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005; Steel 2008; Levy 2013; Parkkinen et al. 2018; Marchionni and Reijula 2019). 
Despite its ubiquity in discussion about medical evidence, there is more work to be done. For 
instance, given the many calls for including mechanistic evidence in medical inference (e.g., 
Parkkinen et al. 2018), further exploration of techniques for amalgamating mechanistic evidence 
with other types of evidence is needed, much like that of Landes et al. (2018), De Pretis et al. (2019), 
and Park et al. (forthcoming). Such techniques, while promising, are still nascent in their 
development and applications. Moreover, there are extensive literatures on robustness in science 
(e.g., Weisberg 2006; Woodward 2006; Parkkinen 2016; Stegenga and Menon 2017) and evidence 
amalgamation (e.g., Stegenga 2013; Fletcher et al 2019; Holman 2019) which is relevant to debates 
about the role of mechanistic evidence in medicine.  
Another important set of concerns involves the question of whether mechanisms constitute a 
worthwhile ontological basis for medical epistemology. For example, one might argue that a process 
ontology, like that proposed by Whitehead (1929) and, more recently, Dupré (2020) could be 
helpful in medical science. Process ontology has primarily been proposed in philosophy of biology. 
On this view, our understanding of biology has been hindered by wrongly assuming that the world 
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is fundamentally composed of entities and their activities, i.e., mechanisms. Rather than adopting 
this such a substance ontology, the argument goes, we should think of the world as fundamentally 
composed of processes, i.e., just activities. What we think of as fixed entities are in fact momentary 
stabilities in a flux of processes. Given the reliance on mechanistic thinking in biomedical research, 
it stands to reason that the arguments for process ontology in biology apply to medicine too. Dupré 
for example, argues that germ theory, which is based on mechanistic thinking, has led to 
categorization microbes as “good, bad, or indifferent” (2020: 108). This, he argues, is untenable since 
there are cases such as bacteria that are necessary for a healthy digestive system causing critical disease 
in other parts of one’s body. Processual thinking, for Dupré, can help by moving us away from seeing 
microbes as entities with intrinsic properties. There is more room for research on how mechanistic 
thinking and processual thinking stack up against one another in medicine.  
A second theme that has emerged in this dissertation is the role of pragmatic considerations in 
medical research. Most of the arguments made here are based on what works best for the goal of 
predicting medical effectiveness, or what is useful for medical inference, or understanding. A stark 
example of this comes in Chapter 1, where I argue for a pragmatic approach to disease classification. 
However, I gesture toward this sort of thinking in the other chapters of the dissertation too. In 
Chapter 2, for instance, I suggest that one important practical consideration when deciding between 
using a mathematical evidence amalgamation technique or a systematic evidence amalgamation 
technique is whether we have access to either quantitative or qualitative information about the 
relevant features of the study and target populations in question. What is more, different 
stakeholders often have varied capacity to understand how we arrive at specific conclusions. Policy 
decision makers, for example, may not be as well-versed in the quantitative techniques of medical 
research, and many individuals in the public even less so. The explanations we provide for the ways 
in which we infer conclusions using varied evidence should be catered according to audience. This 
pragmatic consideration features in Chapter 5 as well. Interpreting artificial neural network 
outcomes involves deriving an understandable explanation from one we find difficult to understand. 
Interpretability is geared toward pragmatics about explaining artificial intelligence models. And in 
Chapter 3, I argue that we should consider the practicalities of a situation when deciding whether p-
hacking is warranted. The same can be said of other questionable research practices, such as 
hypothesizing after results are known and data fishing. Finally, in Chapter 4, there are pragmatic 
elements to proposing that the bias dynamics model make use of evidence about meta-biases, not 
methodological biases. Methodological biases are typically difficult to detect and when we do find 
evidence for them, there is often disagreement about their effects on the quality of evidence.  
Most, if not all, the features related to predicting medical effectiveness, and indeed most areas 
of medical epistemology, can be linked to pragmatic factors. Medicine is, after all, a practical 
endeavor. Given this, one might argue that pragmatic considerations are a necessary element for 
successful medical inference. There is an opportunity to develop an entire research program on the 
topic of medical pragmatism. Such a project would unpack the relevant pragmatic features of 
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medical reasoning, outlining tensions between each, and provide an account of how to navigate these 
various features in pursuit of reliable medical inference. One upshot of medical pragmatism, so 
construed, is that medical inference should be articulated as a multifaceted process involving, among 
other things deeply pragmatic considerations, and not, as it is often characterized by proponents of 
EBM, something that follows a strict set of principles.  
The last theme to emerge from the discussions in this dissertation, and one that is inextricably 
tied to pragmatic considerations, involves the intersection of values and epistemic concerns in 
medicine, particularly with the use of medical AI systems. On explicit example of this comes in 
Chapter 3, where I appeal to the argument from inductive risk to highlight the role of value 
judgments in warranting the practice of p-hacking. I argue that p-hacking can be warranted in 
scenarios where there is urgent need for discovery, such as the onset of a global pandemic. Naturally, 
given that a primary aim of medicine is to prevent death and mitigate suffering, medical inference 
should be fraught with value-based judgements. The argument from inductive risk can be applied 
to claims over whether mechanistic evidence should be considered for causal inference in medicine 
(see Chapter 2). Abstracting much detail, one might argue that if the consequences of wrongly 
deploying an intervention were possibly sever, then we should aim to include available mechanistic 
evidence. For instance, given that the consequences of wrongly deploying efavirenz in the 
Zimbabwean context could have been (and in fact were) serious, the mechanistic evidence, which 
those involved knew existed, should have been considered. Of course, debates over the role of values 
in science are not new (cf. Rudner 1953; Douglas 2009; Betz 2013). However, in Chapter 5, the 
debates about explainability, understandability, and interpretability in AI are partially predicated on 
ethical and value-based considerations. Often, the reason we want to interpret an artificial neural 
network is because it can help explain the ethical concerns of medical AI in understandable ways, 
with the hope that we can resolve the issues.  
One such set of concerns centers on instances where using medical AI systems has led to 
unfairness and discrimination in clinical contexts. An example of this is an algorithm that is less likely 
to allocate resources to black patients than white patients who are equally sick (Rajkomar et al. 2018). 
Given such cases, several AI ethicists have argued that machine learning models, especially those 
intended for use in healthcare, should be designed with equitable outcomes in mind (Mittelstadt et 
al. 2016; Morley and Floridi 2020). This often requires that we be able to understand the AI models 
we use, something I discuss in the dissertation. There is more to be said about how understanding, 
related to ethical concerns, particularly in relation to medical equity.   
One important set of questions involve the kind of understanding we can acquire from AI-
interpretations. One potential problem here is that current interpretation processes seem to only 
provide objectual understanding of ML models. One objectually understands an explanation if they 
grasp that (part of) its explanans entails or is probabilistically or causally relevant to its explanandum 
(Kvanvig 2009). In other words, an objectually understandable explanation tells us that some 
numerical values in the model are relevant to the output or recommendation provided. 
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Approximating the predictions of a health resource allocation algorithm may help us understand 
that the numerical values connected to one’s income level are relevant to a particular resource 
allocation score. However, what we typically want to understand is why a patient received a certain 
resource allocation score. This is explanatory understanding : One explanatorily understands an 
explanation if they grasp why the explanans entails or is probabilistically or causally relevant to its 
explanandum (ibid.). Interpretations of algorithms may not be able to provide this type of 
understanding. More research is required on whether objectual understanding or explanatory 
understanding is better for preventing potential unfairness from using medical AI. Developing a 
deeper understanding of the links between the concepts of understanding and equity in AI is crucial 
to finding novel solutions to the challenges facing the evaluation of medical algorithms and 
mitigating unfair healthcare outcomes that may result from their use.  
These concluding remarks point to the need for more philosophical work on predicting the 
effectiveness of medical interventions. That being said, it is my hope that this dissertation has helped 
identify some of the key concerns underlying the roles of evidence, bias, and artificial intelligence in 




Appendix 1: The Expected Utility Principle 
The arguments I develop in Chapter 3 are based on the expected utility principle (EUP). The 
standard EUP states that an act a1 is preferable to another act a2  if and only if the expected utility of 
ai is greater than the expected utility of a2 . This is represented formally as follows: 
a1 ≻ a2 iff EU(a1) > EU(a2) 
This principle is best illustrated by example. Suppose Mandy has decided to get some writing 
done. The coffee shop she normally works at can sometimes be full which means there would not 
be a table for her, in which case she would have wasted valuable time in the trip there. She could stay 
at home and get an average amount of work done, but she would rather sit at the atmospheric coffee 
shop since it increases her productivity. Mandy is faced with a decision between going to the coffee 
shop or staying at home to write.   
 Space at coffee shop Coffee shop is full 
Go to the coffee shop Increased productivity Lose valuable time 
Stay home Average productivity Average productivity 
Table A 
Mandy’s decision can be formulated in terms of three kinds of entity: states, acts, and outcomes 
depicted in Table A. Let S = {s1 , s2 , … , sn } be the set of all states of the world out of the decision 
maker’s control. In the example, there are two states relevant to Mandy’s decision, there is space at 
the coffee shop (s1 ), or the coffee shop is full (s2 ). Let A = {a1 , a2 , … , an } be the set of acts the decision 
maker can choose from.  For simplicity, in the example Mandy has two relevant choices, either go to 
the coffee shop (a1 ) or stay home (a2 ). Outcomes are the consequences of a decision maker’s different 
acts that occur under different states of the world. For Mandy, there are three possible outcomes: 
Increased productivity (o1 ) from her going to the coffee shop when there is space for her to work; 
losing valuable writing time (o2 ) should she go to the coffee shop and find out it is full; and average 
productivity from her staying at home (the coffee shop being full or empty has no effect on her 
productivity here).   
According to EUP, making a decision here requires calculating the expected utility each act. 
The expected utility of an act ai is equal to the sum of the products of the utility of the outcome of 




                                                    (EU1) 
Applied to Mandy’ decision problem, the expected utility of going to the coffee shop would be 
the product of the utility of having increased productivity and the probability of there being space 
at the coffee shop, added to the product of the utility of losing valuable writing time and the 
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probability that the coffee shop is full. EU1 thus provides a weighted average of the values of the 
states given the decision maker’s acts, where the weights are the probabilities of the states. Using 
EUP, one can act according to how valuable the outcomes are to the decision maker. If the expected 
utility of going to the coffee shop is greater than that of staying home to work, then according to 
EUP, Mandy should go to the coffee shop. 
One problem with this definition of expected utility is that it ignores any connection that may 
exist between an act and a state. In other words, EU1 does not make room for cases where an act 
increases the probability of one possible state over others. Take the following example: Say that 
Mandy has now arrived at the coffee shop and found that there is space for her to work. She has a 
few projects on the go but knows that she is facing a deadline for a specific paper. Mandy could either 
work on this paper at while she is at the coffee shop or work on another project (i.e., not work on 
this paper). She reasons that she could work on that paper another time and possibly still meet her 
deadline and either she will meet her deadline, or she will not meet her deadline. Mandy faces the 
decision problem outlined in Table B. Given that the probability of her meeting the deadline is 
increased by working on her paper (and likewise the probability of her not meeting the deadline is 
increased by not working on the paper), the expected utilities of the acts would be affected by her 
choice. EU1 does not account for such cases.  
 Meet deadline Fail to meet deadline 
Work on paper o1 o2 
Do not work on paper o3 o4 
 Table B 
Given such instances, the probability of the state is usually interpreted as a conditional 
probability. This allows a rational decision maker to choose the act which if performed will most 
likely ensure that she achieve her desired outcomes. Such an interpretation replaces the probability 




                                                    (EU2) 
Here, P(sk |ai ) is the probability of state sk  given act ai  and is defined as P(sk ∩ ai)P(ai) . It measures the 
degree of confidence the decision maker would have in state sk  occurring if ai  were chosen. For 
Mandy, her working on the paper in question increases her confidence that she will meet her 
deadline, hence EU2 provides Mandy with a way to order her preferences over the choice to work or 
her paper or not. In Chapter 3, I use EU2 in my application of the expected utility principle.  
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Appendix 2: Outcome Measures 
In clinical trials, measures of efficacy are quantified as effect sizes using many available outcome 
measures. Outcomes can be continuous (such as total serum cholesterol level) or dichotomous (such 
as healthy cholesterol levels or unhealthy cholesterol levels). In this dissertation, for simplicity, I have 
focused on dichotomous outcomes. Dichotomous outcomes can be measured using either absolute 
or relative outcome measures. I describe the most prominent of these outcome measures below. 
Consider a trial that assesses whether the exposure to some intervention is correlated with a 
particular dichotomous outcome. The study set up is described in Table C, where OE, OC, NE, and 
NC with outcome O and no outcome N in the group receiving the treatment, (E for ‘experimental 
group’) and the group receiving either placebo or no treatment, C (for ‘control group’). TE, and TC 
are the total numbers of participants in the experimental and control groups respectively. 
 O N T 
Experimental Group OE NE TE 
Control Group OC NC TC 
Table C 
Commonly used relative outcome measures for dichotomous outcomes are relative risk (RR), 

























Commonly used absolute outcome measures for dichotomous outcomes include absolute risk 
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